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ABSTRACT
COMPREHENDING EACH OTHER:
WEAK RECIPROCITY AND PROCESSING
SEPTEMBER 2014
HELEN CHRISTA MAJEWSKI
B.A., Honours, UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Lyn Frazier

This dissertation looks at the question of how comprehenders get from an
underspecified semantic representation to a particular construal. Its focus is on
reciprocal sentences. Reciprocal sentences, like other plural sentences, are open
to a range of interpretations. Work on the semantics of plural predication
commonly assumes that this range of interpretations is due to cumulativity
(Krifka 1992): if predicates are inherently cumulative (Kratzer 2001), the logical
representations of plural sentences underspecify the interpretation (rather than
being ambiguous between various interpretations). The dissertation argues that
the processor makes use of a number of general preferences and principles in
getting from such underspecified semantic representations to particular
construals: principles of economy in mental representation, including a
preference for uniformity, and principles of natural grouping. It sees no need for
the processor to make use of a principle like the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis
(Dalrymple et al. 1998) in comprehending reciprocal sentences. Instead, they are
associated with cumulative semantic representations with truth conditions
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equivalent to Weak Reciprocity (Langendoen 1978), as in Dotlačil (2010).
Interpretations weaker than Weak Reciprocity (‘chain interpretations’) arise via a
process of pragmatic weakening. Interpretations stronger than Weak Reciprocity
may arise in different ways. Statives are seen as having special requirements
regarding the naturalness or ‘substantivity’ of pluralities (Kratzer 2001), and this
leads to stronger readings. In other cases, strong interpretations are favoured by
a preference for uniformity, which is taken to be a type of economy preference. It
is assumed that the processor need not commit to a fully spelled out construal,
but may build mental models of discourse that themselves underspecify the
relations that hold among individuals. While the dissertation’s focus is on
reciprocal sentences, the same principles and preferences are argued to be
involved in comprehending other plural sentences.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Reciprocal sentences can be used to describe a range of different scenarios.
Surprisingly, not all of these scenarios actually involve relations that hold
mutually. Consider the contrast between Brigid and Mackie adore each other and
The chairs are stacked on top of each other. The first sentence requires mutual
adoration, but the second does not – cannot – require mutual being-stacked-ontop-of. Some reciprocal sentences require that each individual described take
part in the relation with every other (Those five kids hate each other), but others are
satisfied if each of the individuals takes part with some other(s) (Those five kids are
sitting next to each other on the bench).
This raises the question: does each other contribute the same meaning in
each of these sentences? Semanticists have been puzzling over the range of
reciprocal interpretations for some time. Some contend that the different
interpretations are due to distinct grammatical representations: for instance, that
each other is ambiguous, or that non-overt operators in the grammatical
representation distinguish the various readings. An alternative view is that the
different interpretations arise from a single grammatical representation; on this
kind of view, the grammar leaves the details of the interpretation vague.
Work on the semantics of reciprocals has motivated the introduction of a
new semantic principle. In their 1998 paper, Dalrymple, Kanazawa, Kim,
Mchombo & Peters observe that despite the wide range of possible
interpretations, a particular reciprocal sentence uttered in a particular context
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does not seem to be ambiguous. Rather, it receives a single interpretation: the
strongest one available to it in that context. The strongest interpretation possible
for Those five kids hate each other is that each kid hates every other one of the kids.
But, given what we know about the world, such a strong interpretation is not
available for Those five kids are sitting next to each other on a bench. Humans only
have two sides, so each kid can at most sit next to two others. Dalrymple et al.
propose a new semantic principle: the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH).
They hold that the various reciprocal interpretations are distinct, due to
involving distinct versions of the reciprocal quantifier, and that the SMH is a
principle that selects from among the possible reciprocal meanings the
appropriate truth conditions for a given sentence and context. This has proved to
be an influential idea: most contemporary accounts of the semantics of
reciprocals make use of some version of the SMH.
This dissertation approaches the puzzle of reciprocal interpretations from
a psycholinguistic perspective. How does the language processor arrive at an
interpretation of a reciprocal sentence, given the range of possible
interpretations? In this respect, it is approaching the problem from a different
direction than much work on the semantics of reciprocals in the SMH tradition.
For instance, Kerem, Friedmann & Winter (2009) and Sabato & Winter (2012)
both propose SMH-type analyses that explicitly define their SMH-like principles
as part of a verification procedure: they approach the problem in terms of how
the system decides whether a particular scenario satisfies the principle1. But a
more natural take on the problem from the perspective of the sentence processor
1

Dalrymple et al. (1998) are not as explicit about this, but their account could certainly be viewed
this way.
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is to ask how the processor accomplishes the task of arriving at a construal of a
given sentence. The task is not one of verification, but potentially of the
instantiation of certain relations between individuals in the mental model of the
discourse. When I read the sentence Those five kids hate each other, and intuit that
what it means is that each of the five kids hates all of the others, how is this
accomplished? Is there any role for an SMH-like principle in accomplishing this
task?
Dalrymple et al. (1998) describe the SMH as a semantic principle, and
distinguish it from pragmatic principles like Grice’s. But on its own, this is not
enough information to tell us whether or how a principle like the SMH might be
involved in the task of the sentence processor in fixing on an interpretation.
It seems worth considering what predictions we would make if an SMHlike principle is involved in instructing or guiding the language processor in the
task of fixing on an interpretation. If a principle like the SMH selects the single
appropriate interpretation of a reciprocal sentence in a given context, then the
task for the language processor is a relatively simple one. The processor is not
faced with the task of choosing among the range of reciprocal meanings; this
version of the SMH instructs the processor as to the appropriate meaning given
linguistic and extralinguistic information.
But the task for the language processor looks very different if the
grammatical representation leaves the details of the interpretation
underspecified, and if a principle like the SMH does not play a part in guiding
the processor to an interpretation. One of the aims of this dissertation is to
explore the possibility that reciprocal sentences are associated with grammatical
representations that are underspecified, and further, that the processor does not
3

need a principle like the SMH to guide it. The challenge for such an approach is
to explain SMH effects without an SMH.

1.1 Grammatical representations and comprehension
This dissertation takes as its starting point certain assumptions about how
grammatical representations are related to sentence comprehension, and about
how the language processor constructs grammatical representations.
I assume a representational approach, where the language processor
makes use of linguistic representations in constructing an interpretation. And I
assume that interpretations are built up incrementally out of their parts (i.e. that
interpretations are compositional, cf. work by Ferreira and colleagues that
disputes compositionality (Ferreira, Ferraro & Bailey 2002; Ferreira 2003)).
I assume a serial model, in which the processor – guided by structural
principles – constructs a single parse of a sentence (Frazier & Fodor 1978; Ferreira
& Clifton 1986; Frazier 1990; Frazier & Clifton 1996). The processor prefers the
structurally simplest parse. This contrasts with parallel, constraint-based models,
where multiple sources of information (e.g. plausibility, frequency) activate
multiple potential parses simultaneously (e.g. MacDonald 1994; Tanenhaus,
Spivey-Knowlton & Hanna 2000).
On the view that I am assuming, Logical Form (LF) parsing is guided by
the same principles as surface syntactic structure parsing (Frazier 1999; Tunstall
1998). LF is the level of representation between the surface syntax and truthconditional semantics. The parser builds a single LF, with a surface-structure
default (Tunstall 1998; Anderson 2004).
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A single LF may not fully specify a particular construal. I assume that the
processor makes use of various extragrammatical principles and preferences in
arriving at a particular construal. I assume that grammatical principles determine
the possible interpretations of a given sentence, while the processor is
responsible for preferences in interpretation.
I assume that, simultaneous with surface structure and LF parses, the
processor builds a conceptual representation: a mental model. Early work on
mental models and language (Johnson-Laird 1983) saw linguistic comprehension
as yielding a mental model of the entities and relations described by the
discourse. The mental model aided later non-linguistic reasoning about
information provided by that discourse. I assume that a mental model is built
simultaneously with the linguistic parse, that it is concerned with representing
possible discourse referents (individuals and events), and that the mental model
can have an immediate effect on syntactic processing (Crain & Steedman 1985;
Patson & Ferreira 2009; Patson & Warren 2011; Huffman 2011).

1.2 Semantic analyses of the reciprocal
In Dalrymple et al.’s (1998) analysis, the three different reciprocal meanings on
display in (1) involve different versions of the reciprocal quantifier. In their
analysis each other has a single context sensitive meaning, and that meaning is a
cluster of 6 quantifiers. A semantic principle, the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis
(SMH), determines that a reciprocal sentence receives the logically strongest
meaning consistent with available linguistic and non-linguistic information.

5

(1)

a. The five kids hate each other.
b. The five kids are sitting next to each other on a bench.
c. The chairs are stacked on top of each other.

Dalrymple et al. are careful to clarify that on their view, the reciprocal has a
single meaning; it is not ambiguous, but rather context-sensitive. Nevertheless,
their approach can be seen to involve a certain degree of ambiguity2: they
propose that there are six possible reciprocal quantifiers, and that the SMH plays
a role in determining which of them applies in a given utterance and context.
Beck (2001) takes a very different approach. In her analysis, each other is
completely unambiguous: it always contributes a meaning we can paraphrase as
‘the other ones among them’. The variety of reciprocal interpretations comes
about through the ordinary mechanisms of plural predication (distributive and
cumulative operators) and LF operations (Quantifier Raising). Sentence (1a) has a
double-distributive semantic representation, while sentence (1b) has a
cumulative one. Beck follows Dalrymple et al. in making use of a version of the
SMH, but Beck’s SMH operates on the set of interpretations associated with the
different possible LFs, selecting the logically strongest one available in a
particular context. As for sentences like (1c), which receive an interpretation that
is weaker than ordinary plural predication allows, Beck proposes that this is a
distinct, lexical phenomenon.
While they are quite different, Beck’s and Dalrymple et al.’s approaches
share the characteristic that the SMH is involved in choosing among a finite set of
reciprocal interpretations. Other researchers (Schwarzschild 1996; Sauerland

2

Later proponents of SMH-like approaches, like Sabato & Winter (2012) also classify Dalrymple
et al.’s account as involving ambiguity.
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1998; Dotlačil 2010; Sabato & Winter 2012) have proposed analyses that involve
greater degrees of underspecification. For instance, Sabato & Winter (2012) see
the reciprocal as an unambiguous quantifier that takes the semantic properties of
the predicate as a parameter. Some researchers argue that getting from the
unambiguous grammatical representation to a particular interpretation is a task
for pragmatics (Schwarzschild 1996; Sauerland 1998) and may involve more
general preferences to do with natural groupings (Dotlačil 2010).
If we assume, following Beck (2001), that the various reciprocal
interpretations are associated with distinct grammatical representations, then on
a representational approach to psycholinguistics, the question of how the
processor arrives at a particular interpretation of a reciprocal sentence may in
part be a question about how those grammatical representations are built. On
Beck’s view, where the distinct interpretations result from the application of
different operators/operations at LF, comprehending a reciprocal sentence may
be seen to be in effect the same kind of task as, for example, comprehending a
sentence with a quantifier scope ambiguity. In the case of quantifier scope
ambiguity, there is strong evidence that the processor builds a single LF, and that
by default that LF is one that mirrors the surface structure and respects
principles of economy (Tunstall 1998, Anderson 2004). If as Beck argues, the
different reciprocal interpretations arise from different LFs, we would expect that
the most economical LF would be constructed by the processor by default. While
the serial model of processing that I assume predicts an advantage for the most
economical LF, it has difficulty making predictions about the processing
implications of Beck’s account. For Beck, the SMH chooses among the
interpretations associated with various possible LFs. This makes it a particularly
7

bad fit for a serial model of processing. It is possible that a parallel model, where
multiple parses are constructed simultaneously, would do better at making
predictions based on Beck’s analysis.
If we assume, following Dalrymple et al. (1998), that the reciprocal is a
context-sensitive quantifier with 6 different possible meanings, then the question
is: by what process does the language processor arrive at an interpretation
involving a particular version of the quantifier? On this view, the LF that the
processor constructs underspecifies the eventual interpretation. Based on
Dalrymple et al.’s observations that reciprocal sentences do not feel ambiguous,
and tend to receive the strongest possible interpretation given the context and
other information, it seems that we might need the processor to have input from
an SMH-like principle in choosing the appropriate version of the reciprocal
quantifier.
Dotlačil (2010) presents an account that involves a greater degree of
underspecification than that of Dalrymple et al. (1998). In his analysis, different
reciprocal interpretations involve neither different versions of the reciprocal
quantifier (as in Dalrymple et al. 1998), nor different LF structures (as in Beck
2001). Dotlačil argues that there are only two distinct reciprocal interpretations.
They are not structurally/grammatically distinct. The single grammatical
structure is compatible with both interpretations: one where each individual is
understood to be related to every other, and one where all that is required is that
each individual is related to at least one other. Since the former meaning is
stronger than the latter, Dotlačil suggests that an SMH-like principle chooses it
whenever possible, given contextual and other information. But this version of
the SMH is quite diminished: notice that in this system it chooses between only
8

two interpretations. This SMH is not choosing between a number of different
versions of a quantifier, or different LFs. It merely favours, where possible, an
interpretation where each individual is in the relation with all of the others. Once
our conception of the SMH has shrunk to it only needing to account for this one
preference, it seems possible that the processor does not need to rely on an SMHlike mechanism to choose among a wide array of reciprocal meanings. It might
be that all that is required is some preference that favours the interpretation
where each individual is in the relation with all of the others, known as Strong
Reciprocity (SR).

1.3 Strongest Meaning Hypotheses
Despite their different assumptions about the semantics of reciprocals, most of
the researchers so far discussed argue for some version of the SMH. While it was
first proposed by Dalrymple et al. (1994, 1998) in order to deal with reciprocals,
the SMH is envisioned as a more general principle: potentially involved in the
interpretation of presuppositions (Dalrymple et al. 1998), quantifier domain
restriction (Blutner et al. 2003), prepositions (Zwarts 2003), and plural sentences
(Winter 1996, 2001; Beck 2001).
As we have seen, there is no consensus as to what kind of mechanism the
SMH might be. Chapter 2 will discuss several implementations of the SMH idea,
as well as looking for evidence of the a preference for strong interpretations in
online language comprehension.
All of this support for the idea of an SMH rests on an empirical question:
do hearers really fix on the strongest possible interpretation? The original SMH
of Dalrymple et al. made some strong claims that have been challenged by
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subsequent researchers. For instance, according to Dalrymple et al. (1998:168) the
sentence in (2) receives the strongest possible interpretation, where each of the
men was hitting each of the others.
(2)

The four men were hitting each other.
Philip (2000) tested the availability of weaker readings. He presented

adults3 with the picture in Figure 1, and asked whether the girls were pointing at
each other. This scenario satisfies ‘weak reciprocity’ (WR): each individual points
at one of the others, and is pointed at by one of the others. Philip found that
100% of the adults tested answered affirmatively, despite the fact that the SMH
would predict otherwise. (After all, it is possible for each girl to point at both of
the others4.)

Figure 1: Philip's Condition T2 (2000)

3

In this case, native speakers of Dutch.

4

If ‘pointing’ is taken to mean ‘pointing with a stick’, then because each girl only has one stick,
one might argue that the stronger reading is not possible in this context, thus explaining the
weaker reading. The other example tested by Philip had this same feature. But Kerem et al. (2009)
found that weak readings were acceptable in scenarios without this feature.
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Kerem, Friedmann & Winter (2009) found that the availability of weaker
readings appears to depend on the choice of predicate. In a forced choice task,
participants selected a strong interpretation of ‘A, B and C are hugging each
other’ (a group hug) 90% of the time, but when the predicate was ‘comb’, they
preferred the weaker interpretation where each person combs the hair of only
one of the others. Even though it is possible for each person to comb the hair of
both the others, participants selected this strongest possible interpretation only
35% of the time.
Using an incremental truth value judgement task, Dotlačil (2009) found
that participants were satisfied with weak interpretations of reciprocal sentences.
Participants were given a reciprocal sentence, and then subsequent sentences in
the discourse spelled out – one at a time – the relations that held between the
individuals in the reciprocal sentence. Participants were significantly more likely
to judge the sentence true early in the discourse, once weak reciprocity was
satisfied, than to wait until strong reciprocity held.
Philip (2000), Kerem et al. (2009) and Dotlačil (2009) provide evidence that
comprehenders do not always insist on the strongest possible interpretation –
this could be taken as direct evidence against the SMH. As we shall see in
Chapter 2, Kerem et al. and Sabato & Winter (2012) suggest that the SMH can be
modified to account for such data, but an alternate approach would be to
question whether the SMH is necessary at all. Weak readings of reciprocal
sentences are frequent and unremarkable, so why should we introduce this
principle, only to then weaken it?
It is easy to find naturally occurring examples where the reciprocal
receives a very weak interpretation, with no requirement that the relation hold
11

mutually. As one example, consider the sentence in (3), from Gardent & Konrad
(2000:325). It does not require any mutual helping; rather we are likely to
understand it as a statement about the frequency of events in which one of the
students helps another.
(3)

The students often help each other with their homework.

Similarly, example (4) makes no claim that there have been any reciprocal cases
of betrayal; it merely asserts that there have been instances of people betraying
other people.
(4)

People have for centuries betrayed themselves in letters and diaries,
and they have used them to betray each other.5

For another example, consider the excerpt in (5), from an interview on The
Splendid Table radio program6:
(5)

Marlene Zuk: Some insects actually are farmers… There are also insects of
course that eat plants, insects that eat EACH OTHER, and
insects that eat EACH OTHER but they do it in a way that I
think most humans would find a little grisly [5:26-5:55]7
Lynne Rossetto Kasper: For instance?
Marlene Zuk: Well, so, going back to the cockroaches, there’s a kind of
wasp called an emerald jewel wasp that actually paralyzes
its prey so that it can carry it to a place where it can be used
to feed the offspring.

5

Alec Wilkinson, ‘Remember this?’, The New Yorker, May 28 2007, p43. Notice that this one most
likely involves contrastive stress on each other.
6
7

Episode 493, Segment 1, 1:14 - 9:55.
The small caps mark contrastive stress on both instances of each other.
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The case Zuk describes does not involve mutual eating. Rather, she illustrates
There are… insects that eat each other with a case where one kind of insect eats
another kind of insect.

1.4 Psycholinguistics and reciprocals
As mentioned in §1.3, several recent studies (Kerem et al. 2009; Dotlačil 2009)
have tested the predictions of the SMH, finding that contrary to the predictions
of Dalrymple et al. (1998), WR interpretations are available or even preferred,
even with small-numbered antecedents. A different question is addressed by
Poortman (2011), who investigates the effect of spatial configuration. She finds
that a sentence like (6) is accepted significantly more often when it describes
individuals arranged in a line (71% of the time) compared with an ‘open circle’
configuration (44%), as shown in Figure 2. Poortman’s conclusion is that SMH
calculations do not consider alternative spatial arrangements: the SMH requires
the largest number of relations to hold, given a particular configuration8.
(6)

A, B and C are holding hands.

Figure 2: Line vs. open circle configuration (Poortman 2011)
8

That is, what is required is the locally maximal rather than globally maximal number of
relations (Sabato 2006).
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Syzmanik (2010) and Bott, Schlotterbeck & Syzmanik (2011) investigate
the computational complexity of certain reciprocal sentences. They focus on
reciprocal sentences with proportional and counting quantifier antecedents as in
(7)9. Syzmanik (2010) shows how deciding whether an SR interpretation of these
sentences is true in a model requires solving a CLIQUE problem: the verification
is NP-complete (i.e. cannot be computed in polynomial time) (Garey & Johnson
1979).
(7)

a. Most of the dots are connected to each other.
b. Four of the dots are connected to each other.

Citing a common assumption in cognitive science that ‘cognitive capacities are
limited to those functions that can be computed in polynomial time’ (the ‘PCognition Hypothesis’) (van Rooij 2008:948), Syzmanik (2010) and Bott et al.
(2011) argue that an SR interpretation of sentences like those in (7) should not be
computed by the human sentence processor. They make the point that SR
interpretations of these sentences are of a schema that is NP-complete; in a given
situation with a small number of individuals, checking the truth-value of a
particular sentence can be tractable (Syzmanik 2010:242; Bott et al. 2011:6). But
Syzmanik and Bott et al. assume that even in such simple scenarios, the NPcomplete schema should be dispreferred. Bott et al. (2011) provide some
psycholinguistic evidence that SR interpretations are dispreferred. For example,
in a picture completion task, participants were given a picture with dots, and

9

Kamp & Reyle (1993:466-469) discuss the unclear truth conditions of such sentences, specifically
when it is not clear that there is only one ‘cluster’ of individuals that satisfies the reciprocal.
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asked to illustrate sentences like ‘All the dots are connected to each other’ (a
tractable schema) and ‘Four of the dots are connected to each other’ (an
intractable schema). Participants drew pictures that satisfied SR 47% of the time
for ‘all’, but significantly less frequently for ‘four’ (17.4%)10. All of Bott et al.’s
experiments used the predicate ‘be connected to’, which is a transitive relation.
As they note, this decreases the informativeness of their study somewhat11.
There are a number of language acquisition studies on the semantics of
reciprocals, including Matsuo (1999) and Philip (2000). Matsuo (1999) – testing an
observation due to Fiengo & Lasnik (1973) – provides evidence that like adults,
children (mean age 4;4) treat stative and eventive reciprocals differently. The
eventive sentence (8a) is compatible with a scenario where the horses are
arranged in two groups, and each horse fed only members of its own group (i.e.
Partitioned Strong Reciprocity or Part-SR). The stative (8b) is rejected in such
scenarios: it requires that each of the kids looked like all the others (i.e. SR). We
will return to this contrast in Chapter 5.
(8)

a. These horses fed each other.
b. These kids looked like each other.

Philip (2000) investigated adults’ and children’s interpretations of reciprocal
sentences. Children are shown to be laxer than adults when it comes to scenarios
like that in (9a); while adults respond affirmatively to question (9b) only 13% of

10

In the case of ‘all’, participants were given a picture of 4 dots. For ‘four’, it had seven dots. In
both cases, only a completed picture where each of 4 dots is directly connected to the other 3
counted as SR.
11

Notice that with a transitive relation, what Bott et al. code as an intermediate reading (where a
continuous path connects all the dots) is equivalent to an SR reading (because each dot is
connected directly or indirectly to every other dot).
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the time, children (mean age 5;6) do so 62% of the time. Based on the results of a
number of experiments, Philip argues that the SMH is a pragmatic principle, and
that children acquire it late12. Chapter 3 will return to the question of when
reciprocal sentences can felicitously describe scenarios like (9a).
(9)

a. A ! A ! A ! B
b. “Are the A’s squirting each other?”
There is a body of psycholinguistic work on reciprocity that is unrelated to

the SMH. This work concerns symmetric predicates such as kiss, meet and be
similar (also known as reciprocal predicates). Gleitman et al. (1996) investigate a
number of issues to do with symmetric predication. Work on the question of the
conceptual representation of plurality has made use of reciprocal predicates. This
line of inquiry began with Ferreira & McClure (1997), who studied garden-path
sentences like (10a). There is a temporary ambiguity at the optionally transitive
verb signaled, which leads to the garden-path effect of taking the following DP as
the object. In contrast, Ferreira & McClure found that with an optionally
reciprocal predicate like kiss, the garden-path effect was blocked.
(10)

a. After Jose and the bride signaled the party began in earnest.
b. After Jose and the bride kissed the party began in earnest.

Subsequent work by Patson & Ferreira (2009), Patson & Warren (2010) and
Huffman (2011) has found that the garden-path effect appears to be sensitive to
the conceptual representation associated with the subject: morphological or
semantic plurality is not sufficient to block the effect. Patson and colleagues
12

In another experiment with older (Dutch-speaking) children, Philip found that even the oldest
(8 year olds) gave the adult-like ‘no’ response to sentences like (9b) only 49% of the time.
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argue that a conjoined DP (Jose and the bride) has a more complex conceptual
representation than a simple plural DP (the lovers, the two lovers), and it is only the
more complex conceptual representation that blocks the garden-path effect13.

1.5 The dissertation
Chapter 2 looks at the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH). More precisely, it
looks at a variety of strongest meaning hypotheses; these include Dalrymple et
al.’s original proposal as well as later work that makes use of SMH-like
principles. As discussed above, it is unclear precisely what SMH-type analyses
predict about the sentence processor’s task in comprehending reciprocal
sentences. The chapter considers a number of possibilities, and discusses two eye
movement studies which looked for evidence of default commitments to strong
interpretations in online sentence comprehension. In line with previous studies,
these studies find no evidence that language users commit to the strongest
possible interpretation of reciprocal sentences.
The rest of the dissertation addresses the question: what if there is no
SMH? I assume an underspecified semantic representation, where all reciprocal
interpretations arise from a cumulative semantic representation equivalent to
WR (weak reciprocity). In the absence of an SMH, the question is how to account
for interpretations stronger and weaker than WR.
Chapter 3 looks at interpretations weaker than WR. In particular, it
focuses on what I call ‘chain interpretations’, as in a sentence like The chairs are
stacked on top of each other, where the individuals at the endpoints of the chain
only take part in the relation in one direction. It is argued, based on variable
13

For further discussion, see §5.7.2.

17

acceptability judgements of such sentences (especially when they describe the
relations holding between only two individuals), that they cannot have truth
conditions weaker than WR, as assumed by several SMH accounts. Instead, chain
interpretations arise through pragmatic weakening from a cumulative semantic
representation equivalent to WR.
Chapter 4 looks at interpretations that are stronger than WR. It presents
the results of a questionnaire study showing that reciprocals and other plurals
show a tendency for stative predicates to resist weak interpretations. It argues
that extragrammatical preferences to do with natural groupings and uniformity
can result in a preference for interpretations stronger than required by the
semantics.
Chapter 5 looks at two issues. The first concerns the preference for
reciprocal sentences to describe one ‘general event’ (Fiengo & Lasnik 1973). The
results of a questionnaire study are used to argue that this preference is related to
a more general preference that applies to all sentences, not just reciprocals. The
second issue concerns partitioned interpretations: proposals by Fiengo & Lasnik
(1973) and Sabato & Winter (2010) disallow partitioned interpretations for most
stative predicates (Fiengo & Lasnik) or for reciprocals generally (Sabato &
Winter). This chapter defends the idea that partitioned interpretations should
always be available, given cumulativity.
Chapter 6 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
STRONGEST MEANING HYPOTHESES
As outlined in Chapter 1, most contemporary accounts of the semantics of
reciprocals assume that a Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH) chooses between
possible interpretations. As mentioned in Chapter 1, some of the predictions of
the original SMH of Dalrymple et al. (1998) have not been borne out: it turns out
that weak readings are more prevalent than predicted (Philip 2000; Kerem et al.
2009; Dotlačil 2009). Previous work on this topic used questionnaire studies and
incremental truth value judgement tasks; this chapter discusses two eye
movement studies.
The chapter begins by looking at four different SMH analyses. Section 2.2
presents an experiment looking for evidence of the language processor making a
commitment to the strongest reciprocal interpretation (SR). Consistent with
previous work, the experiment found no sign that the processor commits to SR.
Section 2.3 looks at how SMH accounts deal with the problem of weak
reciprocity (WR). Section 2.4 considers the question of whether we should expect
to see SMH effects in online comprehension. Distinctions are drawn between the
various accounts and possible predictions about the weakest reciprocal
interpretation: the chain interpretation. Section 2.5 presents an experiment
testing these predictions. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.1 Four strongest meaning hypotheses
2.1.1

Dalrymple et al.’s SMH

Dalrymple et al. (1998) is an account of the meaning of the reciprocal which
integrates linguistic and extralinguistic factors. On their view the reciprocal has a
single, context-sensitive, meaning: it is a quantifier with parameters filled in with
the help of contextual information. They propose that there are six possible
reciprocal meanings, as shown in Table 1.

Strong Reciprocity (SR)
Intermediate Reciprocity (IR)

Strong Alternative Reciprocity
(SAR)
One-way Weak Reciprocity
(OWR)
Intermediate Alternative
Reciprocity
(IAR)
Inclusive Alternative Ordering
(IAO)

|A|≥ 2 and
∀x,y ∈A (x≠y ! Rxy)
|A|≥ 2 and
∀x,y ∈A (x≠y ! for some sequence z0, …, zm
∈ A (x=z0 ∧ Rz0z1 ∧ … ∧ Rzm-1zm ∧ zm = y))
unattested
|A|≥ 2 and
∀x ∈A ∃y ∈ A (x≠y ∧ Rxy)
|A|≥ 2 and
∀x,y ∈A (x≠y ! for some sequence z0, …, zm
∈ A (x=z0 ∧ (Rz0z1 ∨ Rz1z0) ∧ … ∧ (Rzm-1zm ∨
Rzmzm-1) ∧ zm = y))
|A| ≥ 2 and ∀x ∈A ∃y∈A (x≠y ∧ (Rxy ∨
Ryx))

Table 1: Six reciprocal meanings (Dalrymple et al 1998)

They arrive at this set of six meanings by considering the interaction of
two parameters. One parameter is how the relation covers the domain. This has
three possible settings: each pair of individuals participates directly (‘FUL’); each
pair participates directly or indirectly (‘LIN’); each individual takes part with one
other (‘TOT’). The other parameter concerns whether we count relations that are
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in the extension of the predicate or its symmetric closure. If A saw B, then the
binary relation ‘saw’ has as its extension <A,B>, whereas its symmetric closure
includes both the extension <A,B> and its inverse <B,A>. The six possible
meanings are in the entailment relation shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Entailment relation (Dalrymple et al. 1998)

The SMH, defined in (1), selects the strongest reciprocal meaning available in the
context, and takes linguistic and extralinguistic information into account
(1998:193).
(1)

Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH):
A reciprocal sentence S can be felicitously used in a context c, which
supplies non-linguistic information I relevant to the reciprocal’s
interpretation, provided the set Sc has a member that entails every other
one:
Sc = {p'p is consistent with I and p is an interpretation of S obtained by
interpreting the reciprocal as one of the six quantifiers in [Figure 3]}
In that case, the use of S in c expresses the logically strongest proposition
in Sc.
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Consider the sentence in (2), which is based on an example from Dalrymple et al.
(1998). According to their analysis, the SMH, combined with linguistic and nonlinguistic information results in the appropriate interpretation of this sentence.
(2)

Five Boston pitchers sat alongside each other.

Because ‘sitting alongside’ is a symmetric relation, the six different possible truth
conditions collapse down to three. In decreasing order of strength, they are
SR(=SAR), IR(=IAR), and IAO(=OWR)1. Because of the non-linguistic fact that
people only have two sides, SR cannot hold – it is impossible for every one of the
five pitchers to be in the ‘sitting alongside’ relation with every other. Therefore,
the SMH predicts that the sentence is interpreted with the strongest available
reading, which is IR. That is, every pitcher is related directly or indirectly via the
‘sitting alongside’ relation.
In this account, SR has a privileged position: it should be the default
interpretation. A sentence like (3), on this view, can only be interpreted as SR.
That is, the only possible interpretations are either SR as in (4i), or partitioned
SR2 (part-SR) if the four men are arranged in pairs as in (4ii).
(3)

The four men were hitting each other.

(4)

(i)

A ! B,C,D
B ! A,C,D
C ! A,B,D
D ! A,B,C

(ii)

A "! B
C "! D

1

That is, distinctions that rest on the ‘directionality of the arrows’ are irrelevant with a symmetric
relation.
2

Dalrymple et al. prefer the term ‘distributed strong reciprocity’ (1998:178).
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If the men were standing in a circle, and each was hitting the man to his left, is
(3) true? According to Dalrymple et al.’s system, the answer is no: the SMH
requires that (3) have the strongest meaning it can, which is SR. Dalrymple et al.
do allow for SR to be used ‘in a loose way’ (1998:168), but they stress that such
imprecision is incompatible with situations like that in (3) where the antecedent
denotes a small group. Rather, they allow for the imprecise use of SR in the case
of a sentence like The men were hitting each other, used to describe a bar-room
brawl (1998:167).
The SMH only allows resort to other interpretations if linguistic or nonlinguistic information rules out SR. The prediction is that if SR is possible, then
that is the only interpretation available. And more generally, a particular
sentence in a particular context will have one interpretation only: the strongest
one. However, given the role of contextual information in this system, we should
allow for the possibility that in the case of a sentence or utterance that does not
provide enough contextual information, the system may leave the interpretation
underspecified.
The SMH is described as a semantic principle (Dalrymple et al. 1998:197).
Dalrymple et al. distinguish it from pragmatic principles (like Grice’s). They do
not claim that listeners use this principle to work out which reading of an
ambiguous expression a speaker might intend. Rather, the SMH chooses the
single literal interpretation (given the context) of particular kinds of expressions
– those with a set of interpretations that are related by entailment3.

3

Though it was proposed to account for reciprocal interpretations, Dalrymple et al. hypothesize
that the SMH applies more generally (1998:198).
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2.1.2

Beck’s SMH

Beck’s (2001) analysis differs from Dalrymple et al.’s in a number of important
respects, yet she too makes use of a version of the SMH. Beck proposes that each
other has a single meaning, as shown in (5): it always denotes the group made up
of all of the members of the antecedent other than the individual that is being
looked at in terms of the distribution4. In this, she follows Heim, Lasnik & May
(1991a,b).
(5)

[[each other]]

= ‘the other one(s) among them’
= max(*λz[¬z ο x1 & z ≤ x3 & Cov(z)])
= [max [* [Cov [[other x1] (of) Pro3]]]]

The various reciprocal interpretations arise from the application of the ordinary
mechanisms of plural predication. In all, Beck proposes that there are four
distinct LFs associated with reciprocal sentences. Strong Reciprocity (SR) is a
distributive interpretation; as shown in (6). There is distribution over both the
antecedent and the set A-x (the antecedent minus the individual being looked at
in terms of the distribution).
(6)

a. Mary, Sue and Bill like each other.
b. Strong Reciprocity (SR):
[[Mary, Sue and Bill]3 [*[Cov[1 [[max [*Cov[[other x1] (of) Pro3]]
[*[Cov[2 [t1 like t2]]]]]

Beck’s Collective interpretation, as in (7), has distribution over the antecedent,
but not over A-x. Each individual in the antecedent is related to the remaining
individuals collectively.
4

‘Max’ is a maximality operator (it is the contribution of the definite determiner). ‘Cov’ stands for
Cover (Schwarzschild 1996). A cover C of P is a set of subsets of P, where every member of P is in
some set in C. Beck uses covers to account for subgroup effects and exceptions.
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(7)

a. Our committees are made up of each other.
b. Collective:
[Our3 [*[Cov[3 [t4’s committee is made up of [max[*[Cov[other x4 (of)
Pro3]]]]]

Beck’s Weak Reciprocity (WR) is a cumulative interpretation, as shown in (8). A
cumulated relation holds between the group denoted by the antecedent and that
same group (in the form of Pro). Beck proposes that the subject and Pro are
Quantifer-Raised, and then the resulting relation is cumulated. If we assume that
the cover provides singularities, this results in the translation in (8c). As Beck
points out, this is a ‘funny’ QR operation in that only part of the meaning of each
other – Pro – moves.
(8)

a. The children hit each other.
b. Weak Reciprocity (WR):
[Pro3 [[the children]3 [**[1 [Cov[2 [t2 [Cov [hit [max [* [[other x1] (of) t2]]]]]
c. <children, children> ∈ **λxλy[x hit max(*λz[z≠x & z ≤ y])]

In Beck’s system, there is a second type of cumulative interpretation: Situationbased WR. Example (9a) is analysed by Beck in this way. It is typically
understood as describing a line of poles, each 500 feet from the next. Beck
proposes that examples of this kind involve pluralization of the situation/event
argument with the situation-based cumulation operator ***, defined in (10).
According to Beck’s analysis, each pole is part of a situation consisting of two
neighbouring poles, and in every situation of that kind the poles are 500 feet
apart.
(9)

a. The telephone poles are spaced 500 feet from each other.
b. Situation-based WR:
[[the telephone poles]3 [Pro3 [***[2 [1 [λs’ [t1 is 500 feet apart from [max
[other1 of t2]]]]]]]]
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c. <poles, poles, s> ∈ [***λxλyλs’ . @(x≠y) & C(x) & C(y) & C(s’) & x is 500
feet apart from y in s’]
d. C(s’) iff s’ is a minimal situation containing two neighbouring poles5
(10)

*** is that function: D <e,<e,<s, t>>> →<e,<e,<s, t>>> such that for any R:
[***R](y)(x)(s) = 1 iff
R(y)(x)(s)
or
∃x1x2y1y2s1s2[(s = s1 & s2) & (x = x1 & x2) & (y = y1 & y2) &
***R(y1)(x1)(s1) & ***R(y2)(x2)(s2)]
These operators (distributive, cumulative) and LF operations (QR) are

commonly assumed to be optional. So then the question is, why do we not
usually observe a four-way ambiguity? Beck uses a version of the SMH to
explain the lack of ambiguity; rather than selecting between quantifiers as in
Dalrymple’s system, Beck’s SMH operates on sets of interpretations associated
with these LFs that are in an entailment relation.
(11)

Beck’s SMH:
#Let Sa be the set of theoretically possible alternative interpretations for a
sentence S. Then, S can be uttered felicitously in a context c, which
supplies non-linguistic information I relevant to S’s interpretation,
provided that the set Sc has a member that entails every other one. #
Sc = {p: p is consistent with I and p ∈ Sa}#
In that case, the use of S in c expresses the logically strongest proposition
in Sc.

Of the four possible interpretations in Beck’s system, three of them are in an
entailment relation: SR entails situation-based WR, which entails WR. Thus
Beck’s SMH chooses SR whenever possible. When it is not, it selects situationbased WR, and when that is not possible, WR. Since the collective interpretation

5

@ marks a presupposition
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is not in an entailment relation with the other three, it is not part of the set of
interpretations that the SMH chooses among6.
Beck suggests (2001:136) that the SMH is at work in codistributives
(relational plurals)7. She points out that (12a) typically requires that both women
know both men, while (12b) does not require that both women marry both men.
(12)

a. The two women know the two men.
b. The two women married the two men.

On Beck’s view, the SMH would choose the doubly distributive interpretation
(as in (12a)) when possible, and only selects the cumulative interpretation (as in
(12b)) when the doubly distributive interpretation is impossible/implausible.
The fact that in Beck’s system the SMH chooses between interpretations
arising from distinct linguistic structures should give us pause. Krifka (1996)
points out that the SMH should be limited to operating on a single linguistic
structure. He has us consider the quantifier scope ambiguity in (13). If the SMH
applied here, it would always select the strongest interpretation (where a student
has wide scope)8. On Krifka’s view, we should assume that because scopally
ambiguous sentences are distinct at LF, the SMH does not apply.
(13)

Every data set was checked by a student.

6

It’s unclear how this is supposed to work. Beck (2001:132, fn 14) mentions some possibilities:
either the collective interpretation is outside of the SMH system (so a sentence can be ambiguous
between a collective or SMH-derived interpretation) or else the entailment requirement of the
SMH is too strong and should be weakened to allow the collective interpretation into the set of
interpretations that the SMH chooses among.
7

Winter 2001 makes the same argument.

8

The reading where a student has wide scope (for some student, every data set was checked by
him/her) entails the one where a student has narrow scope (for each data set, there was a student
that checked it).
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2.1.3

Sabato & Winter’s MIH

Sabato & Winter (2005b, 2012) build on Dalrymple et al. (1998), but make some
major changes. As we have seen, Dalrymple et al. (1998) use the SMH to choose
among a small set of reciprocal quantifiers. Sabato & Winter (2012) present a
different picture. Their analysis does not assume that there is a particular set of
reciprocal meanings that is being chosen from. In their analysis, the reciprocal is
unambiguous: it is a quantifier that is sensitive to the semantic restrictions of the
relation within its scope. Reciprocal meanings are derived directly from those
semantic restrictions.
Consider the relation ‘follow’ in (14). The relation has certain logical
properties: it is asymmetric and acyclic. (Compare a scenario where the kids are
following each other in a circle, where the relation of following has neither of
these properties.) These logical properties define the domain of interpretation of
the relation. The reciprocal requires the relation to denote the maximal relation
within its domain of interpretation. If there are three kids, the maximal number
of following relations is two (e.g. A follows B, who follows C) as in (15). When
the relation is one with no logical restrictions, like ‘know’, the maximal relation is
equivalent to SR.
(14)

The kids followed each other into the treehouse.

(15)

A – B – C ! treehouse
Sabato & Winter’s system uses the Maximal Interpretation Hypothesis to

select the maximal relation:

28

(16)

Maximal Interpretation Hypothesis (MIH):
Let P be a complex predicate with a reciprocal expression RECIP that has a
relational expression REL in its scope. Reciprocity requires REL to denote a
relation in REL’s domain of interpretation ΘREL that is not properly
contained in any other relation in ΘREL. In this case we say that REL
denotes a maximal relation in ΘREL.

Their formal statement of what it means for reciprocity to hold in the MIH
system is shown in (17). A set of individuals, A, and a relation, R, satisfy MIHbased reciprocity if for all relations R’ in the domain of interpretation (restricted
to A and ignoring identities), if R is a subset of or equal to R’, then R and R’ are
identical. (That is, R is not the proper subset of any other relation in the domain
of interpretation; it is the maximal relation.)
(17)

Let Θ ⊆℘(E2) be a set of binary relations over E.
The MIH-based reciprocal function RECIP MIH is defined for all sets A ⊆ E
and relations R ∈ Θ by:
RECIP MIH(A,R) = 1 iff for all R’∈ Θ↓A: R↓A⊆ R’⇒ R↓A = R’ (2012:208)9
Θ

Θ

Sabato & Winter’s system has an advantage over Dalrymple et al.’s in
being quite restrictive about the kind of contextual information that can affect
possible interpretations: it is only information that affects the semantic properties
of the relation that can do so. Consider example (18), with know, with no logical
restrictions. The context provides the fact that Amy doesn’t know Bill. This
accidental fact about the world cannot weaken the interpretation of the reciprocal
in the subsequent sentence, because it does not change how we understand the
concept of ‘knowing’.

9

Θ↓A = Θ restricted to A, disregarding identities

29

(18)

Amy doesn’t know Bill. #Amy, Bill and Carl know each other.

2.1.4

Dotlačil’s SMH

In Dotlačil’s (2010) proposal, reciprocal interpretations arise from a single
cumulative semantic representation.
Like Beck (2001), Dotlačil’s system treats reciprocals as a part of the
regular plural semantics. Like Kratzer (2001), Dotlačil assumes that predicates
and thematic roles are inherently cumulative. Consider example (19). The *operator marks the cumulative predicate *call and the cumulative thematic roles
of *Agent and *Theme10.
(19)

a. Sam and Ben called Amy and Bella.
b. (∃e)(*call(e) ∧ C*Agent(Sam+Ben)(e) ∧ C*Theme(Amy+Bella)(e))

The cumulative predicate *call has as its denotation individual events of calling,
plus all of the pluralities that can be formed from those events. This means that
(19b) can be true in a variety of different scenarios with varying numbers of calls,
as long as Sam and Ben are the plural agent, and Amy and Bella are the plural
theme of those calling events. If Sam and Ben are the plural agent of a possibly
plural event, that means that Sam+Ben, or the subparts of that plurality (Sam,
Ben) are the agents of that event or its subevents.
This can be satisfied in a variety of ways: one possibility is the branching
reading where both boys call both girls, as in (20a). Another is the cumulative
reading, where each boy calls one of the girls and each girl is called by one of the
boys, as in (20b).
10

For the thematic roles, Dotlačil uses the pluralizer C* which is the *-operator, but restricted to
covers.
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(20)

a. branching: <Sam, Amy+Bella, e1> <Ben, Amy+Bella, e2>
b. cumulative: <Sam, Amy, e1> <Ben, Bella, e2>
A reciprocal sentence like (21a) has the interpretation in (21b). There is a

possibly plural event of calling, in which the boys are both agent and theme, and
that event can be split into subevents which have distinct agent and theme.
Dotlačil uses a slightly unusual convention here: the square brackets in (21b) are
to be understood as equivalent to another cumulation operator.
(21)

a. The boys called each other.
b. (∃e)(*call(e) ∧ <boys, boys, e> ∈ [{<a, b, e’>:
C
*Agent(a)(e’)∧C*Theme(b)(e’)∧ e’≤ e ∧ ¬a o b}])
Just like the plural sentence in (19), Dotlačil argues that the reciprocal in

(21) potentially has branching and cumulative readings. The equivalent of the
branching reading is SR: each boy calls all of the other boys. The cumulative
reading is WR11: each boy calls and is called by one of the other boys. In
Dotlačil’s system, there are only three reciprocal readings: these two, which are
derived from the cumulative semantic representation, and the chain reading (his
IAR) which arises some other way12.
Dotlačil’s approach situates the semantics of reciprocals within the general
theory of plurality: the weakest reading of a reciprocal sentence should be no
weaker than a cumulative reading. On this point, his analysis contrasts with
Dalrymple et al. (1998) and Sabato & Winter (2012). Dotlačil illustrates a problem
with Sabato & Winter’s account using the following example (from Øystein
11

Dotlačil calls this interpretation IR.

12

Like Beck (2001), Dotlačil does not see chain interpretations as arising from the regular
reciprocal semantics.
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Nilsen). Example (22) cannot felicitously describe a situation where the lecturer
stares at one audience member, and all the audience members stare at the
lecturer. The cumulative account predicts this: each person must stare at
someone and be stared at by someone, hence the sentence is false in the given
scenario. In contrast, in Sabato & Winter’s system, the MIH predicts that as stare
at is a function, a scenario in which every person is staring at someone should be
felicitous.
(22)

The people in the lecture hall are staring at each other.
Dotlačil (2010:73,173) proposes that the SMH selects the branching

interpretation over the cumulative interpretation whenever possible13. This holds
for plural sentences and reciprocal sentences alike. Dotlačil sees the SMH as a
requirement that an event exemplify the strongest proposition. Since branching
readings always have cumulative readings as their parts – in Dotlačil’s words,
‘the proposition interpreting the branching reading entails the proposition
interpreting the cumulative reading’ (2010:73) – the SMH chooses the branching
reading whenever possible.

2.2 Experiment 1: SR default experiment
We have just seen four different SMH accounts. All four predict that whenever
possible, a reciprocal sentence should receive the SR interpretation. In this sense,
SR could be seen as the default interpretation.

13

He does note that typicality preferences (as in Kerem et al. 2009, which will be discussed
below) seem to play a role (2010:173).
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Imagine that the sentence processor makes use of such a default
interpretation. If the processor makes an initial commitment to SR, then there
should be evidence of disruption if later information is inconsistent with that
construal.
(23)

SR default hypothesis:
The processor fixes on an SR construal of a reciprocal sentence by default.

It is important to note that the SR default hypothesis makes a very simplistic and
strong claim that is not directly related to any particular one of the SMH
accounts we have seen. All those accounts include ways for the context to
influence the interpretation, for example, whereas the SR default hypothesis is a
simple default.
According to the SR default hypothesis, the reciprocal sentence in (24)
should be interpreted as SR: each kid hit every other kid. Accordingly, if the
discourse continues as in (25a), it is consistent with that default interpretation.
But if it continues as in (25b), it is inconsistent14.
(24)

I saw a group of kids playing. The kids hit each other on the arm.

(25)

a. Each kid hit every other kid. (=Strong disambiguation)
b. Each kid hit one of the other kids. (=Weak disambiguation)

The prediction that the reciprocal sentence should require that each kid hit every
other kid assumes that the kids form a single group. Imagine that the kids are
grouped in pairs: if each kid hits and is hit by their partner, that too is an SR
interpretation, but in such a case, the strong disambiguation would be the one
14

Assuming that ‘Each kid hit one of the other kids’ is interpreted as ‘exactly one’ not ‘at least
one’.
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that is inconsistent. To make the assumption that the strong disambiguation in
(25a) is consistent with SR, and the weak disambiguation (25) is inconsistent with
SR, means assuming that comprehenders, upon reading the sentence I saw a
group of kids playing, will not posit that the kids are grouped in pairs, and will
posit that they are in a single group (and that that grouping is salient/relevant)15.
While it seems reasonable to assume that comprehenders will not posit more
complicated scenarios than they have evidence for, it is important to recognize
that we are making this assumption.
In a small pilot study, seven participants rated six discourses like (24) that
continued with either a strong or weak disambiguation as the third sentence.
They were instructed to rate the discourses according to difficulty, on a scale
from 1 to 5. The discourses with strong disambiguations were rated as less
difficult (1.86) than those with weak disambiguations (2.14). This was significant
by participants (t1(6) = 6.0, p<.001), but not by items (p>.5)16.
The results of the pilot study are consistent with the predictions of the SR
default hypothesis. But it is possible that the discourses with weak
disambiguation sentences were dispreferred for some other reason than that
hypothesized by the SR default view. To test the SR default hypothesis, we need

15

In fact, the strong and weak disambiguations would work the same way with multiple groups,
as long as they are large enough groups for the strong disambiguation’s every other kid to be
felicitous. In such a case, the strong disambiguation is felicitous if it is understood with implicit
quantification to subgroups (i.e. In each group, g, each kid in g hit every other kid in g.)
16

Inspection of the means for each item showed that two items had higher difficulty ratings for
the strong disambiguation than the weak disambiguation. These are items 3 and 5 in Experiment
1A in the Appendix. These two items differed from the others in that their reciprocal sentences
were open to a non-episodic interpretation, where they described a procedure rather than the
actions of a particular set of individuals. Furthermore, due to an oversight, item 3 differed from
the rest in not explicitly introducing the antecedent group in the first sentence. It is possible that
these differences discourage the SR interpretation. In Experiment 1, the materials were
constructed more carefully to encourage episodic interpretations.
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a new variable: the order of the reciprocal and disambiguation sentences. By
varying the order, so that the disambiguation sentence either precedes or follows
the reciprocal as in (26), we can separate any difficulty associated with the
disambiguation sentence itself from any difficulty associated with following the
reciprocal sentence.
(26)

a/b.

I saw a group of kids playing.
The kids hit each other on the arm.
{a. Each kid hit every other kid./
b. Each kid hit one of the other kids.}

c/d.

I saw a group of kids playing.
{c. Each kid hit every other kid./
d. Each kid hit one of the other kids.}
The kids hit each other on the arm.

We already have reason to doubt the SR default hypothesis. As mentioned
in Chapter 1, a number of studies (Philip 2000; Kerem, Friedmann & Winter 2009;
Dotlačil 2009) have found that reciprocal sentences are not always interpreted in
the strongest possible way. These studies found evidence that weaker
interpretations are possible, and sometimes preferred. All of these studies
involved judgement tasks. Experiment 1 looks for online evidence of an SR
default in an eye movement study.
In Experiment 1, evidence in support of the SR default hypothesis should
take the form of processing difficulty on the weak disambiguation following a
reciprocal sentence. That is, (26a) should be read faster than (26b). The conditions
in (26c) and (26d) act as controls, since another account of the result in the pilot
study is that result was due to the length/complexity difference between the
weak and strong disambiguation sentences. Thus the SR default hypothesis
predicts an interaction between region and disambiguation type, such that the
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region the disambiguation appears in (before the reciprocal, or after it) should
have more of an effect on the weak disambiguation than the strong.
This design also allows us to compare reading times on the reciprocal
sentence in different contexts. If the processor commits to SR regardless of
context, we might expect the processor to encounter difficulty when the
reciprocal follows a weak disambiguation (as in (26d)). But if the SR default is
sensitive to context, and selecting a weaker construal than SR is not associated
with any cost, then we would expect no difference between reading times on the
reciprocal sentence in conditions (26c) and (26d).
2.2.1

Method

Materials and design

Twenty items like (27) were constructed. Each item

consisted of a three sentence discourse, with the first sentence introducing a
group17. The next two sentences were a reciprocal sentence and a disambiguating
sentence (which disambiguated the reciprocal sentence to either SR or WR). As
shown in (27), in conditions (a) and (b), the disambiguating sentence followed
the reciprocal sentence; in conditions (c) and (d) the disambiguating sentence
preceded the reciprocal sentence. Thus it was a 2x2 design (disambiguation type
x sentence order).

17

This was done by using a collective noun/partitive (a group of kids), a numeral (those four
workers) or a universal (all the boys). The first sentence made it clear that an episodic interpretation
was intended, and that the group was all together at the same place/time.
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(27)

a/b.

c/d.

I saw a group of kids playing.
The kids hit each other on the arm.
{a. Each kid hit every other kid./
b. Each kid hit one of the other kids.}
I saw a group of kids playing.
{c. Each kid hit every other kid./
d. Each kid hit one of the other kids.}
The kids hit each other on the arm.

(=R2 Recip R3 Strong)
(=R2 Recip R3 Weak)
(=R2 Strong R3 Recip)
(=R2 Weak R3 Recip)

The predicates used in the reciprocal sentence were all eventive. The contexts
and predicates allowed SR, and were intended not to favour construals with
group objects or partitioned interpretations. The complete set of items appears in
the Appendix.
The items were separated into 4 counterbalanced lists. There were 65 filler
items, and 7 practice trials. Items were presented in an individually randomized
order.
Participants

Twenty five members of the University of Massachusetts

community received course credit or were paid for participating. All participants
were native speakers of English and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
(soft contact lenses).
Apparatus

Eye movements were recorded by a Fourward Technologies

Dual Purkinje eye tracker, interfaced with an IBM compatible computer. Viewing
was binocular, but only the right eye was monitored. Stimuli were presented on
a 15-inch NEC 4FG monitor. Participants were seated 61cm from the monitor; 3.8
characters equaled 1° of visual angle. The monitor allowed for 80 character
spaces per line, and the experimental items consisted of three-sentence
paragraphs, each sentence of which appeared on a separate, single line. All three
sentences were presented at once.
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Procedure

Participants were tested individually. On arriving at the

laboratory, participants were given instructions, and had a bite bar prepared for
them (in order to minimize head movements). The eye tracker was calibrated for
9 points in a procedure that took approximately 5 minutes. At the beginning of
each trial, a set of fixation boxes were presented. Calibration was checked
throughout the experiment, and when necessary, the eye tracker was recalibrated.
Participants were instructed to look at the centre fixation box and then the leftmost box, at which point the entire sentence (in the case of some filler items) or
paragraph (in the case of the experimental trials, and some filler items) appeared.
They were instructed to read at a normal rate, for comprehension. Once they had
finished reading, participants pressed a button to end the trial.
2.2.2

Results

Trials on which there was a track loss were excluded from the analysis (less than
4% of all trials). Trials with fixations of longer than 800ms were excluded from
analysis, because they are likely to reflect track losses. If a fixation of less than
80ms was within one character of a neighboring fixation, it was incorporated into
the neighboring fixation. Other fixations of less than 80ms were deleted on the
assumption that readers do not extract useful information from such short
fixations (Rayner & Pollatsek 1989).
The experimental items consisted of three sentence discourses; they were
divided into three regions for analysis, with each region consisting of a whole
sentence. The results of Experiment 1 appear in Table 2. As can be seen by
comparing first pass and total time, there was very little rereading of previous
sentences, so I omit discussion of second pass time, go past time and regressions
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out. First pass time is the sum of all fixations in a region from first entering the
region until leaving it. Total time is the sum of all fixations in a region. The
number of fixations is the average number of fixations in the region.

Measure
First Pass Time
R2 strong, R3 recip
R2 recip, R3 strong
R2 weak, R3 recip
R2 recip, R3 weak
Total Time
R2 strong, R3 recip
R2 recip, R3 strong
R2 weak, R3 recip
R2 recip, R3 weak
Number of Fixations
R2 strong, R3 recip
R2 recip, R3 strong
R2 weak, R3 recip
R2 recip, R3 weak

R1
(Sentence 1)

R2
(Sentence 2)

R3
(Sentence 3)

1410 (61)
1408 (53)
1460 (56)
1448 (63)

1354 (57)
1359 (45)
1412 (37)
1353 (39)

1313 (68)
1304 (55)
1243 (45)
1379 (48)

1415 (61)
1444 (56)
1468 (58)
1477 (68)

1362 (60)
1374 (50)
1433 (61)
1368 (51)

1316 (69)
1329 (66)
1256 (52)
1406 (66)

6.32 (.24)
6.30 (.23)
6.42 (.22)
6.52 (.27)

5.55 (.21)
5.75 (.20)
5.98 (.22)
5.59 (.21)

5.39 (.25)
5.38 (.27)
5.10 (.19)
5.85 (.27)

Table 2: Experiment 1 Participant Reading Times (ms). (Standard error of the
mean in parentheses)
The experiment had a 2x2 design (disambiguation type vs. sentence order).
Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs found significant interactions between
disambiguation type (strong vs. weak) and sentence order (reciprocal first or
second) in both Region 2 and Region 3. But these interactions boil down to a
simple observation: the weak disambiguation sentence appears to be associated
with longer reading times than both the strong disambiguation sentence and the
reciprocal sentence. This is unsurprising, since it is longer than the strong
disambiguation sentence. For instance, consider Region 3, where there was a
significant interaction between sentence order and disambiguation type on all
three measures, as well as a main effect of sentence order. Simple effects tests
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revealed that there were significant differences between the condition where
Region 3 contained the weak disambiguation and that where it contained the
reciprocal; in this region the reciprocal had lower reading times and fewer
fixations than the weak disambiguation. There were no significant differences
between the strong disambiguation and the reciprocal. Analyzing the data in this
way is quite uninformative, given the hypothesis the experiment is testing.
To test the SR default hypothesis, we are looking for an effect of the
reciprocal sentence on the disambiguation sentence, and possibly for an effect of
the type of disambiguation sentence on the reciprocal sentence. To test the SR
default hypothesis, we need to look at the effect of sentence order by comparing
reading times for a given sentence when it appears in Region 2 vs. Region 3.
Table 3 presents the relevant data for the disambiguation sentence.

Measure
First Pass Time
S in R2, before reciprocal
S in R3, after reciprocal
W in R2, before reciprocal
W in R3, after reciprocal
Total Time
S in R2, before reciprocal
S in R3, after reciprocal
W in R2, before reciprocal
W in R3, after reciprocal
Number of Fixations
S in R2, before reciprocal
S in R3, after reciprocal
W in R2, before reciprocal
W in R3, after reciprocal

Disambiguation
sentence (S or W)
1354
1304
1412
1379
1362
1329
1433
1406
5.55
5.38
5.98
5.85

R2 – R3

50
33
33
27
0.17
0.13

Table 3: Experiment 1 Participant reading times, difference between R2 and R3
(disambiguation sentence)
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Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs (region x disambiguation type)
found marginal main effects of both region (F1(24)=3.5, p=.072; F2(19)=.927, p=.35)
and disambiguation type (F1(24)=3.4, p=.079; F2(19)=3.81, p=.066) on first pass
time. The pattern is that Region 3 was read faster than Region 2, and the strong
disambiguation sentence was read faster than the weak disambiguation sentence.
However, simple effects tests found nothing significant. For total time, there was
a marginal main effect of disambiguation type, again with the strong
disambiguation sentence associated with a faster reading time than the weak
disambiguation sentence (F1(24)=3.82, p=.062; F2(19)=3.56, p=.075). Simple effects
tests found that this was marginally significant for Region 3 (t1(24)=1.9, p=.07;
F2(19)=1.34, p=.19), but not significant for Region 2 (p’s>.2). As for number of
fixations, there was a main effect of disambiguation type (F1(24)=11.3, p<.005;
F2(19)=.010) such that there were fewer fixations in the strong disambiguation
sentence than the weak. This was significant for both Region 2 (t1(24)=2.59,
p=.016; t2(19)=3.01, p=.007) and Region 3 (t1(24)=3.3, p<.005; t2(19)=1.70, p=.11).
The effects of disambiguation type are all consistent with the length difference
between the weak and strong disambiguations: the weak disambiguation
sentence was longer, and was associated with longer reading times and more
fixations than the strong disambiguation sentence.
Now we turn to considering the reciprocal sentence. Table 4 presents the
relevant data.
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Measure
First Pass Time
In R2, Pre-disambiguation to S
In R3, Post-disambiguation to S
In R2, Pre-disambiguation to W
In R3, Post-disambiguation to W
Total Time
In R2, Pre-disambiguation to S
In R3, Post-disambiguation to S
In R2, Pre-disambiguation to W
In R3, Post-disambiguation to W
Number of Fixations
In R2, Pre-disambiguation to S
In R3, Post-disambiguation to S
In R2, Pre-disambiguation to W
In R3, Post-disambiguation to W

Reciprocal sentence
1359
1313
1353
1243
1374
1316
1368
1256
5.75
5.39
5.59
5.10

R2 – R3
46
110
58
112
0.36
0.49

Table 4: Experiment 1 Participant reading times, difference between R2 and R3
(reciprocal sentence)
Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs (region x disambiguation type)
found main effects of region on both the first pass time and total time measures
for reciprocal sentences. The effect was close to significant for first pass time
(F1(24)=4.178, p=.052; F2(19)=4.32, p=.051) and marginal for total time (F1(24)=3.82,
p=.062; F2(19)=5.32, p=.032). The two measures show the same numerical pattern:
while the reciprocal sentence was read faster in Region 3 than Region 2, it is the
reciprocal following a weak disambiguation sentence that shows the greatest
speed-up. However, neither measure showed a significant interaction (p’s >.25).
Simple effects tests revealed a significant effect of region in the case of reciprocal
sentences preceding or following the weak disambiguation: the reciprocal
sentence was read significantly faster following the weak disambiguation (first
pass: t1(24)=2.77, p=.010, t2(19)=2.12, p=.047; total time: t1(24)=2.32, p=.029,
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t2(19)=2.17, p=.043). There was no significant difference between a reciprocal
sentence preceding and following the strong disambiguation sentence (p’s>.3). If
following the weak disambiguation sentence decreases reading time on the
reciprocal sentence, then we would expect that there would have been a
significant main effect of disambiguation type, but there was not. Simple effects
tests found no significant difference between first pass or total time on the
reciprocal sentence in Region 3 when it followed the weak disambiguation
versus when it followed the strong disambiguation (p’s>.22). While there was no
significant effect of disambiguation type on first pass or total time, there was an
effect on the number of fixations. There were main effects of both region
(F1(24)=16.99, p<.001; F2(19)=12.68, p=.002) and disambiguation type (F1(24)=5.85,
p=.024; F2(19)=1.40, p=.25) on the number of fixations. Simple effects tests found
that there were fewer fixations on the reciprocal sentence when it appeared in
Region 2 versus Region 3. This held for both disambiguation types (Strong:
t1(24)=2.13, p=.044, t2(19)=1.89, p=.074; Weak: t1(24)=3.16, p=.004, t2(19)=2.62,
p=.017). As for the effect of disambiguation type, simple effects tests found only a
very marginal effect in Region 3 (t1(24)=1.72, p=.098). The pattern was that the
reciprocal sentence had fewer fixations in Region 3 when it followed the weak
disambiguation sentence, versus when it followed the strong one.
2.2.3

Discussion

2.2.3.1 Disambiguation sentences
The SR default hypothesis predicts processing difficulty when a reciprocal
sentence (that is open to the SR construal) is followed by information
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inconsistent with the SR construal. In Experiment 1, this predicts difficulty when
Region 2 contained the reciprocal and Region 3 contained the weak
disambiguation sentence.
Experiment 1 found no sign of such difficulty. The SR default hypothesis
predicts an interaction between region and disambiguation type, such that region
should have more of an effect on the weak disambiguation than the strong
disambiguation. The prediction is that the weak disambiguation should show
signs of processing difficulty when it follows the reciprocal. However, there was
no sign of an interaction. Instead, there were marginal main effects of region and
disambiguation type: the pattern was one of a general speed up (with Region 3
faster than Region 2), and of the weak disambiguation sentence being associated
with longer reading times, presumably because it is longer /more complex than
the strong disambiguation sentence.
2.2.3.2 Reciprocal sentences
It is unclear what the SR default hypothesis predicts about how the context will
affect the processing of reciprocal sentences. The question is whether it should
lead us to expect any difference between a reciprocal that follows a weak
disambiguation and one that follows a strong one.
If the processor commits to SR regardless of context, then we might expect
processing difficulty when the reciprocal follows a weak disambiguation, under
the assumption that the default SR construal is incongruous in that context.
If the SR default is sensitive to context, and selecting a weaker construal
than SR is not associated with any cost, then we expect no difference between a
reciprocal that follows the weak disambiguation and one that follows strong. If
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selecting a weaker construal than SR is associated with processing costs, then we
might expect to see signs of processing difficulty on a reciprocal sentence that
follows the weak disambiguation.
The results of Experiment 1 fit with none of these predictions. We saw
evidence of a general speed up: the numerical pattern was that reading times on
the reciprocal sentence decreased from Region 2 to Region 3. This decrease was
significant in the case of the reciprocal following the weak disambiguation, but
not significant for the reciprocal following the strong disambiguation. Rather
than being associated with processing difficulty on the following reciprocal, it
appears that the weak disambiguation context might actually facilitate it.
However, there was no significant interaction.

2.3 A problem for SMH: Weak Reciprocity (WR)
Experiment 1 found no sign that the processor fixes on an SR interpretation of
reciprocal sentences by default. This null result fits with previous research that
finds weak readings of reciprocal sentences are not only available, but sometimes
preferred, even when SR is an available interpretation (Philip 2000; Kerem,
Friedmann & Winter 2009; Dotlačil 2009).
Philip (2000), Kerem et al. (2009), and Dotlačil (2009) all provide evidence
that reciprocal sentences that the SMH predicts should receive the SR
interpretation actually can be interpreted as Weak Reciprocity (WR), as in (28)
(Langendoen 1978).
(28)

Weak Reciprocity:
∀x ∈ A ∃y,z ∈ A (x ≠ y ∧ x ≠ z ∧ xRy ∧ zRx)
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This is a problem for SMH approaches. This section reviews two proposed
solutions: §2.3.1 considers whether these weak readings are due to
nonmaximality. Section 2.3.2 discusses the approach of Kerem et al. (2009), which
uses typicality preferences to explain weaker readings.
2.3.1

WR as nonmaximality

Dalrymple et al. explain that we should expect reciprocal sentences to allow
exceptions (1998:167). They point out that just as speakers and hearers tolerate
exceptions in the case of a sentence like (29) (we wouldn’t say the sentence was
false if the bartender were sober, and probably would allow for a few other sober
people too), so too are reciprocal sentences open to weaker interpretations by the
same mechanism.
(29)

Everyone in the room was drunk.

According to Dalrymple et al., sentence (30) has SR truth conditions, but can be
used ‘in a loose way’ to describe a bar-room brawl (1998:167-8)18. They predict
that nonmaximal interpretations are only available when the antecedent denotes
a reasonably large group. If there are four men, Dalrymple et al. claim (1998:168)
that a nonmaximal interpretation of (30) is impossible: the sentence can only be
interpreted as SR19.
(30)

18

The men were hitting each other.

Example originally from Fiengo & Lasnik (1973).

19

Their system allows SR (i.e. each man is hitting the other three) or partitioned SR (e.g. pairs of
men, each man hitting his partner).
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We have already seen evidence that, contrary to Dalrymple et al.’s claim,
people can interpret sentences like (30) more weakly than SR even when the
antecedent denotes a small group (Philip 2000; Kerem, Friedmann & Winter
2009; Dotlačil 2009). For instance, Kerem et al. (2009) gave participants reciprocal
sentences with three-person antecedents (e.g. ‘A, B and C are verbing each
other’), and had them choose between two drawings: one depicting SR and the
other WR. Depending on the predicate, participants chose the WR drawing
between 10% (‘hug’) and 65% (‘comb’) of the time. The fact that WR
interpretations are available at all with an antecedent numbering only three is
one count against the nonmaximality explanation.
Another question for this account concerns Fiengo & Lasnik’s (1973:453)
observation that the reciprocal (31a) can be interpreted more weakly than the
each-the-other sentence (31b). If both have strong truth conditions, why is the
reciprocal sentence more amenable to nonmaximality, even in cases with a small
number of men?
(31)

a. The men are hitting each other.
b. Each of the men is hitting the others.
Bruening (2004:27) argues against the nonmaximality account using

evidence from the nonmaximality canceller all (Brisson 1998). To see the
nonmaximality canceling effect of all, consider the sentences in (32). Given a
large enough group of boys, a nonmaximal interpretation (where for instance,
one of the boys didn’t eat a sandwich) is possible in the case of (32a), but the
presence of all in (32b) rules this out – each boy must have eaten a sandwich.
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(32)

a. The boys ate a sandwich.
b. The boys all ate a sandwich.

Bruening points out that if the WR interpretation is a nonmaximal interpretation,
then WR should be impossible in the presence of all. He uses example (33) to
show that even in the presence of all, WR is still a possible interpretation. He
concludes that WR is a separate phenomenon from nonmaximality.
(33)

Let’s all help each other: John, you help Paul; Paul, you help George;
George, you help Ringo; Ringo, you help me; and I’ll help John.
Or consider another nonmaximality canceller: without exception. In a non-

reciprocal sentence like (34), the effect of without exception is obvious: it explicitly
cancels the possibility of a nonmaximal interpretation. There were no nonsandwich-eating boys.
(34)

The boys ate a sandwich, without exception.

However, without exception’s nonmaximality canceling does not transfer
straightforwardly to reciprocal sentences. If the WR interpretation of a reciprocal
sentence like (35a) were due to nonmaximality, then we would expect that the
presence of without exception would serve to enforce the SR interpretation. But
this is not the case. Rather, (35b) tends to be interpreted in one of two ways,
neither of which requires SR. One interpretation is that all the boys took part in
the activity of tickling others of the boys (there were no non-tickling boys). The
other interpretation is that on all relevant occasions, the boys took part in this
activity. Crucially, neither interpretation requires that each boy tickle every other
boy.
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(35)

a. The boys tickled each other.
b. The boys tickled each other, without exception.
The fact that the nonmaximality cancellers without exception and all fail to

enforce the SR interpretation suggests that non-SR interpretations are not due to
nonmaximality.
2.3.2

Typicality

Kerem et al. (2009) argue that the SMH needs to be modified to take typicality
into account. On their view, when a sentence like (36) describes a WR scenario
like (37), it is not a counterexample for the view that the strongest possible
interpretation is selected. Rather, it is evidence that the SMH chooses the
strongest possible interpretation that is consistent with typicality preferences.
(36)

A, B and C pointed at each other.

(37)

A points at B
B points at C
C points at A
Just as a concept like BIRD has instances that we categorize as more typical

(sparrow) and less typical (emu) (Rosch 1975), Kerem et al. suggest that a concept
like POINT AT has more typical and less typical instances. They assume that
scenarios like (38) and (39) are ranked according to typicality: the scenario with
one agent and one theme is a more typical instance of POINT AT than the scenario
with two themes.
(38)

A points at B
No one points at C

(39)

A points at B and C
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Kerem et al. (2009) modify the MIH of Sabato & Winter (2005b, 2012)
(§2.1.3 above) to use typicality information related to the predicate concept rather
than logical restrictions. Their informal statement of the Maximal Typicality
Hypothesis (MTH) appears in (40).
(40)

Maximal Typicality Hypothesis (MTH):
A reciprocal expression requires the denotation of its predicate antecedent
to be a relation of maximal typicality relative to the predicate concept
Their definition of what it is for a set of entities and a binary relation to

exhibit reciprocity in the MTH system appears in (41). A set of entities A and a
binary relation R (with typicality greater than zero) are said to exhibit reciprocity
if it is impossible to add more pairs to the situation without decreasing typicality.
When looking at relations restricted to A, the definition in (41) says that if R is a
subset of or equal to some relation R’, and the typicality of R is less than or equal
to the typicality of R’, then R and R’ must be identical. That is, it is not possible
for R to be a proper subset of any other relation with greater typicality. Any
relation R’ that has R as a proper subset is of lower typicality.
(41)

Maximal Typicality Hypothesis-based reciprocity20:
Given a typicality function Θcl: ℘(E2) ! [0,1), a set of entities A ⊆ E and a
binary relation R ⊆ E2 such that Θcl (R|A) > 0 EXHIBIT RECIPROCITY with
respect to Θcl if and only if the following holds:
∀R’⊆ E2 : R ⊆AR’ ∧ Θcl (R|A) ≤ Θcl (R’|A) ⇒ R =A R’
Consider sentence (42). If it is the case that POINT AT has a typicality

preference for a single theme per agent, then the WR scenario in (43) is of
maximal typicality: adding pairs would decrease typicality. Note that according
20

[0,1) = the values in the interval between 0 and 1 (i.e. typicality values). The subscript A is read
‘restricted to A’, and R|A = R restricted to A minus identities.
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to (41), it is also the case that the SR scenario in (44) exhibits reciprocity and is
maximally typical21. As long as the SR scenario has a typicality greater than zero,
it is of maximal typicality because adding pairs is impossible and therefore it is
trivially true that there is no way to add pairs to the situation without decreasing
typicality.
(42)

A, B and C pointed at each other.

(43)

A points at B
B points at C
C points at A

(44)

A points at B+C
B points at A+C
C points at A+B

That is, both the WR scenario in (43) and the SR scenario in (44) exhibit
reciprocity according to the definition in (41). The definition in (41) is concerned
with ruling out impossible reciprocal interpretations. For instance, the scenario in
(45) does not satisfy reciprocity because the pair <B,C> could be added without
decreasing typicality.
(45)

A points at B
B points at no one
C points at A
But the definition in (41) does choose an SR interpretation over a WR

interpretation in the following case: that where the concept does not have a
typicality preference for a single patient. For example, Kerem et al. provide
21

As Sabato & Winter (2012:230) explain, it is not of ‘globally’ maximal typicality (that would be
the WR scenario, since POINT AT prefers a single patient per agent). But it is of ‘locally’ maximal
typicality. According to Sabato & Winter (2012), the MTH only requires that a relation R be of
locally maximal typicality (i.e., ‘maximal typicality with respect to all other relations that contain
R in the relevant domain’ (2012:230)).
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evidence that HUG is such a concept22. If so, the scenario in (46) fails to exhibit
reciprocity because it is possible to add pairs (<B,A>, <C,B>, <A,C>) without
decreasing typicality.
(46)

A hugs B
B hugs C
C hugs A
As we have seen, Kerem et al. (2009) hypothesize that we arrive at

typicality judgements for complex reciprocal scenarios by considering the
typicality judgements associated with simple single agent scenarios. If a
particular concept has as its most typical instance a single agent acting on a
single patient, then that preference will carry over to more complex reciprocal
scenarios, allowing scenarios where each of the multiple agents acts only on a
single patient to satisfy reciprocity. They predict that, for a given concept, there
should be a correlation between the typicality of the single patient scenario and
the availability of the WR interpretation.
Kerem et al. (2009) report the results of four experiments investigating this
hypothesis23. Two of the experiments investigated typicality preferences in single
agent scenarios; the others looked at preferences regarding WR interpretations of
reciprocal sentences. They gathered data on typicality preferences in single agent
scenarios in two ways: one experiment gave participants sentences (e.g. The boy is
hitting) with a forced choice between two pictures as ‘descriptions of the sentence’

22

In their experiment 1, participants were given two pictures: one where A hugs B (and not C),
and one where A hugs B and C. They chose the hug with two patients to illustrate a sentence like
‘A is hugging’ 68% of the time.
23

The experiments were conducted in Modern Hebrew.
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(boy hits two people; boy hits one person24), the other experiment provided
participants with an incomplete transitive sentence and had them complete it by
choosing between a singular and plural object. Table 5 shows a subset of the
results of the sentence completion task: the predicates range from those that
strongly prefer a plural object (perfective ‘see’) to those that strongly prefer a
singular object (‘stab’).

eventive predicate
ro’e
maxmi
macbia
doker

translation
‘see’
‘compliment’
‘point at’
‘stab’

perfective
25
62
81.3
95.8

stative predicate
mefake’ax
somex al
sone
Soxe’ax

translation
‘supervise’
‘trust’
‘hate’
‘forget’

perfective
10.4
25
81.3
95.8

imperfective
63.3
77.1
72.9
86

Table 5: Percentage of singular objects selected in sentence completion task
(Kerem et al. 2009 experiment 3)
The other two experiments investigated preferences concerning WR
interpretations of reciprocal sentences. In one, participants were given a
reciprocal sentence and had to chose between two drawings, one depicting SR
and the other WR. In the other, they read a reciprocal sentence (‘A, B and C
stabbed each other’) and answered a question (‘Is it necessary to conclude that A
stabbed B?25). Overall, these experiments found that preferences for WR
depended on the choice of predicate. Participants chose the SR drawing 90% of

24

The picture included a second person that the boy did not hit.

25

Answering ‘yes’ means that the participant has arrived at an SR interpretation; answering ‘no’
is consistent with the WR interpretation
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the time in the case of ‘hug’, but only 35% of the time in the case of ‘comb’. Table
6 shows a subset of the results of the question-answering experiment. It shows
the percentage of answers consistent with a WR interpretation. The predicates
ranged from those that overwhelmingly received SR interpretations (‘see’, ‘trust’)
to those where the preference for SR was less strong (‘point at’, ‘hate’).
eventive predicate
ro’e
maxmi
macbia
doker

translation
‘see’
‘compliment’
‘point at’
‘stab’

perfective
0
12
25
16

stative predicate
mefake’ax
somex al
sone
Soxe’ax

translation
‘supervise’
‘trust’
‘hate’
‘forget’

perfective
13
4
19
4

imperfective
4
14.3
12
31

Table 6: Percentage of answers consistent with WR interpretation (Kerem et al.
2009 experiment 4)
As mentioned earlier, Kerem et al. predict a correlation between a
predicate’s preference for a single patient and its acceptability on the WR
interpretation. They analyzed the results of the two picture-based experiments
and found a strong positive correlation, but it was not significant. As for the two
text-based experiments (their experiments 3 and 4; see Table 5 and Table 6), they
found a significant positive correlation, but only for the eventive predicates.
They found no correlation for the stative predicates.
As can be seen in Table 6, overall, WR interpretations were dispreferred.
That is, it is not the case that a preference for a single patient translates to a
preference for WR over SR. Compare ‘stab’ in Table 5 and Table 6; even with an
overwhelming preference for a single patient, this predicate allows the WR
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interpretation at most 31% of the time. Rather, the correlation is such that a
typicality preference for a single patient is merely associated with increased
acceptability of WR.
In modifying the SMH to take account of typicality preferences, Kerem et
al. (2009) have proposed a solution to the problem that WR interpretations cause
for the SMH. On their view, when a WR interpretation is preferred over a SR one,
it is not a counterexample for the SMH, but rather evidence that the SMH can
choose the strongest interpretation consistent with typicality. Their evidence of a
correlation between typicality preferences (patient cardinality), and the
acceptability of WR interpretations supports this view. What is left unexplained
is the behaviour of stative predicates. Why should typicality be relevant only for
eventives? We will return to the stative/eventive contrast in Chapter 4.

2.4 SMH and online comprehension
In §2.1 we saw four versions of the SMH, and §2.3.2 added Kerem et al.’s MTH.
This section considers the question of whether we can use these semantic
accounts to make predictions about online sentence comprehension.
As discussed in Chapter 1, I am assuming a serial model in which the
language processor is guided by structural principles in building a single parse
for a sentence (Frazier & Fodor 1978; Ferreira & Clifton 1986; Frazier 1990;
Frazier & Clifton 1996). This model has been extended to LF parsing (Tunstall
1998; Frazier, Pacht & Rayner 1999; Anderson 2004). On this view, the processor
by default builds the simplest possible structure. (This kind of model contrasts
with parallel, constraint-based models, where the processor makes use of
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multiple sources of information to build potentially many parses
simultaneously.)
On the serial, structure-driven approach, predictions about online
comprehension are closely tied to the particular grammatical representation that
is assumed. Take the Minimal Semantic Commitment (MSC) hypothesis of
Frazier & Rayner (1990) and Frazier et al. (1999). According to this hypothesis,
the processor only makes semantic commitments when those commitments are
invited (e.g. there is evidence or bias in the context that encourages a particular
commitment) or when a commitment is grammatically necessary (as in the case
of a choice between distinct (uncollapsible) grammatical representations). On this
view, processing evidence can be used to weigh in on the question of whether a
given semantic representation is ambiguous or vague. If the semantic
representation is underspecified or vague, then absent misleading context or bias,
the processor will not make a semantic commitment to a particular interpretation
during online processing. If the semantic representation is ambiguous, the choice
is grammatically necessary and the processor must commit to a representation.
According to the MSC hypothesis, semantic garden-path effects (in neutral
contexts that do not bias a particular interpretation) can be taken as evidence that
the particular semantic contrast involves distinct grammatical representations.
For the most part, the researchers who have proposed SMH analyses do
not discuss their implications for sentence processing26. In many cases, these
researchers see the SMH as part of a verification procedure, but asking questions

26

Sabato (2006:32) mentions that computational considerations favour looking at a specific
situation and asking whether pairs can be added while staying within the interpretation domain
(vs. considering other arrangements)
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about how the sentence processor fixes on an interpretation means thinking
about the problem from the other direction: the task is to instantiate individuals
and relations in the mental model of the discourse, not to determine whether a
reciprocal sentence is true in a given scenario.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 (§1.4), there is some relevant work from a
computational perspective by Syzmanik (2010) and Bott et al. (2011), but their
focus is on sentences with certain proportional and counting quantifier
antecedents. Gardent & Konrad (2000) propose a computational implementation
of the SMH; their system is discussed below.
Since most SMH proposals do not consider sentence processing, the
discussion in this section is by necessity speculative. Section 2.4.1 looks at
Dalrymple et al. (1998). Section 2.4.2 considers Gardent & Konrad’s (2000)
implementation of the SMH, and §2.4.3 concerns the MIH/MTH of Kerem et al.
(2009) and Sabato & Winter (2012). Section §2.4.4 looks at Dotlačil (2010). Finally,
§2.4.5 considers the predictions that each of these approaches might make about
the processing of sentences with the weakest reciprocal interpretation, the chain
interpretation.
2.4.1

Dalrymple et al.’s SMH

Recall that in Dalrymple et al.’s system, each other has a single, context-sensitive
meaning. It is a quantifier with parameters that are filled in by the context. The
interaction of two parameters results in 6 possible reciprocal meanings, and the
SMH selects the appropriate one in a given context.
Dalrymple et al. are careful to explain that each other is not ambiguous.
Nevertheless, since in their system the SMH chooses among a finite set of
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possible reciprocal meanings, and thus resembles an ambiguity account in some
respects, at this juncture it seems worth discussing the difference between
ambiguity and underspecification in the context of sentence processing.
Frazier & Rayner (1990) argue that selecting the meaning of an ambiguous
word (bank ‘financial institution’ vs. ‘river’s edge’) is a necessary decision point
for the language processor, but selecting between different senses of a single
word (newspaper ‘reading material’ vs. ‘publishing organization’) is not a
necessary decision point27. According to their Minimal Semantic Commitment
(MSC) hypothesis, in the absence of evidence favouring a particular commitment,
only necessary decision points require the processor to make a semantic
commitment. In the case of different senses of a single word, if there is no biasing
evidence pointing towards a particular sense, the processor can leave it
underspecified. But in the case of an ambiguous word this is not possible; one of
the meanings must be chosen.
Dalrymple et al. argue against seeing the reciprocal as ambiguous in the
same way as bank (1998:190); they say it has a single context sensitive meaning.
On the one hand, this suggests that choosing the appropriate reciprocal
quantifier will not be a necessary decision point. But on the other hand, Frazier,
Pacht & Rayner (1999:89) suggest that points where a decision is not necessary
are ones where the grammar remains silent: ‘The grammar will simply contain
no instruction about what can or must be done concerning the matter. No
grammatical choice point will be defined’. This does not seem to fit well with

27

They found that delaying disambiguation interfered with processing the less frequent
ambiguous word, but not the less frequent sense of a single word.

58

Dalrymple et al.’s view: after all, they propose the SMH as a necessary part of the
system, which derives the literal meaning of an utterance:
We claim that the SMH is a semantic principle determining the literal
meaning of utterances of certain expressions in any context appropriate
for the expression. As employed here, the SMH is not a pragmatic
principle – for example, for listeners to use in divining which reading of
an ambiguous expression a speaker might intend on a given occasion. It
does not concern how the speaker’s meaning can diverge from literal
meaning of an utterance. (1998:197)
But note that Frazier, Pacht & Rayner (1999) are talking about the grammar; it is
unclear whether the Dalrymple et al.’s SMH should be considered a part of the
grammar. They describe it as a semantic principle (1998:197), but it is not entirely
clear whether such principles should be considered part of the grammar.
According to the SMH, in (47), the reciprocal is combined with its
antecedent and scope, as well as relevant contextual information, resulting in a
set of propositions. If they are in an appropriate entailment relation, the sentence
is interpreted as the logically strongest proposition in the set.
(47)

Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH):
A reciprocal sentence S can be felicitously used in a context c, which
supplies non-linguistic information I relevant to the reciprocal’s
interpretation, provided the set Sc has a member that entails every other
one:
Sc = {p'p is consistent with I and p is an interpretation of S obtained by
interpreting the reciprocal as one of the six quantifiers…}
In that case, the use of S in c expresses the logically strongest proposition
in Sc.
Let’s assume that an SMH-like principle guides the language processor in

fixing on an interpretation. In trying to translate Dalrymple et al.’s SMH account
into a set of predictions about the task of the language processor, we need to
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make some assumptions about the role of contextual information in this system.
One might take the view that, absent relevant contextual information, this SMHlike principle cannot determine the logically strongest proposition and thus
leaves the interpretation underspecified. But on the other hand, it seems
plausible that comprehenders will fill in plausible values for contextual
information when necessary.
Consider Dalrymple et al.’s discussion of example (48) (1998:194). After
explaining how the relation follow into the church rules out various stronger
reciprocal interpretations, they note that two possible interpretations remain:
IAR (where the children entered as a single group, since IAR requires that each
individual be related to every other individual directly or indirectly) and IAO
(which allows more than one group to enter the church at the same time through
different doors, since IAO only requires that each child follow or be followed by
some other).
(48)

The children followed each other into the church.

Dalrymple et al. say of this example:
In a situation where the context supplies the additional information that
the children enter the church in multiple groups, IAO is the strongest
possible meaning, and it is the one that is chosen. When the context does
not supply this information, the stronger meaning IAR is chosen
(1998:194)
Faced with a sentence like (48), a comprehender who is guided by an SMH-like
principle might use plausibility and economy principles to posit a single entrance,
and use that filled-in contextual assumption to derive the IAR interpretation.
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It is not a simple matter to translate Dalrymple et al.’s SMH into a
particular set of predictions about online sentence comprehension. Their system
potentially allows for the reciprocal to remain underspecified, if the necessary
contextual information is not supplied or assumed. That is, comprehenders need
not make commitments to a particular construal. And an important feature of
their system is that it allows (or requires) various kinds of linguistic and nonlinguistic information to influence the interpretation. The question of how and
when that information becomes accessible to the language processor is not one
that I will address here.
Instead, I will discuss a toy version of Dalrymple et al.’s SMH, as
translated into a prediction about sentence comprehension. This is the Online
SMH hypothesis, in (49). I want to be very clear here: I am not claiming that the
Online SMH hypothesis is the only way (or even a very good way) of translating
Dalrymple et al.’s SMH into a principle of use to the sentence processor. In this
toy version, the serial sentence processor starts with the strongest possible
interpretation (SR) and shifts to the next weakest if that interpretation is
impossible.
(49)

Online SMH hypothesis:
The SMH describes a process that occurs in online sentence
comprehension. The processor applies the strongest reciprocal quantifier.
If that conflicts with non-linguistic information, it applies the next
strongest reciprocal quantifier.

According to the Online SMH hypothesis, processing a sentence where the nonlinguistic information allows the strongest interpretation should be the least
costly. The most costly would be the weakest interpretation.
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One aspect of Dalrymple et al.’s system not addressed in §2.1.1 above is
that the SMH involves calculating the meaning of the whole sentence, and in
particular paying attention to polarity/monotonicity information. In downward
entailing contexts, the strength ordering reverses. (The Online SMH hypothesis
(49) would need to be modified to deal with this.) And in combination with some
antecedents (non-monotone quantifiers, as in (50)) no proposition is stronger
than any other, so the SMH does not choose one. (This leaves open the question
of how people interpret these sentences28.)
(50)

Exactly ten members of this club know each other29.

2.4.2

Gardent & Konrad (2000)

Gardent & Konrad (2000) propose a computational implementation of the SMH.
They argue that since Dalrymple et al.’s approach involves the SMH choosing
among a set of possible reciprocal meanings it is problematic in computational
terms; they suggest that there is no method of checking each of the possible
readings for consistency that is guaranteed to always return a result. Instead,
they propose that the reciprocal has a single, weak semantic representation
equivalent to the weakest of Dalrymple et al.’s reciprocal meanings: IAO. In
addition, they introduce a predicate $R that is true of assumptions that are
28

Dalrymple et al. (1998) agree with Kamp & Reyle (1993) that reciprocal sentences with nonmonotone quantifiers do not have well defined truth conditions unless it is clear that only one
‘cluster’ of domain members satisfies the reciprocal. When it is clear that only one cluster satisfies
the reciprocal, they argue that usual strength ordering is preserved (1998:206). Bott et al. (2011)
provide some evidence regarding preferred interpretations of reciprocal sentences with nonmonotone antecedents like ‘exactly N’.
29

Discussing this example, Kamp & Reyle (1993:466) point out that it is clearly true if there is a
set of 10 club members, each of whom knows all the others, and the rest of the club members
don’t know anyone. It is clearly false if there is such a set, but with a cardinality different from 10.
But intuitions are unclear if there are multiple clusters, or if there is no single cluster where SR
holds.
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considered costly (in this case, this corresponds to the pairs of individuals that
are not in the relation). Putting these together, their representation of the
meaning of each other is as in (51). Reciprocal sentences have the weakest
reciprocal meaning (RCPIAO) and every pair of distinct individuals in the
antecedent that does not stand in the relation R is in the $R relation.
(51)

λPλR(RCPIAO(P)(R) ∧ ∀x∀y (P(x) ∧ P(y) ∧ x≠y ∧ ¬R(x,y) ⇔ $R(x,y)))

Gardent & Konrad’s version of the SMH is the Maximize Meaning Hypothesis
(MMH).
(52)

Maximize Meaning Hypothesis (MMH):
The valid interpretations of a reciprocal sentence S in a context Γ (where Γ
includes knowledge about the previous discourse, the discourse situation
and the world) are those which (a) are consistent both with the IAO form
of reciprocity and the information provided by Γ, and (b) whose
contributions to the scope relation are the strongest.

Their system implements the MMH as a requirement for minimality: what is
minimized is the number of pairs not in the relation (i.e. $R). Their model
generator enumerates possible models consistent with contextual knowledge,
and determines the $R cost for each. Once the lowest cost model is found, models
with non-minimal cost are eliminated. Gardent & Konrad argue that this system
never encounters undecidable logical problems. However, Winter (n.d.) points
out that putting $R within the denotation of the reciprocal leads to problems
with environments that are not upward monotone.
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2.4.3

Maximal Interpretation (and Typicality) Hypotheses

As we saw in §2.4.1, the SMH of Dalrymple et al. requires a sentence-level
calculation of which quantifier results in the strongest proposition. In Sabato &
Winter’s (2012) Maximal Interpretation Hypothesis (MIH) system, the
calculations all occur at the level of the predicate30. Reciprocal interpretations are
derived directly from the logical restrictions on the predicate.
There is nothing about Sabato & Winter’s system that suggests or requires
that the language processor make semantic commitments regarding reciprocal
interpretations during online sentence comprehension. Since it is not an
ambiguity account, according to the MSC hypothesis, we should in fact expect
the processor need not make these commitments during immediate processing.
Sabato & Winter’s (2012) and Kerem et al.’s (2009) discussion is generally
phrased in terms of the task of verifying whether a reciprocal sentence is true in a
given context. Their statements of the MIH/MTH have it that a reciprocal
sentence is true in a context if it is not possible to add another pair of individuals
to the relation (to which the MTH adds: ‘without decreasing typicality’).
Consider the sentences in (53). Kerem et al. assume that with ‘know’, typicality
increases or remains constant when adding more pairs to the relation31. Because
it is possible to add pairs to the scenario in (54) without decreasing typicality, the
individuals and relations in this scenario do not exhibit reciprocity. In contrast,

30

They disagree with the sentential strategy of Dalrymple et al. (1998). When it comes to DE
environments, they argue that there are confounding factors at work in Dalrymple et al.’s
examples.
31

Although they make this assumption, their experiments found that the relationship between
typicality and reciprocal interpretations did not work as expected with statives like ‘know’.
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with ‘point at’, typicality would decrease if pairs were added to the scenario in
(54). Therefore the individuals and relations do exhibit reciprocity.
(53)

a. The kids knew each other.
b. The kids pointed at each other.

(54)

<A,B>
<B,C>
<C,A>

As for the question of how the sentence processor fixes on an interpretation of
sentences like those in (53), it is unclear what the MIH/MTH should lead us to
expect.
Given that the MIH/MTH is not an ambiguity account, according to the
MSC hypothesis, in the absence of bias or evidence in the context favouring a
particular interpretation, we should not expect that semantic commitments to
particular reciprocal meanings are obligatory during immediate processing.
(‘Semantic commitments’ here might broadly be understood to include positing
certain relations between individuals in the mental model.) But one of the
interesting features of the MIH/MTH account is the degree to which the
reciprocal interpretation is available just by virtue of the meaning of the
predicate. Recall that according to the MSC hypothesis, the processor may make
semantic commitments that are invited by evidence or bias in the context. We
might see the choice of predicate as inviting certain semantic commitments. In
which case, we might expect commitments to particular reciprocal
interpretations during online comprehension, potentially as early as during
processing of the predicate. (So, potentially earlier than in the SMH system of
Dalrymple et al., which requires computation of the meaning of the whole
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sentence.) If we were to see online reflexes of the MIH, we would make different
predictions from the Online SMH hypothesis discussed above: since the
reciprocal interpretation is derived directly from the semantic restrictions on the
predicate, the processor need never consider and discard stronger interpretations
than are allowed given those semantic restrictions. The prediction is that – as
long as information about the semantic restrictions on the predicate is available
for free – there should be no difference in processing cost between the various
reciprocal interpretations.
(55)

Online MIH hypothesis:
The MIH describes a process that occurs in online comprehension. The
processor derives a reciprocal interpretation directly from the semantic
restrictions on the predicate.

2.4.4

Dotlačil’s SMH

In Dotlačil’s system, most reciprocal interpretations arise from a single,
cumulative semantic representation. The SMH selects the branching (i.e. SR)
interpretation over the cumulative (e.g. WR) when possible.
Given that this is not an ambiguity account, the MSC hypothesis would
suggest that fixing on a particular reciprocal interpretation is not a necessary
decision. In the absence of evidence in the context pointing towards a particular
interpretation, the processor need not make a semantic commitment.
On the other hand, the cumulative semantic analysis that Dotlačil assumes
raises questions for the MSC. In particular, note that Dotlačil’s account assumes
that reciprocals and plural sentences alike are associated with cumulative
semantic representations. Frazier, Pacht & Rayner (1999) argue that the
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collective/distributive distinction is one based on structural ambiguity. They
provide evidence that the processor commits by default to the collective
interpretation. According to the MSC, the processor only makes necessary or
invited commitments. If there is nothing in the context that invites the collective
interpretation, but the processor nonetheless makes this commitment,
collective/distributive must be a necessary decision: it must be structural
ambiguity. But Dotlačil assumes that a sentence like (56a) has a cumulative
semantic representation along the lines of (56b) that can give rise to a variety of
interpretations; it allows a collective interpretation (Sam and Ben together make
a single phone call to the girls) as well as non-collective interpretations (e.g. Sam
calls Amy and Bella, and Ben does likewise)32. If the processor commits to the
collective interpretation in (56a) over a non-collective one, this is not due to
structural ambiguity in Dotlačil’s system.
(56)

a. Sam and Ben called Amy and Bella.
b. (∃e)(*call(e) ∧ C*Θ1(Sam+Ben)(e) ∧ C*Θ2(Amy+Bella)(e))
We have evidence that the processor makes a commitment to a collective

interpretation during online comprehension of sentences like (56a) (Frazier,
Pacht & Rayner 1999; Frazier & Clifton 2001; Brasoveanu & Dotlačil 2012). If
collective/distributive is not a structural ambiguity, the MSC cannot explain the
commitment to the collective interpretation33.

32

Distributive readings with covariation, where one argument scopes over the other (i.e. subject
distributive, object distributive) do require a phrasal *-operator; the presence or absence of the *operator is thus a matter of structural ambiguity. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.
33

There are complications here to do with assumptions about phrasal cumulativity. Chapter 4
returns to this issue.
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Dotlačil’s account differs from Dalrymple et al.’s SMH and from the
MIH/MTH in excluding chain interpretations from the productive reciprocal
semantics. The SMH only chooses between SR and WR; weaker interpretations
arise from what Dotlačil speculates is a lexical process.
2.4.5

Predictions about chain interpretations

Reciprocal interpretations range from strong (SR) to the very weakest, which I
call the chain interpretation, as in (57)34. This section considers whether different
accounts might make different predictions when it comes to the online
processing of the weakest interpretations.
(57)

The chairs are stacked on top of each other.
First, let’s consider the predictions of the Online SMH hypothesis. If the

processor starts with the reciprocal quantifier that leads to the strongest
interpretation (SR), and works down the list rejecting impossible interpretations,
this suggests that the chain interpretation (because it is the weakest
interpretation and requires the greatest number of rejected interpretations) will
be associated with the most difficulty35.
The Online MIH predicts no such difficulty. On this account,
interpretations that are outside of the relation’s domain of interpretation are not
even considered. The kinds of predicates that receive chain interpretations are
asymmetric and acyclic – as long as the processor can access this information at

34
35

In Dalrymple et al.’s nomenclature this is IAR/IAO.
This prediction does not hold for DE environments, where the strength ordering reverses.
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no cost, there is no difference predicted between different types of predicates and
different reciprocal interpretations.
Another possibility is that Dalrymple et al.’s SMH, and the MIH/MTH,
describe processes that are not computed during online processing. In which case,
no difference is predicted between chain interpretations and other reciprocal
interpretations during online processing.
For Dotlačil (2010), the chain interpretation is not one of the
interpretations that the SMH is choosing between. Instead, it arises through a
separate, lexical process. Other instances of the reciprocal are interpreted using
the ordinary productive semantics, but chain interpretations are not. So the
reciprocal can be seen as involving a lexical ambiguity: productive vs. limited to
certain predicates/relations. We might expect that this would be a necessary
decision point (Frazier & Rayner 1990). But we cannot look for evidence of a
garden path effect because by the time the processor hits the reciprocal, the
predicate has presumably already narrowed it down to the lexical
interpretation36. It is possible that each other might have a preferred interpretation
(presumably the productive one), and it is possible that the lexical process that
results in arriving at the chain interpretation is not immediate. From this
perspective, either no difference is predicted between chain and other reciprocal
interpretations, or if there is a difference, chain interpretations may be associated
with some difficulty.

36

This is most clearly true if the idea is that there is a finite list of predicates that receive chain
interpretations (Beck 2001 seems to suggest this). Chapter 3 discusses the possibility of chain
interpretations with predicates that are not asymmetric. In such cases, the predicates are open to
other reciprocal interpretations too.
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2.5 Experiment 2: Chain/nonchain experiment
2.5.1

Method

Materials and design

The experimental items consisted of 14 items like (58).

The A and B conditions contained an unconstrained eventive predicate (that is, a
predicate that allows SR); the C and D conditions had a chain predicate. This is a
2x2 design, with predicate type (chain/non-chain) and reciprocal (+reciprocal
each other, -reciprocal DP) as factors. The complete list of items appears in the
Appendix.
(58)

a/b. When the manuscript was printed out, the editors teased {a. each
other / b. the intern} about the spelling errors.
c/d. When the bell rang, the biologists followed {c. each other / d. the
speaker} into the auditorium for the lecture.

As (58) illustrates, the A and B conditions contained entirely different lexical
material from the C and D conditions. This is not an optimal design, but
plausibility and other considerations made it necessary. (For instance, a number
of the chain predicates used in the experiment prefer inanimate subjects and are
stative – matching lexical material with the unconstrained eventive predicates
proved impossible.) The idea behind this design is that the DP condition acts as a
control for the reciprocal of the same predicate type.
Each item began with a temporal adverbial, which was meant to
encourage a ‘point’ interpretation. The subject of the sentence was a definite
plural DP. The predicates differed greatly in length. (Many of the chain
predicates were complex, e.g. be stacked on top of, while all but one of the
nonchain predicates consisted of a single verb).
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The experimental items were arranged in two lists, with two versions of
each item appearing on each list. For example, list 1 had A and D, and list 2 had
B and C for item 1. Because they saw two versions of each of the 14 items,
participants saw a total of 28 experimental trials. There were 72 filler items. The
100 trials were presented in an individually randomized order, following 8
practice items at the beginning of the experiment. Each predicate was used in
two items. Participants thus saw each predicate twice, once with each other and
once with a DP. (Other parts of the sentences were entirely different.)
Participants

Twenty eight members of the University of Massachusetts

community were paid for participating in the experiment, or took part for course
credit. All were native speakers of English and had normal or corrected-tonormal vision.
Apparatus

Eye movements were recorded by an Eyelink 1000

eyetracker. Viewing was binocular, but only the right eye was monitored. Stimuli
were presented on a 17-inch Viewsonic monitor. Participants were seated 60 cm
from the monitor; 3.2 characters equaled 1° of visual angle. The experimental
items were displayed on a single line.
Procedure

Participants were tested individually. On arrival at the

laboratory they read instructions, and then went through a calibration process.
The accuracy of the calibration was checked after each sentence. Participants
were instructed to read at a normal rate, for comprehension. When they finished
reading a sentence, they pressed a button to remove it from the screen. The
experiment took approximately 30 minutes.
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2.5.2

Results

The experimental sentences were divided into 5 analysis regions, as shown in
(59), with “|” marking the region boundaries. The first region is the adverbial,
the second region is the subject and the third region is the predicate. The fourth
region consists of each other/DP plus the following one to four words37. The fifth
region is the sentence final region.

(59)

a. When the manuscript was printed out,| the editors| teased| each other
about the spelling| errors.|
b. When the manuscript was printed out,| the editors| teased| the intern
about the spelling| errors.|
c. When the bell rang,| the biologists| followed| each other into the
auditorium| for the lecture.|
d. When the bell rang,| the biologists| followed| the speaker into the
auditorium| for the lecture.|
Trials on which there was a track loss were excluded from the analysis

(less than 3% of all trials). When a fixation of less than 80ms was within one
character of the neighboring fixation, it was incorporated into that neighboring
fixation. Otherwise, fixations of less than 80ms were deleted, on the assumption
that readers do not extract useful information from such short fixations (Rayner
& Pollatsek 1989). Trials with fixations of longer than 800ms were excluded from
analysis, on the assumption that such long fixations are likely to reflect track
losses.
The results of Experiment 2 appear in Table 7.

37

As much as practical, the spillover region extended until the next content word.
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Measure
First Pass Time
Nonchain reciprocal
Nonchain DP
Chain reciprocal
Chain DP
Total Time
Nonchain reciprocal
Nonchain DP
Chain reciprocal
Chain DP
Go-Past Time
Nonchain reciprocal
Nonchain DP
Chain reciprocal
Chain DP
Second Pass Time
Nonchain reciprocal
Nonchain DP
Chain reciprocal
Chain DP
Regressions Out
Nonchain reciprocal
Nonchain DP
Chain reciprocal
Chain DP

R1
(Adv)

R2
(DP)

R3
(verb)

R4
(eo/DP + spillover)

R5
(final.)

819 (40)
831 (34)
678 (31)
676 (31)

338 (14)
339 (17)
357 (21)
357 (16)

319 (10)
337 (18)
518 (25)
523 (22)

784 (38)
764 (37)
750 (29)
718 (31)

547 (31)
513 (33)
608 (33)
615 (33)

936 (51)
929 (42)
763 (39)
765 (41)

411 (24)
400 (22)
407 (25)
413 (23)

391 (15)
428 (24)
587 (28)
614 (28)

959 (39)
1034 (44)
868 (38)
869 (42)

648 (39)
603 (32)
700 (39)
669 (37)

861 (45)
872 (38)
693 (34)
692 (37)

372 (20)
350 (18)
383 (21)
384 (18)

361 (16)
380 (19)
567 (25)
579 (28)

898 (34)
988 (47)
828 (35)
844 (37)

889 (78)
851 (66)
837 (35)
835 (68)

80 (24)
88 (24)
70 (15)
77 (21)

55 (10)
56 (10)
36 (9)
45 (11)

52 (9)
73 (14)
40 (9)
56 (11)

103 (20)
121 (22)
68 (14)
73 (20)

2 (1)
0 (0)
5 (5)
5 (3)

0
0
0
0

3.0 (1.3)
2.0 (0.9)
4 .0 (1.2)
4.3 (1.3)

8.2 (1.8)
6.0 (1.4)
7.1 (2.4)
7.4 (2.0)

10.8 (2.4)
15.3 (2.3)
8.8 (1.9)
10.6 (2.1)

25.8 (4.3)
27.9 (4.0)
17.1 (2.8)
17.9 (4.0)

Table 7: Experiment 2, participant mean reading times, in milliseconds. (Standard error of the mean in parentheses)

As a way of compensating for the region length differences between
conditions, a deviation from regression analysis was computed. The reading
times in Table 8 are in terms of deviations from the reading time expected based
on the best linear fit between reading time and region length (Ferreira & Clifton
1986).

Measure
First Pass (DR)
Nonchain reciprocal
Nonchain DP
Chain reciprocal
Chain DP
Total Time (DR)
Nonchain reciprocal
Nonchain DP
Chain reciprocal
Chain DP

R1
(Adv)

R2
(DP)

R3
(verb)

R4
(eo/DP +
spillover)

R5
(final.)

-71
-59
-27
-30

-43
-41
-5
-8

-9
11
52
55

44
5
10
-23

-56
-91
-2
3

-99
-92
-53
-50

-43
-52
-25
-23

-1
38
40
63

104
159
11
14

-59
-104
-12
-43

Table 8: Experiment 2, participant reading times (deviation from regression)
I will begin by discussing the three measures from Table 7 for which a
deviation from regressions analysis was not calculated: go-past time, second pass
time, and regressions out. As expected, there are significant main effects of
predicate type on each of the measures, since the chain and non-chain conditions
contained entirely different lexical material. Given that in the case of these
measures there is no attempt to control for length differences, I will ignore effects
of predicate type in the discussion of these three measures.
Go-past time is the sum of all fixations from the first fixation in the region
until the eyes move out of the region, to the right. It includes time spent rereading previous regions, and re-reading the region itself. Second pass time is
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the sum of all fixations in the region after the initial first pass. Regressions out is
the probability of regressing out of the region during the first pass.
Apart from the aforementioned main effects of predicate type, there were
no significant effects in Region 1 or Region 2. In Region 3, second pass times
showed a marginal main effect of reciprocal (F1(27)=3.23, p=.083; F2 not
significant). The pattern was that sentences with each other in Region 4 had lower
second pass times in Region 3, but simple effects tests found nothing significant.
In Region 4, the region containing each other/DP plus spillover, go-past
times showed both a main effect of predicate type (F1(27)=20.73, p<.001; F2 not
significant) and a close to significant interaction (F1(27)=4.09, p=.053; F2 not
significant). For non-chain predicates, the presence of DP is associated with a
longer go-past time in Region 4 (t1(27)=2.12, p=.043), but for chain predicates,
there is no significant difference between reciprocal and non-reciprocal
(t1(27)=.46, p=.65). It is likely that this marginal interaction is attributable to the
different lexical material in the two conditions1. Unfortunately, the lexical items
in Region 4 were not matched for frequency or plausibility. In fact, the mean
frequency of the nouns2 in the chain condition was numerically higher (55) than
the non-chain (27) (Kucera and Francis frequency). The chain condition had a
larger range (from 0 to 204) whereas all the nouns in the non-chain condition
were below 86. And although there appears to be a numerical interaction in the
regressions out data from Region 4, there were no significant effects.
1

An alternative view might have it that each other is read faster than DP in the non-chain
condition (and that this can be taken as a baseline), but in the chain condition each other’s
advantage disappears and that this can be interpreted as difficulty associated with the chain
interpretation. But I found no other evidence supporting this interpretation.
2

i.e. the DP’s noun
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The rest of the discussion in this section is based on the deviation from
regression analysis. Even with the deviation from regression analysis attempting
to compensate for length differences, effects of predicate type are not unexpected,
given that the chain and non-chain conditions contained entirely distinct lexical
material. And indeed, 2 way repeated measures ANOVAs found main effects of
predicate type in each of the five regions. In the discussion below I will describe
all of the significant effects, but most are main effects of predicate type. Main
effects of reciprocal were found in Region 3 and Region 5. There were no
significant interactions in the deviation from regressions analysis.
In Region 1, there were main effects of predicate type on first pass time
and total time. Non-chain sentences had lower first pass time (F1(27)=16.11,
p<.001; F2 not significant) and lower total time (F1(27)=5.05, p=.033; F2 not
significant). Simple effects tests show that for first pass time, this was significant
for reciprocal (t1(27)=2.15, p=.041) and marginal for non-reciprocal (t1(27)=1.78,
p=.086). As for total time, simple effects tests found only a very marginal effect
for reciprocal (t1(27)=1.72, p=.098).
Likewise, in Region 2 there was a main effect of predicate type on first
pass time, with faster reading times in this region for non-chain sentences
(F1(27)=16.04, p<.001; F2(13)=2.88, p=.11). This was significant for both reciprocal
(t1(27)=2.90, p<.01) and non-reciprocal (t1(27)=2.56, p=.016). There were no
significant differences on total time for this region.
In Region 3, we see the first sign of another kind of main effect: there was
a main effect of reciprocal on total time in this region (F1(27)=5.57, p=.026; F2 not
significant). Only the total time measure showed this main effect of reciprocal;
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there was no first pass time effect. Numerically, the pattern is that the presence of
a reciprocal in the following region (Region 4) is associated with a lower total
time in Region 3. Simple effects tests found only that this was marginally
significant for non-chain sentences (t1(27)=1.98, p=.059). The rest of the significant
effects in Region 3 were of predicate type. There was a main effect of predicate
type on first pass time, with faster reading times for non-chain sentences
(F1(27)=18.31, p<.001, F2(13)=6.28, p=.026; this was significant for both reciprocal
(t1(27)=3.48, p=.002; t2(13)=2.43, p=.030) and non-reciprocal (t1(27)=2.53, p=.017;
t2(13)=2.02, p=.065)). And there was a main effect of predicate type on total time
in this region (F1(27)=4.85, p=.036; F2 not significant), with simple effects tests
revealing a significant effect of predicate type for reciprocal sentences
(t1(27)=2.20, p=.037): non-chain sentences had lower total time in this region than
chain.
In Region 4, the region containing each other/DP plus spillover, again the
only significant effects were of predicate type. There were no significant
differences on first pass time in this region. There was a main effect of predicate
type on total time, with chain sentences associated with lower total time on this
region (F1(27)=17.61, p<.001; F2 not significant). Simple effects tests found that
this was significant for both reciprocals (t1(27)=2.99, p=.006) and non-reciprocals
(t1(27)=3.62, p=.001). There was no sign of the interaction that we saw with
respect to go-past times in the non-deviation from regression analysis.
In Region 5, we see a marginal main effect of reciprocal (F1(27)=4.07,
p=.054; F2 not significant) on total time. The pattern is that the presence of a
reciprocal in Region 4 is associated with longer total time in Region 5. However,
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simple effects tests found no significant differences (p’s>.3). In addition, there
were main effects of predicate type on first pass time (F1(27)=15.85, p<.001; F2 not
significant) and total time (F1(27)=6.49, p=.017; F2(13)=8.86, p=.011), with faster
reading times for non-chain sentences. For first pass time, this was significant for
non-reciprocal (t1(27)=2.88, p=.008) and marginal for reciprocal (t1(27)=1.76,
p=.09). For total time, simple effects tests found nothing significant.
2.5.3

Discussion

2.5.3.1 No difference between chain and non-chain reciprocals
Experiment 2 found no clear evidence of any difference between chain and nonchain reciprocal sentences during online processing. A difference between the
two would be expected to show up as an interaction between predicate type
(chain/non-chain) and reciprocal (+reciprocal each other / -reciprocal DP).
For the most part, significant effects were of predicate type, and
attributable to differences in length/lexical material between the chain and nonchain conditions. There were main effects of reciprocal in Regions 3 and 5, but no
interactions.
The only close to significant interaction between predicate type and
reciprocal was found with respect to go-past times in Region 4 in the nondeviation from regression analysis. The pattern was that in the non-chain
condition, the non-reciprocal (DP) condition had higher go-past times in Region
4 than the reciprocal. In contrast, in the chain condition, go-past times were
similar for the reciprocal and DP. As mentioned above, the interaction is likely to
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be attributable to frequency and plausibility differences between the DPs in the
chain and non-chain conditions.
A number of the hypotheses discussed in §2.4.5 predict no difference in
online processing of chain and non-chain reciprocals. But two do predict a
difference. First, the Online SMH hypothesis assumes that the processor starts
with the reciprocal quantifier that leads to the strongest interpretation and works
down the list rejecting impossible interpretations. This hypothesis predicts that
the chain interpretation, the weakest interpretation, will be associated with the
most difficulty3. Second, if the chain interpretation arises through a lexical
process (as suggested by Dotlačil 2010), and if the productive reciprocal
interpretation is preferred, we might predict difficulty in the case of the chain
interpretation. Experiment 2 found no support for either of these hypotheses.
2.5.3.2 The time course of processing reciprocals
For the most part, the experiment found only marginally significant effects of
reciprocal. Nevertheless, the results provide some interesting hints regarding the
online processing of reciprocal sentences.
In Region 4, the region containing the reciprocal (or DP), there were no
significant differences between reciprocal and non-reciprocal sentences, apart
from the close to significant interaction on the go-past measure4.
There was a difference between reciprocal and non-reciprocal sentences in
the previous (predicate) region. Recall that there was a main effect of reciprocal

3

This excludes downward–entailing contexts, as mentioned in §2.4.1.

4

As mentioned above, this is likely due to frequency/plausibility differences between the DPs in
the chain and non-chain conditions.
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on total reading time in Region 3, with reciprocal non-chain sentences having
lower total times in Region 3 than their non-reciprocal counterparts. Numerically,
chain sentences showed the same pattern: a reciprocal in Region 4 is associated
with a lower total time in Region 3. (The same pattern occurs with second pass
time in the non-deviation from regressions analysis, where there was a marginal
main effect of reciprocal.) The total time and 2nd pass time results together
suggest that there is more rereading of region 3 when region 4 contains a nonreciprocal DP.
Given the fact that the possible interpretations of the reciprocal depend
almost entirely on the particular predicate involved, one might have expected
that interpreting the reciprocal would be associated with more rereading of the
predicate region. But what we see is the very opposite. One way of
understanding this is to consider the fact that the non-reciprocal DP, as opposed
to the reciprocal, involves the introduction of a new discourse referent. In this
sense, the non-reciprocal is more complex and thus might require more
rereading of the previous region.
Neither Region 3 nor Region 4 show any sign of processing difficulty for
the reciprocal. But in Region 5, the sentence final region, there was a (marginal)
main effect of reciprocal on total time. Though simple effects tests found nothing
significant, numerically the pattern is that reciprocal sentences have longer total
times in this region. That is, there is what looks like a sentence wrap-up effect
associated with reciprocals (Just & Carpenter 1980).
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented the results of two eye movement studies which looked for
and did not find evidence of SMH-like principles at work in online sentence
processing. It is important to note that these experiments were testing very
simple hypotheses: e.g. that the processor commits to SR by default. The null
results of the experiments are informative insofar as they suggest that the
processor does not make use of a default strong interpretation. These null results
fit with previous studies (Philip 2000; Kerem et al. 2009; Dotlačil 2009) that have
found evidence that language users do not commit to the strongest possible
interpretation of reciprocal sentences.
The null result of Experiment 2 is interesting in the context of accounts
like Beck (2001) and Dotlačil (2010) which treat the very weakest reciprocal
interpretation (the chain interpretation) as a lexical phenomenon, distinct from
the productive reciprocal/plural system. The experiment did not find evidence
that the processor treats chain and non-chain reciprocal sentences differently.
We saw Kerem et al.’s (2009) modification of the SMH to include typicality
preferences. Their Maximal Typicality Hypothesis (MTH) predicts that a
reciprocal sentence can truthfully describe a scenario weaker than the strongest
possible interpretation if that stronger interpretation would be associated with
decreased typicality. Kerem et al. provide evidence of a correlation between
typicality preferences concerning patient cardinality, and the acceptability of WR
interpretations. But this correlation only held for eventive predicates, not statives.
In conclusion, the null results of the eye movement studies discussed in
this chapter suggest that the processor does not by default make a commitment
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to an SR interpretation. These results are not informative on the question of
whether more sophisticated versions of SMH-like principles might guide
comprehenders in the task of interpreting reciprocal sentences.
The rest of the dissertation takes a different approach to the question of
whether an SMH-like principle guides the sentence processor to a construal of
reciprocal sentences. It begins with the assumption that there is no SMH, and
looks at whether SMH effects can be accounted for with other principles or
preferences.
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CHAPTER 3
NO WEAKER THAN WEAK RECIPROCITY
As we saw in the previous chapter, most contemporary accounts of the semantics
of reciprocals subscribe to some version of the SMH. Is it possible to account for
the range of reciprocal interpretations without the SMH? This is the question
addressed by the rest of the dissertation.
I start with the assumption that all reciprocal interpretations arise from a
cumulative semantic representation equivalent to WR (Dotlačil 2010). There are
two issues for such an analysis: how to account for interpretations stronger than
WR, and how to account for those weaker than WR. While Chapter 4 will look at
stronger interpretations, the focus of the current chapter is on weaker
interpretations. In particular, this chapter focuses on chain interpretations.
Chain interpretations of reciprocal sentences (e.g. The tables are stacked on
top of each other) are a puzzle that researchers have dealt with in different ways.
Some (e.g. Beck 2001, Dotlačil 2010) conclude that this use of the reciprocal is not
a productive part of the system, and exclude it from their analyses. But others –
notably Dalrymple et al. (1998) and Sabato & Winter (2012) – see the selection of
the chain interpretation as an ordinary part of the system. Dalrymple et al.’s
SMH, and Sabato & Winter’s MIH, select this, the weakest reciprocal meaning,
when no stronger reading is possible.
There are arguments in the literature against the kind of approach
espoused by Dalrymple et al. and Sabato & Winter. For instance, Dalrymple et al.
(1998:196) themselves note that their account overpredicts the availability of the
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chain interpretation (e.g. it wrongly predicts a chain interpretation should be
available for comparatives like #Amy and Ben are taller than each other.) Another
line of argument notes that the truth conditions for chain reciprocals proposed by
Dalrymple et al. and Sabato & Winter are even weaker than the cumulative
reading of plural sentences. For researchers such as Beck and Dotlačil who hold
that reciprocal sentences are a subtype of plural sentence, a weaker reading than
cumulative should not be possible.
This chapter presents a novel argument against the SMH/MIH
approaches of Dalrymple et al. (1998) and Sabato & Winter (2012), in particular
against the notion that the reciprocal is ever associated with truth conditions
weaker than WR. The key evidence comes from reciprocal sentences with
antecedents denoting two individuals. It is argued that variability in
acceptability judgements of such sentences is impossible to explain on the
accounts of Dalrymple et al. and Sabato & Winter. The variable acceptability of
such sentences argues against this interpretation being an ordinary part of the
reciprocal system, as those accounts suggest. In contrast, the variability has an
explanation if the chain interpretation arises through pragmatic weakening from
a WR semantic representation.
Section 3.1 looks at the literature on the cumulative/WR semantic analysis
and the evidence for weaker readings than WR. Section 3.2 looks at previous
accounts of the chain interpretation, and sketches an account that derives this
interpretation from a WR semantic representation. Section 3.3 uses the evidence
from sentences with antecedents denoting two individuals to argue for the WR
approach, and against analyses that assign weaker-than-WR reciprocal meanings.
Section 3.4 looks at how the chain interpretation arises from the WR semantic
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representation. Section 3.5 addresses the question of why chain interpretations
are sometimes rejected. It suggests a Gricean account might explain some of the
variability in acceptability judgements. Comparisons are made with the account
of Mari (2014). And in §3.6, the question of whether the chain interpretation is
truly a productive part of the system is addressed.

3.1 WR semantics, and readings weaker than WR
3.1.1 The cumulative/WR semantic representation
Langendoen (1978) introduced Weak Reciprocity, defined in (1), as a possible
interpretation of reciprocal sentences.
(1)

∀x ∈ A ∃y,z ∈ A (x ≠ y ∧ x ≠ z ∧ xRy ∧ zRx)

Langendoen pointed out the parallels between ‘elementary relational plural
sentences’ like (2a) and ‘elementary reciprocal sentences’ like (2b). Both are open
to a strong reading with universal quantification (Every girl tickled every boy;
Every girl tickled every other girl) and a weak one with existential quantification
(Every girl tickled some boy; Every girl tickled some other girl and was tickled
by some other girl).
(2)

a. The girls tickled the boys.
b. The girls tickled each other.
Sternefeld (1998) showed that a cumulative semantics provides the tools

necessary to capture Langendoen’s generalization. Sternefeld argues that
cumulation is responsible for WR readings of reciprocal sentences. On this view,
the weak (i.e. cumulative/WR) readings of both kinds of sentences in (2) are as in
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(3) – the only difference is that the reciprocal (3b) involves an anaphoric relation
and a non-identity statement.
(3)

a. <Girls, Boys> ∈ **λyλx[x tickles y]
b. <Girls, Girls> ∈ **λyλx[x tickles y & x ≠ y]
Getting this kind of analysis to work compositionally is another matter.

Sternefeld and others since (notably Sauerland (1998), Beck (2001) and Dotlačil
(2010)) have offered different ways of implementing it. While the specifics of
Sternefeld’s analysis have been challenged, the main idea – that cumulativity is
behind weak readings of both reciprocal and plural sentences – has proven to be
a fruitful one.
Beck (2001) argues that reciprocal sentences are semantically ambiguous,
with four distinct LF representations: SR, collective, WR and situation-based WR.
The WR and situation-based WR representations involve cumulative operators.
Even though in principle a cumulative (WR) LF would be compatible with a
range of interpretations (for instance, SR), in Beck’s system it is only responsible
for the WR interpretation.
In contrast to Beck’s ambiguity account, Dotlačil (2010) proposes a single
equivalent to WR. This single representation is argued to give rise to all
reciprocal interpretations (except chain interpretations1). Dotlačil represents a
sentence like (4a) as in (4b)2.

1

As mentioned previously, Dotlačil (2010) and Beck (2001) both exclude chain interpretations
from their analyses.
2

Recall that Dotlačil uses square brackets to covey another cumulative operator.
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(4)

a. Carl, Dan and Fern photographed each other.
b. (∃e)(*photograph(e) ∧ <c+d+f, c+d+f, e> ∈ [{<a, b, e’>:
C
*Θ1(a)(e’)∧C*Θ2(b)(e’)∧ e’≤ e ∧ ¬a o b}])

This is true if Carl, Dan and Fern and an event e can be split into parts that are in
the set {<a, b, e’>: C*Θ1(a)(e’)∧C*Θ2(b)(e’)∧ e’≤ e ∧ ¬a o b}. As usual with a
cumulative representation, there are many equally valid ways of satisfying this
requirement:
(5)

a. <c, d, e1>; <d, f, e2>; <f, c, e3>
b. <d+f, c, e1>; <c, d, e2>; <c, f, e3>
c. <c, d+f, e1>; <d, c, e2>; <f, c+d, e3>
In each of these cases, C+D+F are the plural agent and theme of the

photographing. Informally, we can think of it this way: what (4b) wants is for
C+D+F to fill the roles of both agent and theme of the photographing. It does not
care how this is accomplished, so long as subevents where the agent of that
subevent overlaps with the theme of that subevent are not involved. In each of
the scenarios in (5), the events can sum together to give the event <c+d+f, c+d+f,
e1+e2+e3>.
In the rest of the dissertation I assume Dotlačil’s analysis, where the
various reciprocal interpretations arise from a single semantic representation
equivalent to WR. I refer to this as the ‘WR’ or ‘cumulative’ account. Like Dotlačil,
I am committed to the idea that reciprocal sentences, like other plural sentences,
have semantic representations no weaker than WR. The next section looks at
reciprocal interpretations that appear to cause problems for this stance.
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3.1.2 Readings that are weaker than WR
Dalrymple et al. (1998) propose three reciprocal interpretations that are weaker
than WR: one-way weak reciprocity, intermediate alternative reciprocity (IAR)
and inclusive alternative ordering (IAO). (Beck (2001), Dotlačil (2010) and Sabato
& Winter (2012) collapse the distinction between IAR and IAO3. In what follows,
I will refer to both as instances of chain interpretations.)
Dalrymple et al. provide (6) as an instance of their one-way weak
reciprocity, which is defined in (7). The truth conditions are weaker than WR in
that each pirate need only take part in the relation in the first argument position;
not every pirate needs to be stared at. Sentence (6) can describe the scenario in
Figure 4, even though nobody stares at pirate 6.
(6)

“The captain!” said the pirates, staring at each other in surprise.

(7)

One-way weak reciprocity: |A|≥ 2 and ∀x ∈A ∃y ∈ A (x≠y ∧ Rxy)

Figure 4: Pirates staring at each other (Beck 2001:75)

As Beck (2000) argues, such examples can be analyzed as WR plus
exceptions. In the case of the pirates in Figure 4, pirate 6 isn’t stared at, so we just
remove him (via nonmaximality (Brisson 1998)). Beck argues that getting rid of
3

Sabato & Winter (2012) and Dotlačil (2010) discard IAO in favour of IAR. Beck (2001) keeps IAO
and gets rid of IAR. The main difference between IAR and IAO is that IAR requires that all pairs
be connected directly or indirectly, while IAO does not have that requirement.
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one-way weak reciprocity in favour of WR accounts for the contrast in the
acceptability of (8) in the scenarios in (9a,b). It seems fine as a description of the
scenario in (a), but not (b). The love triangle scenario in (a) satisfies WR: each
person wants to marry one of the others, and has one of the others that wants to
marry them. The problem with scenario (b) is that no one wants to marry C. This
is wrongly predicted to be felicitous if one-way weak reciprocity is a possible
interpretation. In contrast to one-way weak reciprocity, the WR analysis cares
about both directions: everyone has to be a wanter, and a wantee. And unlike the
pirates case, with only three people it is apparently impossible to treat C as an
exception.
(8)

Those three want to marry each other.

(9)

a. A wants to marry B. B wants to marry C. C wants to marry A.
b. A and B want to marry each other. And C wants to marry B.
The other kind of weak reading, the chain interpretation, is more

problematic for the WR account, and will be the focus of the rest of the chapter.
Consider the sentence in (10a) which describes the scenario in (11). The problem
for the semantic representation in (10b) concerns the endpoints of the chain: table
3 is not stacked on top of any table, and table 1 does not have a table stacked on
top of it. If you were to sum the events of being stacked on top of in scenario (11),
you would end up with the event in (12) which does not satisfy (10b).
(10)

a. The three tables are stacked on top of each other.
b. (∃e)(*BE.STACKED.ON.TOP.OF(e) ∧ <tables, tables, e> ∈ [{<a, b, e’>:
C
*Θ1(a)(e’)∧C*Θ2(b)(e’)∧ e’≤ e ∧ ¬a o b}])
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(11)

Table1
Table2
Table3

(12)

<T1+T2, T2+T3, e1+e2>
Such examples do not seem amenable to the kind of approach we took

with the pirates case. If the problematic individuals at the endpoints are removed,
via nonmaximality, the problem shifts to the middle table4. (Sauerland 1998
makes a similar point.)
Dalrymple et al. (1998) have as their weakest reciprocal interpretation IAO,
as defined in (13). All it requires is that each individual take part in the relation
in either first or second argument position.
(13)

IAO: |A| ≥ 2 and ∀x ∈A ∃y∈A (x≠y ∧ (Rxy ∨ Ryx))

They claim that the IAO interpretation appears in negated reciprocal sentences5.
For instance, sentence (14) requires that nobody know anybody’s name – it
would be false if even one person knew another’s name.
(14)

The people in the room don’t know each other’s names.

But such examples are open to another analysis: Beck (2001) and Dotlačil (2010)
argue that they can be dealt with using the homogeneity presupposition that

4

This will be discussed further in §3.4 below.

5

The SMH chooses the strongest meaning; in the scope of a downward entailing expression, the
ordinarily weakest meaning IAO is the strongest meaning.
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plurals are subject to6. If we follow Beck and Dotlačil in this, it leaves only chain
examples like (10a) as a problem for the WR account.

3.2 Various approaches to the chain interpretation
Section 3.2.1 surveys the literature on the chain interpretation. Section 3.2.2
sketches the approach I will adopt here.
3.2.1 Previous approaches
Some researchers propose that chain interpretations have truth conditions
weaker than WR. Dalrymple et al. posit IAR and IAO, in (15), while Sabato &
Winter (2012:19) dispute the need for IAO, and analyse all chain interpretations
as IAR7.
(15)

IAR: |A|≥ 2 and ∀x,y ∈A (x≠y ! for some sequence z0, …, zm ∈ A
(x=z0 ∧ (Rz0z1 ∨ Rz1z0) ∧ … ∧ (Rzm-1zm ∨ Rzmzm-1) ∧ zm = y))
IAO: |A| ≥ 2 and ∀x ∈A ∃y∈A (x≠y ∧ (Rxy ∨ Ryx))

The account of Mari (2014) is somewhat similar, in that all reciprocal sentences
must satisfy the condition in (16)8. As with IAR and IAO, this condition allows
for an individual to take part in either first or second argument position9.

6

When a predicate is applied to a plurality, there is a presupposition that the plurality is
homogeneous with respect to the predicate – either it applies to each member of the plurality, or
none of them. For example, The children are asleep means all the children are asleep, yet The
children are not asleep does not simply mean that not all of the children are asleep, it means that all
of them are awake (Löbner 2000).
7

More precisely, their system includes several reciprocal meanings that are variants of IAR, but
the main point is that they get rid of IAO.
8
9

“A\{x}” is read “the set A minus the individual x”.
There are a number of other conditions that reciprocals must satisfy in Mari’s system.
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(16)

a. ∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ A\{x} ∃J ⊆ I (R(〈x,y〉, w0, J) ∨ (R(〈y,x〉, w0, J)
b. In the actual world, every element x ∈ A is or has been involved in
the relation R with some element y ∈ A (either as the first or second
element of the ordered pair), in I or in a subinterval J of I.
Other researchers, who seek to capture the parallels between reciprocal

sentences and other plural sentences, are committed to WR being the weakest
possible interpretation of a plural sentence. Because chain interpretations appear
to have weaker truth conditions than WR, Beck (2001) and Dotlačil (2010) argue
that we have reason to believe that they arise through some other mechanism
than the ordinary productive reciprocal semantics. Beck (2001:130) cites the fact
that the chain interpretation is limited to a small set of spatial/temporal relations
to support her view that the chain interpretation arises through a ‘lexical process
different from ordinary reciprocity and limited to [that set of relations]’10.
Dotlačil (2010:141) agrees.
Schwarzschild (1996:128) sketches an approach whereby the asymmetry of
the predicate (and hence the impossibility of satisfying WR) pushes the hearer
towards a more elaborate cover11. He suggests that understanding a sentence like
10

Beck (2001:129) also points out that chain examples don’t interact with scope the way ordinary
reciprocals do. She compares the following sentences:
(i) These people were introduced to each other by a linguist.
(ii) The glasses were lined up behind each other by an apprentice magician.
Beck points out that (i) can involve different linguists, while (ii) requires that the same apprentice
magician lined up all the glasses. I am not sure what to make of this.
11

In Schwarzschild’s (1996) analysis, a cover is a way that the domain of discourse is structured.
A cover of a set of entities P is a set of subsets of P; we say that a cover groups the individuals in
P into cells (with one subset per cell). Take the plates. There is a cover in which each individual
plate is in its own cell. Schwarzschild uses such a cover to explain distributive interpretations (e.g.
‘The plates cost $5 (each)’). Or the plates might all be in one cell – this gives the collective
interpretation ‘The plates cost $5 (altogether)’. Other covers can be made salient by the context.
For instance, imagine the plates come in sets of 4 (there are 4 floral plates; 4 geometric plates; 4
striped plates etc). In this scenario, the cover might put each set in its own cell. We would then
understand the sentence ‘The plates cost $5’ to mean ‘per matching set’.
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The plates are stacked on top of each other might involve a cover where half the
plates are in one cell and half in another cell. As I understand it, the idea is that
These plates are on top of those plates and Those plates are on top of these plates are
both true if the two groups of plates are interleaved, and team credit is allowed
(not every one of the plates has to be on top of a plate or have a plate on top of
it)12.
For Sauerland (1998), chains involve a contextual restriction that has us
considering pairs or neighbours. In a sentence like The children followed each other
into the room, the ‘other’ part of each other provides, for each child, the child that
preceded them. In the case of a chain interpretation, there is a presupposition
failure for the first child, for whom there is no preceding child. This cannot be
fixed by accommodating a restrictor for the children that excludes the first one,
because then the problem would just shift to the second child in line. He
proposes using the ENOUGH operator in (17), which makes a predicate true of a
group if it is true of a substantial part of that group. Sauerland’s representation
of The children followed each other into the room, with the ENOUGH operator, appears
in (18).
(17)

ENOUGH(P)(y) = 1 if and only if there is an x such that x is a substantial
part of some y and P(x) = 1

(18)

ENOUGH(λy[⋆λx[[⋆[follow]]([the](κother∩[other](x)(y)))]](y))([the
children])

12

This approach would have trouble with a two-item chain.
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Bruening (2004) does not go into much detail on this point, but makes the
suggestion that chain interpretations arise from a WR semantic representation,
with the individuals on the endpoints being treated as exceptions.
3.2.2 WR plus endpoint exceptions
In what follows, I will argue that the chain reciprocal interpretation arises from a
semantic representation with truth conditions equivalent to WR. I follow Beck
(2001) and Dotlačil (2010) in holding that reciprocal sentences are a type of plural
sentence. Like Dotlačil, I assume that reciprocal sentences and other plural
sentences have cumulative semantic representations. In the case of reciprocals,
this means a semantic representation equivalent to WR. Like Sauerland (1998)
and Bruening (2004), I argue that the chain reciprocal interpretation arises
through pragmatic weakening.
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 work through the details of this account, with §3.4
focusing on how the pragmatic weakening works, and §3.5 looking at why chain
interpretations are not always possible. Before we get into the details of the
analysis, though, §3.3 presents an argument for the WR approach over
competing analyses.

3.3 Two-item chains support the WR approach
There is some variability in acceptability judgements when it comes to chains of
only two individuals. This section will argue that this is a crucial piece of
evidence in support of the WR (plus exceptions) approach. Analyses that
propose weaker-than-WR truth conditions for chain reciprocals fail to explain the
variable acceptability of two-item chains.
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3.3.1 Variability in acceptability judgements
My informants on occasion will completely reject sentences like (19), explaining
that it sounds nonsensical. In such cases, they report arriving at the impossible
interpretation where Box 1 is on top of Box 2 and Box 2 is on top of Box 1.
(19)

Those two boxes are stacked on top of each other.

This judgement seems to be quite variable. An informant might reject the
sentence emphatically, but after thinking about it for a while, or being presented
with a similar example, will change their mind.
The fact that some speakers reject sentences like (19) has been noted by a
number of researchers (e.g. Kamp & Reyle 1993:465). Bruening (2004:33) reports
that he and others he consulted dislike the examples in (20), originally from Beck
(2001:128). Likewise, Mari (2005) asserts that (21) ‘cannot be interpreted if the
plurality is composed of only two tables’.
(20)

a. The two books are lying on top of each other.
b. The two students followed each other into the elevator.
c. You put these two bowls inside each other.

(21)

The tables are stacked on top of each other.
While some speakers report finding two-item chains infelicitous, others

find them relatively unexceptional. They are certainly not rare in naturally
occurring text, and most research on this topic assumes that they are felicitous.
Although one might be tempted to treat Bruening’s and Mari’s observations as a
matter of a difference in idiolect, my own observations lead me to see this
variation as linked to the process of allowing for endpoint exceptions.
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3.3.2 Problems for previous accounts
Most of the accounts we have seen permit two-item chains with certain
predicates without reservation (Dalrymple et al. 1998; Beck 2001; Sabato &
Winter 2012; Mari 2014). And some accounts propose disallowing them
completely (Bruening 2004; Mari 200513). It is obvious that neither of these
approaches captures the variability in judgements that we have just seen. I will
argue that the variability is a crucial piece of evidence, and that it strongly
suggests that the approaches of Dalrymple et al. (1998), Sabato & Winter (2012)
and Mari (2014) are on the wrong track.
3.3.2.1 A problem for all accounts with weaker-than-WR truth conditions
The variability in acceptability judgements is a problem for all accounts in which
the chain interpretation has truth conditions weaker than WR. Specifically, the
accounts of Dalrymple et al. (1998), Sabato & Winter (2012), and Mari (2014) posit
truth conditions for the chain interpretation that are disjunctive: satisfied by each
individual taking part in the relation either in first or second argument position14.
Given that they have these weak truth conditions as an ordinary,
productive part of the reciprocal semantics, these accounts have no explanation
for why the number of individuals denoted by the antecedent should matter.

13

Note that Mari (2005) makes an exception for multiple two-item chains. So The tables are stacked
on top of each other cannot describe a single pair of tables, but may describe four tables arranged in
two stacks of two.
14

This is true of Mari’s requirements for events in the actual world (not including requirements
on events in possible futures).
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3.3.2.2 A problem for Sabato & Winter
Recall that in Sabato & Winter’s (2012) system, the logical properties of the
predicate narrow the field of possible interpretations of the reciprocal. For
instance, the relation be stacked on top of is acyclic, and Sabato & Winter assume
that the relation and its inverse are both functions. This narrows the possibilities
for the reciprocal interpretation down to IAR. While this system neatly accounts
for possible reciprocal interpretations, it cannot explain why an informant might
on occasion reject a sentence like (22).
(22)

Those two boxes are stacked on top of each other.
Given my informants’ comments, I assume that when they reject a

sentence like (22) it is because they have arrived at an interpretation equivalent
to WR, which describes an impossible situation. Here is the problem for Sabato &
Winter’s system: if the logical properties of the predicate narrow down the
possible interpretations of the reciprocal, there is no way for the sentence in (22)
to receive an interpretation that is incompatible with acyclicity. And yet, that is
what appears to happen when informants object to the sentence.
Sabato & Winter do not address this particular issue, but do point out that
their system has some trouble with certain other asymmetric predicates. In
particular, they note that comparatives are a problem for their account – rather
than receiving an interpretation consistent with the asymmetry of the predicate,
a sentence like (23) is interpreted as SR and is hence infelicitous.
(23)

#Anna and Bryan were taller than each other.

97

Sabato & Winter (2012:30) describe this as an ’unresolved interpretational conflict’
and say that the topic requires further study.
3.3.2.3 Beck; Dotlačil
Both Beck (2001) and Dotlačil (2010) exclude chain interpretation examples from
the regular productive system. Dotlačil agrees with Beck that it should be seen as
a lexical process. Even so, it is surprising that the number of individuals denoted
by the antecedent should matter for this lexical process. In contrast, I will argue
that if chain interpretations arise from the WR semantic representation by way of
allowing for exceptions at the endpoints, we have a natural explanation for the
variable acceptability of two-item chains.
3.3.3 Conclusion: no weaker-than-WR truth conditions for reciprocals
Accounts that propose weaker-than-WR truth conditions cannot explain the
variable acceptability of two-item chains.

3.4 Endpoint exceptions
I follow Bruening (2004) and Sauerland (1998) in seeing the chain interpretation
as arising from the ordinary reciprocal semantics, with exceptions made for the
individuals at the endpoints of a chain. But what is the pragmatic mechanism
that allows this?
One well-worked out account of exceptions is that of Brisson (1998).
Example (24) illustrates the kind of exceptionality Brisson accounts for: the
sentence can be true even if not every kid is taking part in the raft-building. (Say
there are 8 kids, and one didn’t take part.) Brisson refers to this phenomenon as
nonmaximality.
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(24)

The kids are building a raft.
Brisson’s approach to nonmaximality builds on Schwarzschild’s approach

to distributivity and covers. In Schwarzschild’s system, collective and
distributive sentences alike involve a distributive operator (Part). The
distributive operator has a context dependent domain selection variable, Cov.
The value of Cov is a cover. A cover is a set of subsets of the domain of
discourse15.
Let’s look at example (24) again. Assume that the kids denotes the set {a, b,
c, d, e, f}. Some possible covers appear in (25). If Cov has the value in (25a), the
sentence will be interpreted distributively (with no exceptions). If it has the value
in (25b), it will be interpreted collectively (again with no exceptions). Brisson’s
innovation is to allow for the possibility of ill-fitting covers. A cover is ill-fitting
with respect to a set if a union of the cells of the cover is not equivalent to the set.
The covers in (25c) and (25d) are ill-fitting with respect to the kids, because kid f is
in a cell with non-kids x, y and z. In Brisson’s terminology, kid f is in the
‘pragmatic junkpile’. For Brisson, the junkpile is a cell in the cover that contains
all the individuals in the universe of discourse that we happen to not care about
for the moment (1998:89-90). Since {f, x, y, z} is not a subpart of the kids, we in
effect do not care whether kid f took part or not.
(25)

a. {{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {e}, {f}}
b. {{a, b, c, d, e, f}}
c. {{a, b, c, d, e}, {f, x, y, z}}
d. {{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {e}, {f, x, y, z}}

15

C is a cover of a set of entities P iff: C is a set of subsets of P, every member of P belongs to
some set in C, and ∅ is not in C. (Schwarzschild 1996)
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The first objection to using Brisson’s approach with the endpoint
exceptions of a chain comes from the fact that, as we have seen, chain reciprocals
can describe the relation holding between two individuals. Brisson notes that
nonmaximality is sensitive to the size of the plurality; it is much more difficult to
obtain a nonmaximal interpretation if the plurality is small16. Beck (2001:128)
rejects an ‘exception story’ for chain reciprocals for just this reason.
The second objection concerns all. Brisson argues that all functions to
select well-fitting covers (and hence rule out nonmaximality). For instance, while
(26a) allows for some of the chairs to be elsewhere, (26b) does not allow
exceptions: each of the chairs must be in the dining room. Since chain reciprocals
necessarily involve exceptional individuals at the endpoints, if these exceptions
were due to nonmaximality, we would not expect that all would be compatible
with chain reciprocals. And yet (26c) is felicitous17. It seems that the endpoint
exceptions are not due to an ill-fitting cover.
(26)

a. The chairs are in the dining room.
b. The chairs are all in the dining room.
c. The chairs are all stacked on top of each other.

16

For example, if there are two kids, and only one is building a raft, it is hard to judge (24) true.
Note that Brisson (1998:50) provides an example from Lasersohn suggesting that given an
elaborate enough context (for example, where two people form a team) it might be possible.
17

Dotlačil (2010) provides evidence that such sentences are not always accepted. In a
questionnaire study, Dotlačil and Nilsen found that chain sentences with all were accepted 52%
of the time. This was significantly less often that chain sentences without all, which were accepted
88% of the time. Nevertheless, the fact that chain sentences with all are accepted at least some of
the time tells us that the exceptional individuals at the endpoints of the chain are different from
the exceptions Brisson deals with. We might account for Dotlačil and Nilsen’s result if all has
other effects than simply ruling out Brisson-type nonmaximality. I think it is likely that because
chain interpretations involve pragmatic weakening, judgement tasks like Dotlačil and Nilsen’s
may encourage participants to apply stricter standards than they would in regular conversation.
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Finally, consider what an account using Brisson-type nonmaximality
would have to say about a sentence like (27). Recall that on the WR account, the
problem with (27) is that both boxes are exceptional: one has no box stacked on
top of it; the other is not stacked on top of any box. There is only one event: (28b).
It does not seem possible for both boxes to be in the pragmatic junkpile18.
(27)

Those two boxes are stacked on top of each other.

(28)

a. (∃e)(*be-stacked-on-top-of(e) ∧ <box 1 + box 2, box 1 + box 2, e> ∈
[{<a, b, e’>: C*Θ1(a)(e’)∧C*Θ2(b)(e’)∧ e’≤ e ∧ ¬a o b}])
b. <box 1, box 2, e>
Sauerland (1998) suggests a different approach: he proposes using the

ENOUGH

operator in (29), which functions to make a predicate true of a group if it

is true of a substantial part of the group.
(29)

ENOUGH(P)(y) = 1 if and only if there is an x such that x is a substantial
part of some y and P(x) = 1
The first problem with this approach concerns chain reciprocals with

small-numbered antecedents. Given an intuitive understanding of what it takes

18

Brisson’s (1998:106-7) discussion of pragmatically weakened interpretations of inherently
reciprocal predicates like collide may be relevant, since she provides an example with only two
individuals, one of whom is in the junkpile. She notes that a sentence like Pete and Les collided may
be open to a pragmatically weakened interpretation, roughly synonymous with ‘Pete collided
into Les’. She suggests such an interpretation would arise if the cover assigns Les to the
pragmatic junkpile. But note that both (which is a non-maximality canceller like all) rules out the
weakened interpretation of the sentence (Both Pete and Les collided). In contrast, both can co-occur
with chain interpretations, e.g. I put both pieces on top of each other while cutting, they are perfectly
identical. http://www.mp3car.com/fabrication/78313-03-neon-sxt-in-dash-xenarc-install-2.html
[Accessed 17 September 2013]
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to be a substantial part, it is hard to understand how the level of exceptionality in
a sentence like (27) could be allowed using ENOUGH19.
Setting aside considerations of how to judge what is a substantial part, we
need to modify Sauerland’s definition of ENOUGH to deal with chain reciprocals.
Imagine there is a stack of three chairs as in (30). There is no event that satisfies
the truth conditions in (31), because we only have the subevents <C1,C2,e’> and
<C2,C3,e’’> to work with. Summing them gives us <C1+C2, C2+C3, e’+e’’>.
What we want ENOUGH to do is make the fact that the scenario satisfies the truth
conditions in (32) enough to also satisfy the original truth conditions in (31). That
is, make it such that C1+C2 is a substantial enough part of C1+C2+C3, and
C2+C3 is a substantial enough part of C1+C2+C3.
(30)

Chair 1
Chair 2
Chair 3

(31)

(∃e)(*BE.ON.TOP.OF(e) ∧ <C1+C2+C3, C1+C2+C3, e> ∈ [{<a, b, e’>:
C
*Θ1(a)(e’)∧C*Θ2(b)(e’)∧ e’≤ e ∧ ¬a o b}])

(32)

(∃e)(*BE.ON.TOP.OF(e) ∧ <C1+C2, C2+C3, e> ∈ [{<a, b, e’>:
C
*Θ1(a)(e’)∧C*Θ2(b)(e’)∧ e’≤ e ∧ ¬a o b}])

Sauerland’s definition does not work because there is no substantial part of
C1+C2+C3 that ‘be stacked on top of each other’ is true of. Perhaps it would
work to modify it as in (33).
(33)

ENOUGH(P)(y)(x)

= 1 iff there is a z that is a substantial part of y and a
w that is a substantial part of x, and (P)(z)(w) =1.

19

Indeed, Sauerland (1998:201) says of #My mother and I gave birth to each other type cases that the
problem is that one person is not a substantial enough part of two people.
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We might need a definition of what it is to be a substantial part that is
specific to individuals that fit into a chain schema:
(34)

If individuals x1 to xn are a chain, then x1 to xn-1 is a substantial part of
the chain, and x2 to xn is a substantial part of the chain. (And no other
subset of a chain is substantial.)

The idea behind such a stipulation would be to restrict exceptions to the
endpoints of a chain. That is, I am open to the idea that the chain interpretation is
not completely productive and may require that the scenario fit into the chain
schema20. A crucial part of this approach is the definition of ‘chain schema’.
What I have in mind is that there is a conceptual schema that can be
satisfied by spatially/temporally ordered individuals or events. A chain both
consists of a series of individuals/events, and is the larger object created by that
ordering (an arrangement, like a stack; a pattern, like a series of events) 21. In the
kind of schema I have in mind, the individuals are less important than the
pattern that they are arranged in. We might expect prototypicality effects: for
instance, chains may be best when the individuals are alike or indistinguishable22,
and chains probably prototypically have more than two members23. At present,
the notion of a chain schema remains in need of further development.

20
21

We will return to this in §3.6 below.
Mari (2014) talks about ‘paths’.

22

Mari (2008) suggests that a chain reciprocal works better to describe a stack with two books of
the same size than one with a tiny book stacked on top of a huge one.
23

Such prototypicality effects may be involved in the phenomena described in §3.5 below, but
are not explored here.
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This section has discussed some possible ways of implementing the
pragmatic weakening required to get from WR truth conditions to a chain
reciprocal interpretation. The phenomenon of endpoint exceptions seems distinct
from the nonmaximality dealt with by Brisson (1998). An approach along the
lines of Sauerland’s (1998) seems more promising. While I have contrasted the
kind of pragmatic weakening involved in allowing for exceptions with the kind
of nonmaximality Brisson (1998) was concerned with, the difference between
them in essence has to do with the basis on which exceptions are allowed.
Brisson’s account concerns examples where the numerosity of the individuals
described is generally what justifies excluding some of them as exceptional. But
endpoint exceptions are allowed for a different reason: we make a distinction
between middles and endpoints. Endpoints are by nature exceptional.

3.5 Chain reciprocals and pragmatics
I argue that the chain interpretation arises from the WR semantics via pragmatic
weakening. This section first looks at factors involved in this weakening (§3.5.1),
and then suggests a Gricean account (§3.5.2). Then §3.5.3 considers Mari’s (2014)
claim that chain reciprocals are only felicitous if the individuals in the chain are
potentially able to be reordered. It is argued instead that Mari’s examples involve
a pragmatic effect related to the fact that reciprocal chains do not specify the
ordering of the individuals.
The main idea of this section is that since the chain interpretation involves
pragmatic weakening, we should expect that this process will be sensitive to
various factors. In particular, this section focuses on two-item chains since they
are associated with the most variable acceptability judgements, and this
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variability makes visible the factors that affect the availability of the chain
interpretation.
3.5.1 Why are two-item chain examples ever rejected?
If the chain interpretation arises from the WR semantics via pragmatic
weakening (for instance, something along the lines of Sauerland’s (1998) ENOUGH
operator) then the question is: why is this interpretation not always available? As
we saw above, two-item chains are sometimes judged to be infelicitous. This
section discusses some factors that appear to affect the felicity of two-item chains.
One relevant factor is animacy. Two-item chain sentences with inanimate
antecedents as in (35a) are more acceptable than those with human antecedents
as in (35b). This isn’t to say that individuals of high animacy are never described
by two-item chain sentences. For instance, consider the naturally occurring
examples in (36).
(35)

a. The two tables are stacked on top of each other.
b. ?#The two girls are standing on each other’s shoulders.

(36)

a. I open up the door to find my best friend and the love of my life half
dressed on top of each other!24
b. After smoking marijuana, Peter and Lois are shown lying on top of
each other on the sofa25
c. Single luge can stay; we have all seen people on sleds before. But two
people lying on top of each other on one sled is a little foreign and
frankly, doesn’t make a lot of sense.26
d. He really looks like two people standing on each other’s shoulders27.

24

http://www.fanfiction.net/s/6079532/1/Cheated-and-Pissed-Rewritten (Accessed 24 April,
2013)
25

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Throats (Accessed 24 April, 2013)

26

The Michigan Daily, Feb 14 1994, p3. (The writer is complaining about the sport of doubles
luge.)
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Such examples are, however, predicted to be infrequent (and rejected more often)
compared to those with inanimates.
Another factor that is relevant is the number of two-item chains described.
While a single pair of individuals cannot be felicitously described by (37),
sentence (38) can describe a scenario with multiple pairs.
(37)

#The girls are sitting on each other’s lap.

(38)

“Trying to get people to political fundraisers is never easy,” he told
[this reporter]. “But on this occasion, I think we’re going to have people
sitting in each other’s laps.”28
Similarly, Mari (2005) reports that (39) cannot describe a single stack of

two tables29, but can describe two such stacks.
(39)

The tables are stacked on top of each other.
How are we to understand the effect of animacy and number of

individuals described on the acceptability of two-item chains? What evidence do
these factors provide about the process of allowing for endpoint exceptions, and
why it is that two-item chains are ever judged to be infelicitous?
One possible explanation for the decreased acceptability of two-item
chains is that all of the individuals are exceptional30. Both individuals are at the

27

http://www.pilkipedia.co.uk/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=9021&start=75 (Accessed 6
August 2014) (The writer is describing a very tall man.)
28
29
30

The West Australian, January 13 2010, page 2.
In later work, Mari does allow two-item chains.
e.g. Bruening (2004) takes this position.
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endpoints of the chain; with greater numbers, there are some non-endpoint and
hence non-exceptional individuals. But we can rule out this explanation: if this
were the case, then we would not expect that increasing the number of two-item
chains as in (38) and (39) would make any difference.
In my account, chain reciprocal sentences have WR semantics. A chain
scenario is always going to be an imperfect way of satisfying the WR truth
conditions. We have observed several factors that play a role in how likely we
are to tolerate the necessary endpoint exceptions:
1. Two-item chains are more frequently rejected than chains of greater
number.
2. Animate/human two-item chains are more frequently rejected than
inanimate ones.
3. Increasing the number of two-item chains described increases
acceptability.
It is commonly observed that vague interpretations are easier to accept if the
sentence describes a large number of individuals31. This gives us an explanation
for points 1 and 3. And it would not be surprising if we have a lower tolerance
for vagueness when it comes to discussing animates/humans. They are simply
more interesting to us than inanimates, so treating them as exceptions should be
associated with more of a penalty.
But this cannot be the whole story. Consider the contrast between (40a)
and (40b). Simply adding one individual improves the sentence greatly. It is hard
to believe that such a small increase in number should make such a difference –
typically, when discussing the effect of the number of individuals on tolerance
31

e.g. Dalrymple et al. (1998), Brisson (1998).
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for vagueness, we are talking about much larger numbers than this. The next
section, §3.5.2, looks at a Gricean account of this contrast.
(40)

a. ?#Amy and Bella stood on each other’s shoulders to reach the
window.
b. Amy, Bella and Caroline stood on each other’s shoulders to reach the
window.

3.5.2 A Gricean account
Let’s assume that exceptions are dispreferred32. Why should a speaker utter (41a),
violating this preference, when there is a competitor (41b) which does not violate
it?
(41)

a. ?#Amy and Bella are standing on each other’s shoulders.
b. Amy is standing on Bella’s shoulders.

Thinking about possible competitors might explain the contrast between twoitem and three-item chains. If we assume that there is a preference for brevity
(e.g. Grice’s Maxim of Manner ‘Be brief’), then a speaker has a reason for
violating *EXCEPTION in (42a) – the competitor in (42b) is too unwieldy.
(42)

a. Amy, Bella and Caroline are standing on each other’s shoulders.
b. Amy is standing on Bella’s shoulders and Bella is standing on
Caroline’s shoulders.

To my ears, the contrast between sentences (41a) and (42a) is quite stark. I take
this as evidence against an account that would explain the problem with (41a) as
being due to the proportion of exceptional individuals. Adding one more
32

This seems reasonable, but there will of course be preferences in favour of vagueness too, e.g.
Grice’s second Maxim of Quantity (‘Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required’). Krifka (2002) makes use of a preference for vague interpretations of measure
expressions.
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individual does not seem like it should be enough to remedy that. On the other
hand, the starkness of the contrast is not surprising on an account that considers
competitors.
If exceptions are dispreferred, then to describe chain configurations, we
should see speakers preferring non-reciprocal competitors, unless there is some
reason not to (e.g. brevity as in (42)). In §3.5.1 we saw that two-item chains of
inanimates are more acceptable than those with animates/humans. We might be
able to explain this contrast by thinking about the difference between animates
and inanimates when it comes to the non-reciprocal competitor. In the case of
humans, who are easily distinguishable and named, the competitor is clearly
preferable, as in (41). But consider the case of two stacked tables. Tables are
harder to tell apart than humans; they typically don’t have names or
distinguishing features. As mentioned in the previous section, it might be that
the penalty for exceptions is simply not as large for inanimates as it is for
animates, because we don’t ‘care’ about them as much. Or it could be that the
non-reciprocal competitor is itself somewhat disfavoured: in the case of the
stacked tables, non-reciprocal descriptions like (43b) and (43c) involve taking a
perspective on the scenario that distinguishes between the two tables (e.g.
making one the figure and the other the ground as in (43b), or providing further
distinguishing information as in (43c)) . Notice that these potential competitors to
the reciprocal (43a) are approximately the same length as it; cf. (41) where the
non-reciprocal competitor is shorter, and preferred.
(43)

a. The tables are stacked on top of each other.
b. One table is stacked on top of the other (table).
c. The teak table is stacked on top of the oak table.
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3.5.3 Changeable ordering
Mari (2014) observes that chain reciprocals seem to require that the ordering of
individuals is changeable, such that any individual could in theory be in any
position. For instance, she points out that while the sentence in (44) cannot
describe a living human being (where the spatial arrangement of head and body
is fixed), it could possibly be used to describe an artwork made of a decapitated
head and body.
(44)

(#)The head and the body are on top of each other.

In the case of a living being, the ordering of the body parts is ‘permanent’ and
‘decided’, and thus the use of a chain reciprocal is infelicitous (2014:245).
Likewise, she provides the case of the stacked pizzas (attributed to Barry
Schein): while (45) can describe a scenario where mushroom and pepperoni
pizza boxes are stacked randomly, it cannot describe one where pepperoni
pizzas are, according to company policy, mandatorily stacked on top of
mushroom pizzas (2014:217-218). While the ordering of boxes is non-permanent
– you could rearrange the order of the stack – the company policy means that
there is no reasonable future in which they might be so rearranged. That is, the
ordering is decided (2014:245-246).
(45)

(#)The mushroom pizzas and the pepperoni pizzas are stacked on top
of each other.
In Mari’s system, decidedness is important because chain sentences are

only felicitous if they can potentially satisfy SR, once plausible future events are
taken into account. If the ordering is not decided or permanent, then there are
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other orderings in possible futures that allow for SR to be satisfied. If it is fixed,
there are no orderings in possible futures that would allow SR to be satisfied, and
hence the reciprocal is infelicitous33.
In this section, I will argue that changeable ordering is a pragmatic effect
associated with the chain reciprocal. Reciprocal chain sentences do not specify
the ordering of individuals. Via Gricean reasoning, we might conclude that a
speaker who choses this form does not know or does not care about the ordering.
In support of this kind of approach, consider the fact that there are
felicitous examples where the individuals described by a reciprocal chain
sentence cannot be reordered in any possible futures. Mari herself mentions the
problem that examples like (46) cause for her account – given that the dolls’ sizes
are fixed, there are no possible future events that allow for SR to be satisfied
(2014:253n34). Likewise, the examples in (47) describe fixed orderings34.
(46)

The Russian dolls are nested inside each other.

(47)

a. Collectively, the vertebral bodies comprise the boney building blocks
of the spine. They are stacked on top of each other with a disc in
between each one35.
b. The jaw joint consists of two rounded bones sitting on top of each
other, similar to a golf ball balancing on top of another golf ball36.

33

This is true of sentences in present tense. Mari’s system makes different predictions for past
tense, because a constraint similar to the SMH requires that in the actual world, the maximum
number of pairs allowed by contextual information stand in the relation (2014:233-234). In Mari’s
branching time framework, there is a unique actual world prior to speech time, but there is not
yet an actual world after the time of utterance so this constraint does not apply to non-past
sentences (2014:235)
34

I am following Mari in assuming that the order of a living being’s body parts is fixed. (As in
her discussion of example (44) above.)
35

http://www.spine-health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/vertebrae-vertebral-column
[Accessed 8 February 2014]
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The examples that Mari uses to argue for changeable ordering, e.g. (44)
and (45), are easy to account for if this is a pragmatic effect of choosing a form
which does not specify the ordering of individuals. For instance, there are several
reasons why we do not describe the arrangement of a living human’s head and
body as in (44) (repeated here as (48b)). First, why choose this form when there is
a better competitor in (48a)? Second, why use a form that can be associated via
Gricean reasoning with the conclusion that the speaker does not know or care
about the ordering? On the other hand, if we are talking about artworks made of
body parts, it seems likely that the precise ordering of the body parts is less
interesting than the fact that they are stacked at all.
(48)

a. The head is on top of the body.
b. #The head and the body are on top of each other.
Likewise, Mari’s pizza example (45) simply shows that a speaker would

not choose a form that does not specify the ordering when the precise ordering is
salient, and particularly when there is a concise competitor that does specify that
ordering (The pepperoni pizzas are stacked on top of the mushroom pizzas).
In my analysis, the question of whether the items can be rearranged is
irrelevant. Sometimes the speaker’s choice to use the chain reciprocal can be
associated with this particular pragmatic effect. The effect is likely to arise if
there are few (in particular only two) items in the chain. This is because such
sentences have a concise non-reciprocal competitor that specifies the ordering. By
not choosing the competitor, the speaker leaves themselves open to the hearer

36

http://pvpost.com/2013/05/28/active-injury-free-pop-pop-ow-all-about-jaw-pain-18670
[Accessed 8 February 2014]
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concluding that the items are freely ordered. In the case of the Russian dolls in
(46), there is no such effect because of what we know about the world: there is
only one possible ordering.
Speakers can have various reasons for choosing the reciprocal – which
does not specify the ordering – over a competitor that does. Consider the
headline in (49), from a news story about two students. What happened was that
student A moved from one town to another, and then student B made the same
move. Then Student A graduated at the top of the class, and student B was
runner-up. In both cases, B ‘follows’ A.
(49)

[East Greenwich]’s top grads have followed each other before37

What is interesting about this example is that it has characteristics that typically
make the chain interpretation more difficult: two individuals of high animacy.
The writer could have chosen to describe the scenario as “Student B follows
Student A again” but seems to be trying to focus on the pair of them, in a
noncompetitive way. The writer has a reason (e.g. politeness) for not choosing
the non-reciprocal competitor. The Gricean reasoning associated with the choice
of the chain reciprocal over its non-reciprocal competitor does not always lead to
the conclusion that the individuals are freely ordered38.

37

http://www.independentri.com/local/article_55cce459-16a7-5884-92a2-4278b417cff7.html
(Accessed 13 April 2013)
38

Even in Mari’s system, you wouldn’t expect free ordering here, since both events (the
presupposed one, and the asserted one) are prior to speech time. Mari’s SMH constraint applies
to events are prior to speech time. This constraint requires the maximum number of pairs to
stand in the relation, given real world knowledge. There are two separate events of following;
Mari’s system could use the SMH constraint separately on each of them, resulting in the actual
interpretation where SR does not hold over both events (since in both cases B follows A).
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In conclusion, though it often seems that chain reciprocals describe
scenarios where the individuals are freely ordered, it is better seen as a pragmatic
effect.

3.6 Is the chain interpretation productive?
I am proposing an account where the chain reciprocal interpretation arises from
the ordinary reciprocal semantics. What distinguishes the chain reciprocal is that
there are exceptions – specifically, exceptions at the endpoints of the chain. Since
the chain interpretation arises from the regular semantics, one of the tasks for
this account is to explain why it is not always a possible interpretation.
It has long been observed that only certain predicates allow the chain
interpretation. Consider the examples in (50) (Langendoen 1978).
(50)

a. They {followed/#preceded} each other into the elevator.
b. The plates are stacked {on top of / #underneath} each other.

Langendoen explains these contrasts by saying that we simply have a particular
preference for certain configurations of figure and ground:
It would appear that the ordering of elements that is required in order for
such sentences to be so used is, however, a natural (or possibly culturally
determined) one. We normally stack things one on top of the other rather
than the other way around, line up one behind the other rather than one in
front of the other, and view time as progressing from earlier to later rather
than from later to earlier. (1978:193)
Changing our assumptions about the world can change the acceptability of these
sentences. Schein (2003) has us imagine a set of magnetic plates that are placed
underneath a shelf, with each plate attracted to the one above it. These plates
might be described as being stacked underneath each other.
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Setting considerations of the preferred direction of ordering aside, the
other thing to explain is why not all asymmetric predicates are allowed. Section
3.6.1 looks at comparatives. Section 3.6.2 looks at other asymmetric predicates.
Section 3.6.3 considers other predicates.
3.6.1 Comparatives
The fact that comparatives disallow the chain reciprocal interpretation has been a
longstanding puzzle for those accounts that see the chain interpretation as a
productive part of the system. Dalrymple et al. (1998) note that it is a problem for
their account. Recent work by Sabato & Winter (2012) discusses some possible
approaches to the problem.
As we saw above, Mari (2014) has it that the reciprocal requires that it be
possible for future events to rearrange the ordering so as to satisfy SR. In her
system, this accounts for the unavailability of the chain interpretation for
comparatives: in many cases, comparatives describe fixed states of affairs, thus
there is no possibility of future reordering. For instance, (51) is infelicitous
because we assume that buildings are of fixed height (2014:248)39.
(51)

#The skyscrapers are taller than each other.
Mari (2014) shows that comparatives can co-occur with the reciprocal in

certain circumstances. For instance, the adverbial in (52b) makes available a

39

Mari cites Dowty’s (1979) notion of ‘inertia’. Even though a future earthquake might change
the buildings’ heights with respect to each other, this event is not part of the plausible future.
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reciprocal interpretation. It is not, however, a chain interpretation. Rather, it
describes a situation that (at least) satisfies WR40.
(52)

a. #My sons were taller than each other.
b. My sons were taller than each other at different stages in their lives.
Other examples provided by Mari (2014) do seem to be able to receive

chain interpretations. Consider (53). It can describe many kinds of scenario, but
one example of a chain interpretation would be where there are a group of men,
and each man runs a lap, and is faster than the previous man41. And the naturally
occurring example from Mari (2008:30) in (54) receives a chain interpretation: the
flowers are planted a few weeks apart, and the first planting and the last planting
are endpoint exceptions.
(53)

These men are running faster than each other at each lap.

(54)

I try to have several varieties blooming throughout the growing season
by either choosing ones that bloom progressively at certain times of the
season or by planting them a few weeks later than each other in
stages42.
Sabato & Winter (2012) provide a number of naturally occurring examples

where comparatives co-occur with the reciprocal, including ones that receive
interpretations that are similar to chain interpretations, such as those in (55).

40

If there are two sons, each is taller than the other at some point (i.e. equivalent to WR/SR). If
there are more than two, it is unclear to me exactly what is required.
41

If each man runs only once, this is not available with only two men. It seems to require a
reasonable number of men and runs (at least four?).
42

Arlene Wright-Correll, The Impractical Gardener, 2007, p15. (Accessed via Google Books, 31
August 2013.)
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(55)

a. To see if two numeric values are greater than each other, we use the
comparison operator >.
b. Do different liquids evaporate slower than each other?
Sabato & Winter note that verbs of comparison like outrank or exceed seem

more open to chain interpretations than adjectival comparatives (2012:239). They
provide example (56), which is a clear case of a chain interpretation with a verb
of comparison. The personnel outrank each other from left to right, so the
leftmost department is outranked by no one, and the rightmost outranks no one.
(56)

Personnel of equivalent-level ranks outrank each other by department
on the chart below from left-to-right.
As we have just seen, comparatives can receive chain interpretations.

Nevertheless, they typically do not. I think comparatives typically disallow
exceptions (and hence the chain interpretation) because their very point is to
convey ordering relative to some scale. The difference between follow and be taller
than is that while both convey an ordering (A follows B; A is taller than B), follow
has more to it. If A followed B in, then we know that they both took the same
path and ended up in the same place and so on. If boxes are stacked on top of
each other, then what is of interest that they form a particular configuration (a
stack). But with be taller than, the ordering (on the tallness scale) is all that there is.
In some cases, whether the items can be ranked on a particular scale at all
is what is of interest. This is how I would explain what is going on in the
examples in (55) above. This brings us back to the pragmatic effect of choosing
the chain reciprocal over a competitor expression. A speaker choosing the
reciprocal typically leads the hearer to conclude that the ordering is not
important. And since comparatives are usually used to express an ordering
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relation, they are usually incompatible. They are compatible when the ordering
itself is not important, for example when what is of interest is whether the items
can be ranked at all43.
When they receive chain interpretations, comparatives like those in (57)
require that the antecedent denote more than two individuals (or in (57a) more
than two laps). I would explain this using the reasoning familiar from §3.5.2: a
non-reciprocal competitor is preferable for smaller numbers of individuals.
(57)

a. These men are running faster than each other at each lap.
b. I plant them a few weeks later than each other in stages.
These examples also seem to depend on explicit adverbial modification to

make available the chain interpretation, as the somewhat infelicitous examples in
(58) show.
(58)

a. #?These men are running faster than each other.
b. #?I plant several varieties later than each other.

Mari (2014:254) mentions the following example (attributed to Chris Kennedy):
(59)

The boys are successively taller than each other.

She notes of sentence (59) that:
it can be uttered by someone describing the sizes of boys standing in a line,
provided she/he goes from one boy to the other. The sentence describes a
‘path’ in which the criterion for moving on from one position to the other
is to reach boys with greater sizes.

43

This seems to fit the flower-planting example (54) too. The particular order in which they are
planted is irrelevant, what matters is the spacing (weeks apart vs. being planted all at once).
Similarly with the men running laps in (53): what matters is the pattern (each lap is faster than
the previous one)
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The adverbial in (59) is crucial. Without successively or something like it, the line
context Mari describes is not enough to make the chain interpretation felicitous,
as (60) shows.
(60)

Scenario: The boys line up, and as it happens they are arranged in
order of increasing height. I am walking along the line and I say:
a. #Hey, the boys are taller than each other.
b. Hey, the boys are taller than each other as you go along.

It seems that comparatives require the adverbial modification to provide the
necessary chain structure. As Mari points out, the adverbial needs to draw
attention to the ‘path’; a for-adverbial as in (61) does not work (2006:252).
(61)

#The skyscrapers are taller than each other for miles.

3.6.2 Other asymmetric predicates
If the chain interpretation arises from the ordinary reciprocal semantics, then we
need to explain why this interpretation is not generally available for asymmetric
predicates. Consider examples (62a,b) from Mari (2014) and (62c) from Beck
(2001). Why is it that these are not open to a chain interpretation?
(62)

a. #My mother and I gave birth to each other.
b. #The two kings succeeded each other44.
c. #The three men buried each other on this hillside45.
Actually, it has been pointed out (Beck 2001) that such examples may

become acceptable when the antecedent denotes a large group:
44

In a context where succession happens after death, or where a king is not allowed to retake the
throne after giving it up. (It could describe two kings who alternate multiple times, but that
would satisfy WR so is not of interest here)
45

‘Buried’ in the sense of ‘buried after death’.
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(63)

a. The members of this family have inherited the shop from each other
for generations.
b. The settlers have buried each other on this hillside for centuries.
c. The kings succeeded each other46.
Mari (2014:253) reports that her corpus study found such examples

‘almost exclusively… in historical and legend reporting contexts’. Beck (2001:128)
says the effect of the size of the antecedent is evidence that ‘it is possible to tell
some kind of an exception story’ about these. She contrasts this with predicates
like on top of or follow that allow chain interpretations with small-sized
antecedents. For Beck, an exception story is ‘extremely implausible’ in the case of
these predicates47.
Both Beck and Mari draw a distinction between these asymmetric
predicates and the temporal/spatial ones (on top of, follow). For Mari it is that the
temporal/spatial ones allow for possible futures with different ordering. For
Beck, it is that the chain interpretation is lexically restricted to a small set of
temporal/spatial relations. Both point to the fact that apparent chain
interpretations of non-temporal/spatial asymmetric predicates require that the
antecedent denotes a large group. For instance, consider the contrast between
Beck’s example in (64a) and one like (64b):
(64)

46

a #The three men buried each other on this hillside.
b. The three men stood on each other’s shoulders to reach the ceiling.

Example from Mari (2014).

47

By an ‘exception story’ I assume that Beck means something like Brisson-type nonmaximality,
in which case I agree: as argued above in §3.4, that does not explain on top of and follow.
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Here are some ideas. First is that there is something special about the
chain interpretation – say it needs to have a particular configuration, a ‘chain
schema’. While these asymmetric predicates can map onto this kind of structure
temporally, it is indirect. So we might say that we simply require a larger
number of individuals in order to justify seeing the situation as involving the
required configuration.
Another idea: dramatic changes of state like those in (62) disincline us
from allowing for endpoint exceptions (and/or choosing to express the relation
with a chain reciprocal which does not specify the ordering). To test this, we
would need to think about asymmetric predicates that are not ‘interesting’ in this
way – for instance, of low transitivity (e.g. no impact on the object).
From my point of view, the reason that #My mother and I gave birth to each
other is out is that there is a perfectly good competitor: My mother gave birth to me.
Examples of this type improve with larger numbers because the competitors
become more cumbersome. (What this leaves unaccounted for is that with the
familiar temporal/spatial examples, there is a dramatic improvement going from
two to three items in the chain. These other asymmetric predicates seem to
require much larger numbers.)
Unlike Beck (2001) and Dotlačil (2010), I do not think that the chain
interpretation is limited to a particular set of spatial/temporal relations (e.g. Beck
2001:128 provides a very short list). I think it is fairly productive. Consider the
following examples describing relay races48:

48

In the context of a relay race, we understand pass the baton as an asymmetric predicate.
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(65)

There were no mistakes this time as the four Americans passed the
baton to each other safely and quickly but they were beaten on merit49.

(66)

As a demonstration of the family ties within the club, a unique
occurrence was observed where 3 sets of family members passed the
baton to each other50.

The context of example (66) makes it clear that what is described is three twoitem chains, as shown in in (67).
(67)

Family 1: mother passes to daughter
Family 2: father passes to son
Family 3: sister passes to sister

Like other chain reciprocals, judgements are variable when it comes to chains of
only two individuals. To my ears, sentence (68) sounds somewhat odd as a
description of a chain scenario. However, it is easy to turn up naturally occurring
examples with only two individuals, as in (69).
(68)

?Today we had a mother and daughter pass the baton to each other.

(69)

a. The brothers pass the baton to each other in the 4x100 relay with
Stephen the third leg and Courtney the anchor51.
b. Kristel watches as two of the other people in her relay try to pass the
baton to each other52.
The example in (70) involves a chain interpretation of evolve into with a

three-membered antecedent.
49

http://mobile.reuters.com/article/olympicsNews/idUSL6E8JB32H20120811?irpc=970
[accessed 23 December 2013]
50

http://www.valleyaths.org/results/s06_07/winter/road_rlys.html [accessed 23 December
2013]
51

http://onlineathens.com/stories/051304/jef_20040513077.shtml [accessed 22 January 2014]

52

http://jesus-deafchurch.blogspot.com/2010_11_01_archive.html?m=1 [accessed 22 January
2014]
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(70)

Those protohumans are generally known as Australopithecus africanus,
Homo habilus, and Homo erectus, which apparently evolved into each other
in that sequence53.

I see examples like this as evidence that chain interpretations are available for
more than just a short list of relations specified in the lexicon54.
3.6.3 Other predicates
If the chain interpretation arises from the ordinary WR semantics, then it should
be possible for non-asymmetric predicates to receive this interpretation.
In a production study, Hurst & Nordlinger (2011) found that participants
sometimes used reciprocal sentences in describing chain-like scenarios with nonasymmetric predicates like have a conversation with or talk to. Specifically, in
response to a video clip showing two people where one of them is speaking and
the other is ‘actively engaged in listening’, participants offered descriptions like
those in (71) (2011:83).
(71)

a. Two guys having a serious conversation with one another.
b. Person and boy talking to each other facing each other in a room.

Hurst & Nordlinger note that participants were less likely to offer reciprocal
descriptions of other superficially similar scenarios involving events where one
person hugged, hit or looked at another person (with that person not
reciprocating). I think cases like those in (71) are not clear examples of a chain

53

Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, Vintage, London, 1998, p36.

54

This particular example is complicated in that the three individuals are kinds, and the
evolution occurs over a long period of time. Mari (2014) might describe it as a ‘historical
reporting context’ and Beck (2001) might see it as involving nonmaximality since these kinds
involve countless individual members.
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interpretation. Rather, in (71a), have a conversation with satisfies WR: speaking and
listening are both ways of taking part in a conversation. In (71b), talk to seems to
be being understood in the same way.
Philip (2000) found evidence that speakers sometimes accept chain
interpretations with non-asymmetric predicates. In one experiment, English
speaking adults allowed a chain interpretation of sentences like (72) 24% of the
time. (This is how often they answered the question affirmatively in a scenario
like Figure 5.)
(72)

Did the dog, the cat, the mouse and the rabbit squirt each other?

dog ! cat ! mouse ! rabbit
Figure 5: Animals squirting (Philip’s T1 condition)

In another of his experiments, Dutch speakers answered questions like
(73) affirmatively in contexts like Figure 6 13% of the time. Generalizing over the
two experiments, Philip (2000:14) reports that ‘none of the adults tested gave the
predicted no response one hundred percent of the time under the T1 condition’.
In contrast, all of them gave the expected no response 100% of the time for the
NO control condition55.
(73)

Kietelen
de
katten elkaar?
tickle
the
cats RECIP
‘Are the cats tickling each other?’

55

However, Philip reports that the difference between the T1 condition and the NO control
condition was not significant.
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cat1 ! cat 2 ! cat 3 ! bird
Figure 6: Cats tickling (Philip's T1 condition)

Poortman (2011) discusses some pilot experiments in which Dutch
speakers accepted the chain interpretation. Participants were given a drawing of
the scenario in (74), and their task was to decide whether the picture was a
possible depiction of the sentence in (75).

(74)

(75)

Cindy ! Sofie ! Emma

In
deze tekening
kammen
Cindy, Sofie en Emma elkaar.
in
this
drawing
combing
C.
S. and E. RECIP
‘In this drawing, Cindy, Sofie and Emma are combing each
other(‘s hair)’

In Poortman’s third pilot study, scenarios like (74) were judged acceptable 63%
of the time. However, in the subsequent experiment (with a larger number of
participants, test items, and verbs) the acceptance rate was much lower (around
20%).
These experiments suggest that the chain interpretation is fairly marginal
for non-asymmetric predicates. Why should this be? The obvious difference
between these predicates and the asymmetric ones we saw in §3.6.1 and §3.6.2 is
that reciprocal sentences with non-asymmetric predicates have stronger readings
available. This might be evidence that an SMH or other preference favouring
strong interpretations is at work. Or it might be evidence that the predicate being
non-asymmetric makes it harder to see the scenario as fitting a chain schema.
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I have found some naturally occurring examples where non-asymmetric
predicates receive chain interpretations. Consider example (76). This is the
headline accompanying an online collection of 15 photos56. In each photo, a pet
photobombs57 another pet. (Note that photobomb is not asymmetric – I have found
examples where two people are described as photobombing each other
simultaneously, and the examples in (78) below are only felicitous if understood
in this way.)
(76)

15 hilarious pets photobombing each other58

What is described is 15 instances of a two-item chain where one pet photobombs
another. Likewise, example (77) is the jokey caption of a photograph of two
mannequins. One is in the foreground and one in the background, as in a typical
photobombing scenario. I see this as a chain interpretation: one mannequin
photobombs the other59.
(77)

Mannequins photobombing each other60

56

We should understand the headline as being short for something like ’15 photos of hilarious
pets photobombing each other’.
57

“Photobombing is the act of inserting oneself into the field of view of a photograph, often in
order to play a practical joke on the photographer or the subjects.” [OED, from Wikipedia]
58

http://wtfhub.com/2010/11/15-hilarious-pets-photobombing-eachother/ [accessed 16 May
2013]
59

Given that it is possible for two people to photobomb each other simultaneously, it is also
possible that the writer could have intended the SR interpretation.
60

http://turbo-walking.blogspot.com.au/2013/07/mannequins-are-just-like-us.html [accessed
22 January 2014]
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A complicating factor in (76) and (77) is that both are headlines/captions
with the reciprocal in a participle phrase modifying the preceding noun. This
seems crucial to their receiving a chain interpretation. According to my intuitions,
the sentences in (78) all prefer non-chain interpretations.
(78)

a. In one photo, the pets photobombed each other.
b. In one photo, the two mannequins photobombed each other.
c. In this photo, the mannequins are photobombing each other.

It is unclear why it is that this structure aids the chain interpretation in (76) and
(77). It is not the case that it generally allows for weak readings: a photo of one
kid tickling another, where the other kid is not tickling them back, cannot be
felicitously captioned Kids tickling each other.
For another example that we might see as a chain interpretation, consider
(79).
(79)

The car rental company only has to fill it up the first time, and then
after that the renters fill it up for each other.
Neither of these examples (photobombing, car-filling) is a prototypical

example of a non-asymmetric predicate. I would say that photobombing is
prototypically asymmetric. (It is tempting to see it as a case where typicality
allows weaker readings ala Kerem et al. (2009), but if so why do the sentences in
(78) prefer strong readings?) The car-filling example is asymmetric by virtue of
the way that renters only use the car once usually, so they aren’t around to have
some other renter return the favour.
Though my account predicts that chain interpretations arise from the
ordinary WR semantics, and so should be available no matter the predicate, the
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chain interpretation appears to be fairly marginal for non-asymmetric predicates.
This remains a puzzle for my account.

3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has defended the idea that all reciprocal interpretations arise from a
cumulative semantic representation equivalent to WR. In particular, the chapter
focused on the problem of interpretations that are weaker than WR: chain
interpretations.
It was argued that approaches that see chain reciprocals as an ordinary
part of the system, and assign them truth conditions weaker than WR (e.g.
Dalrymple et al. 1998, Sabato & Winter 2012) fail to account for the variability in
acceptability judgements of sentences with antecedents denoting two individuals.
In contrast, such variability is a natural consequence of an approach where chain
interpretations arise via pragmatic weakening from the WR semantics.
I argued for an analysis where, like other reciprocal sentences, chain
reciprocals have a WR semantic representation. A chain interpretation is an
imperfect way of satisfying the reciprocal truth conditions, since the individuals
at the endpoints of the chain only take part in the relation in one direction. I
suggested that getting to such an interpretation from the WR semantic
representation involves a special kind of nonmaximality, distinct from the kind
dealt with by Brisson (1998). The idea is that we can treat the individuals at the
endpoints of a chain as exceptional. Unlike ordinary nonmaximality, allowing for
endpoint exceptions is not restricted to cases where there are a reasonably large
number of individuals – in the case of two-item chains, both individuals are
treated as exceptions.
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While this chapter has defended the WR semantics against weaker
readings, the next chapter looks at the opposite problem: cases where reciprocal
sentences are necessarily interpreted more strongly than WR.
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CHAPTER 4
WEAK TRUTH CONDITIONS; STRONG CONSTRUALS
4.1 Introduction
I assume a semantic representation of reciprocal sentences that is equivalent to
WR. Chapter 3 considered the question of how to account for chain
interpretations, which are even weaker than WR. This chapter turns to the
opposite issue: how to deal with stronger interpretations.
Here is a problem for the WR account: it seems that the sentence in (1) can
only mean that each one of the kids hates every other one (i.e. the SR
interpretation). This is much stronger than the requirements of WR, which would
only require each kid to hate and be hated by at least one of the others.
(1)

Those five kids hate each other.

The WR account predicts that (1) should have other possible interpretations,
notably WR. But this interpretation is not available. This kind of problem is not a
new one. Proponents of lexical cumulativity likewise have weak semantics for
plural sentences, and have observed that not all of the interpretations predicted
by the cumulative semantics are actually available. Kratzer (2001) and Dotlačil
(2010) propose that the cumulative semantics is constrained by a set of
independently needed principles concerning natural groupings. This chapter
looks at whether such principles can explain cases where only interpretations
stronger than WR are possible.
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The fact that many reciprocal sentences necessarily receive such strong
interpretations seems to be damning evidence against the WR account. One
approach, taken by Dotlačil (2010), is to supplement a semantic representation
equivalent to WR with a version of the SMH that requires events to exemplify
the strongest possible proposition. This chapter explores a similar approach,
arguing that a preference for strong interpretations can be explained using
economy conditions on mental representations, and specifically a preference for
uniformity.
4.1.1 Where do we see stronger readings?
This section outlines the data that causes problems for the WR account.
First, there are stative predicates such as know, like and resemble. Reciprocal
sentences with statives strongly resist WR interpretations – the stative (2a)
requires that each kid hates the other four, while the eventive (2b) does not
require that each kid hit and was hit by each of the others.
(2)

a. Those five kids hate each other.
b. Those five kids hit each other.

By ‘stative’ here, I mean the class of lexically stative predicates. One test that
picks out lexically stative predicates is awkwardness (or a meaning change) with
the progressive as in (3).
(3)

Amy is {#hating/#knowing/hitting} Ben.

Both individual level and stage level stative predicates show this strong
preference for SR. (Stative predicates like know and hate are individual level:
roughly, they are understood to express permanent properties. Stage level
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predicates like those in (4) express more transient properties, and resist WR
interpretations just like individual level statives1.)
(4)

The kids were {hidden from/available to} each other.
Second, there are neighbour interpretations2. Consider example (5). If we

assume that the telephone poles are arranged in a line, then (5) means that there
is a gap of 500 feet between each pole and its neighbour(s).
(5)

The telephone poles are 500 feet from each other.

Neighbour interpretations are stronger than WR in two respects: first, the
relation must hold between an individual and its neighbour(s), not some
arbitrary individual as WR would allow. Second, the relation holds between an
individual and all of its neighbours. These two requirements are illustrated by
the fact that example (5) is not felicitous in the scenarios in Figure 7, Figure 8 or
Figure 93, even though each would satisfy WR.

A---250---B---250---C---250---D
Figure 7: Telephone poles, 250 feet apart

1

There are proposals (Kratzer 1989) that stage level and individual level predicates differ on
whether they do (stage level) or do not (individual level) have an argument position for events.
So the fact that both types of statives show this preference for SR is informative: it is not due to
some quirk of individual level predicates.
2

This is my shorthand for those reciprocal interpretations weaker than SR that are possible with
symmetric predicates of temporal/spatial configuration. This is ‘Intermediate Reciprocity’ for
Dalrymple et al. (1998).
3

Dalrymple et al. (1998:166) point out that neighbour interpretations do not tolerate gaps. Schein
(2003:334) discusses the problem that such scenarios cause for WR. Beck (2001) argues that the
SMH chooses a stronger interpretation than WR (her situation-based WR) in neighbour examples.
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B

500

100
C

A
500

Figure 8: Telephone poles, isosceles triangle

A---500---B -----700-------C---500---D---500---E
Figure 9: Telephone poles, with gap

Third, even the chain interpretations we saw in Chapter 3 must have truth
conditions stronger than WR according to Sabato & Winter (2012). They point
out that The four circles contain each other is felicitous in Figure 10’s scenario (a),
but not in (b). The truth conditions of WR (plus endpoint exceptions as in
Chapter 3) would incorrectly allow both (a) and (b)4.
(a)

(b)

Figure 10: The four circles contain each other (Sabato & Winter 2012:224)

Finally, there is the question of the preferred interpretation of reciprocals
with eventive predicates. As discussed in Chapter 2, contra the predictions of
Dalrymple et al.’s SMH, eventive predicates allow WR interpretations. Not only
4

For the (b) scenario, I think the WR plus endpoint exceptions analysis from Chapter 3 would see
it as two separate chains: (naming the circles in order of size) one chain where <1,2>; the other
chain where <1,3><3,4> (and since contain is transitive, <1,4>)
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are WR interpretations possible, but some evidence (Kerem et al. 2009; Dotlačil
2009) suggests that WR readings can be preferred. There is very little clear
evidence that reciprocal sentences with eventive predicates are necessarily
interpreted more strongly than WR5.
To sum up, the clearest challenges for the WR semantic account come
from statives like know, neighbour predicates like sit next to, and chain predicates
like contain6.
4.1.2 If SR is an implicature, it should be defeasible
One key piece of evidence against approaches with weaker truth conditions
concerns examples like (6) (from Dalrymple et al. 1998:165).
(6)

#House of Commons legislators refer to each other indirectly; the most
senior one addresses the most junior one directly.

Dalrymple et al. claim is that this example shows that the first clause must be
understood as SR, and that that this is not a matter of pragmatic strengthening. If
it were, they reason that it should be defeasible, and (6) shows that it is not.
Likewise, Winter (n.d.:2) points out that (7) is infelicitous.
(7)

#Mary, Sue and Jane saw each other yesterday at 8pm, but it’s possible
that Mary didn’t see Sue.
Is it necessary to conclude from the infelicity of (7) that Mary, Sue and Jane

saw each other has a semantic representation with stronger truth conditions than

5

Certain eventive examples seem to receive SR interpretations. e.g. A, B and C saw each other. But I
will argue that this is not generally true.
6

Sabato & Winter (2012) point out that this problem is specific to relations that are strict partial
orderings (i.e. are asymmetric and transitive). Not all chain predicates are strict partial orderings.
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WR? One problem with this kind of evidence is that we know that people allow
or even prefer WR interpretations of reciprocal sentences with eventive
predicates, yet even in these cases asserting that some pair may not have taken
part in the relation sounds awkward. We know that a sentence like (8a) can
receive a WR interpretation (Philip 2000), so how are we to account for the fact
that (8b) sounds odd?
(8)

a. Alex, Bev and Chris pointed at each other.
b. ?#Alex, Bev and Chris pointed at each other, but it’s possible that
Alex didn’t point at Bev.

Given the evidence of weak readings for sentences like (8a) (Philip 2000; Kerem
et al. 2009; Dotlačil 2009), I do not consider the infelicity of (8b) as convincing
evidence that the sentence must have SR truth conditions.
4.1.3 Outline of the chapter
That some plural sentences necessarily receive interpretations stronger than the
cumulative truth conditions would suggest is not a new problem. Section 4.2
looks at proposals to limit the available interpretations based on salient
pluralities (§4.2.1), substantive pluralities (§4.2.2) and principles of natural
grouping (§4.2.3). Section 4.2.3 applies this approach to reciprocal neighbour and
chain examples.
Section 4.4 turns to the stative/eventive contrast: there is evidence that not
only reciprocals, but other plural sentences show a tendency for stative
predicates to resist weak/cumulative interpretations. Section 4.5 presents an
experiment that found evidence of the stative/eventive contrast both for
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reciprocals and other plurals. Section 4.6 presents some approaches to the
question of why statives require strong readings.
Section 4.7 looks at the question of how weak truth conditions can give
rise to strong construals from the perspective of sentence processing. It argues
that the stative/eventive contrast can be accounted for using economy principles
at the level of discourse representation, moderated by plausibility considerations.
Section 4.8 looks at evidence from reciprocals’ co-occurrence with except-phrases.

4.2 Limits on cumulativity
The issue addressed by this chapter is not a new one. In assuming a
weak/cumulative semantic representation, this approach to the semantics of
reciprocal sentences faces a problem common to analyses of plurality that
assume lexical cumulativity: not all of the construals predicted by the cumulative
semantics are actually available. This section looks at proposals to limit possible
construals by requiring that the pluralities referred to be salient (Schwarzschild
1996), substantive (Kratzer 2001) or available by natural principles of grouping
(Dotlačil 2010).
4.2.1 Salient pluralities
Schwarzschild (1996:107) has us imagine two groups of prisoners, separated by
an opaque barrier. He points out that (9) is likely to be judged false in this
scenario, even though it is true that each of the prisoners could see and be seen
by the other prisoners on their side of the barrier. That is, the scenario satisfies
WR – even SR – within the subgroups.
(9)

The prisoners on the two sides of the room could see each other.
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Schwarzschild argues that in this context, there are two salient subpluralities (the
two groups on either side of the barrier), and those are the ones that are
preferably understood to be in the reciprocal relation.
Here is the semantic representation I am assuming (Dotlačil’s):
(10)

a. The prisoners see each other
b. (∃e)(*see(e) ∧ <prisoners, prisoners, e> ∈ [{<a, b, e’>:
C
*Θ1(a)(e’)∧C*Θ2(b)(e’)∧ e’≤ e ∧ ¬a o b}])

The context supplies the two salient subpluralities of prisoners. Those two
groups are preferably taken to be the experiencers and themes of the subevents.
That is, even thought the cumulative semantic representation would allow for
any collection of subevents that when summed together gave use <prisoners,
prisoners, e> (as long as the non-identity condition is obeyed), our choice is
constrained by which subpluralities are salient.
4.2.2 Substantive pluralities
Kratzer (2001:64) illustrates the need for limits on cumulativity with the
sentences in (11), in the context of Figure 11 (based on Scha’s (1981) example).
We have the intuition that sentence (11a) is clearly true of Figure 11, while (11b)
is not.
(11)

a. The sides of rectangle A are parallel to the sides of rectangle B.
b. The sides of rectangle A are perpendicular to the sides of rectangle B.
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Figure 11: Rectangles
The infelicity of (11b) in this context is surprising, in light of the fact that
cumulativity permits both of the inferences in (12) and (13). Lexical cumulativity
leads us to expect that both of the sentences in (11) should be judged true in this
context.
(12)

1+3 are parallel to 5+7
2+4 are parallel to 6+8
___________________________
1+2+3+4 are parallel to 5+6+7+8

(13)

1+3 are perpendicular to 6+8
2+4 are perpendicular to 5+7
________________________________
1+2+3+4 are perpendicular to 5+6+7+8
Kratzer’s solution to this problem uses the concept of a ‘substantive

plurality’. Because we assume that the domains of individuals and eventualities
are closed under sum, they include countless pluralities only some of which
correspond to natural groupings in the actual world. These natural ones are the
substantive pluralities. According to Kratzer’s constraint for quantification over
states, in (14), substantive pluralities restrict which states we are allowed to
quantify over (2001:63).
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(14)

Constraint for quantification over states:
Quantification over states is restricted to sums of states whose participants
are substantive pluralities
Kratzer uses this constraint to account for the puzzle concerning Figure 11.

Recall that of the two sentences in (15), only (15a) is judged to be clearly true of
Figure 11.
(15)

a. The sides of rectangle A are parallel to the sides of rectangle B.
b. The sides of rectangle A are perpendicular to the sides of rectangle
B.

On Kratzer’s view, each side of rectangle A forms a substantive plurality with
the corresponding side of rectangle B (e.g. sides 1 and 5 constitute a substantive
plurality, while a plurality made up of side 1 and side 8 is not substantive). Now,
all of these pairs of corresponding sides (which constitute substantive pluralities)
happen to be pairs whose members are parallel. Hence the states we need to
quantify over in the case of the be parallel to relation in (15a) are in our domain.
But in (15b), with be perpendicular to, we would need to quantify over states
whose participants are not substantive, an option ruled out by (14).
What makes something a substantive plurality? Kratzer (2001:32) stresses
the real-world basis of substantive groupings:
You can’t just stipulate the existence of substantive groups. They are there
in reality. Actual teams, piles, bunches, flower arrangements, clubs,
committees, congregations, and what have you - all correspond to
substantive groupings of pluralities in the actual world.
Substantive pluralities can be based on temporal/spatial proximity. Kratzer
(2001:60-62) suggests that natural kinds can form the basis for substantive
pluralities. She has us imagine a situation where she owns a cat and a donkey,
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and you own a cat and a donkey. The cats look alike and the donkeys look alike.
In this scenario, she can truthfully say (16a) but not (16b).
(16)

a. My animals look just like your animals.
b. My animals look very different from your animals.

The states where a donkey looks different from a cat are not available to us
because those pairs are not substantive7. Only the states whose participants are a
substantive plurality (in this case, both of the same kind) are available.
It seems that not just any similarity between individuals can be the basis
for a substantive plurality. Consider Figure 12, where the perpendicular sides of
the two rectangles share the quality of being dashed or solid lines. This similarity
does not seem to be sufficient to justify seeing e.g. side 1 and side 6 as a
substantive plurality: the sentence The sides of rectangle A are perpendicular to the
sides of rectangle B does not seem to be true here8.

Figure 12: Rectangles with dashed/solid sides

7

In this context at least.

8

It is certainly true that The dashed lines of rectangle A are perpendicular to the dashed lines of rectangle
B, and The matching sides of rectangle A and B are perpendicular. That is, in order for the pattern to be
involved in matching up the sides of A and B, it needs to be explicitly mentioned. It may be that
‘parallel’ and ‘perpendicular’ privilege certain kinds of properties (say, spatial location rather
than e.g. colour) in determining the relevant substantive pluralities.
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4.2.3 Principles of natural grouping
Dotlačil (2010) takes a similar approach to Kratzer. Going back to the rectangles
example, for the sentence with be parallel to, we are looking for subevents where a
side of rectangle A is parallel to a side of B. Splitting the plural event into
subevents of this kind is natural – as shown in Figure 13, such subevents are
‘convex spaces in which the two closest lines are put together’ (2010:63). The split
into subevents that would be required for the be perpendicular to case is not
natural – the subevents would involve pairing up lines that are not closest to
each other.

Figure 13: Split of events for 'parallel' (Dotlačil 2010:65)
Dotlačil (2010:64-68) cites Wertheimer’s (1923) work on perceptual
organization, in particular the principles that guide our categorization of visual
stimuli into groups and objects. To illustrate, he provides the diagram in Figure
14. We perceive no grouping of the items in line A, other than the line as a whole.
But in line B, the spacing leads us to perceive the items as being grouped in pairs
(‘principle of proximity’). In lines C and D, we see pairs again but this time based
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on the principle of similarity. Line E illustrates the principle of common region:
items within the same closed region of space are naturally grouped together.

Figure 14: Demonstration of grouping principles (Dotlačil 2010:66)
In judging whether a sentence that describes a plural event is true in a
given context, we are looking for atomic events which combine to make the
sentence true. On Dotlačil’s view, when we are splitting a complex event into its
subevents, we do this in such a way as to respect principles of natural grouping.

4.3 Neighbours and chains
4.3.1 Neighbours
As we saw above, neighbour interpretations are stronger than WR in two
respects: (1) the relation must hold between an individual and its neighbour(s),
not some arbitrary individual, and (2) the relation must hold between an
individual and all of its neighbours. This section looks at whether
the requirements of salience / substantivity and natural groupings discussed in
§4.2 can restrict the WR semantics appropriately.
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I follow Dotlačil in seeing the neighbour interpretation as arising from WR
semantics, constrained by natural principles of grouping. He provides (17a) as an
instance of the weaker of his two reciprocal meanings, IR (for us this is WR).
(17)

a. The telephone poles are 500 feet from each other.
b. (∃e)(*STAND(e) ∧ <the poles, the poles, e> ∈ [{<a,b,e’> : C*Θ1(a)(e’) ∧
C
*500 FT FROM(b)(e’) ∧ e’ ≤ e ∧ ¬a ο b}])

This is true if the plurality of telephone poles can be split into parts such that
each part is 500 feet from some other part. It can be true if the telephone poles are
in a line and only the neighbouring ones are 500 feet apart. Dotlačil suggests that
we can use grouping principles such as the principle of proximity (‘all else being
equal, the closest elements tend to be grouped together’ (2010:65)) to only
consider the spacing of poles that are adjacent. The principle of proximity
correctly rules out the kind of grouping that would be required in order to judge
sentence (17a) true in the scenario in Figure 15.
A---250---B---250---C---250---D
Figure 15: Telephone poles, 250 feet apart

Dotlačil does not go into detail on the question of how principles of
natural grouping would rule out the scenarios in Figure 16 and Figure 17. In both
cases, the subevents needed to satisfy WR would appear to be available via
principles of natural grouping – each pole is 500 feet from a neighbouring pole
(and the grouping into neighbours should be considered natural because of the
principle of proximity).
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A---500---B -----700-------C---500---D---500---E
Figure 16: Telephone poles, with gap

B
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Figure 17: Telephone poles, isosceles triangle

Consider Figure 16. The WR semantic representation of sentence (17) has it that
there is an event of the poles being 500 feet from the poles, and we are looking
for subevents of ‘being-500-feet-from’ that can combine via cumulativity to make
the sentence true. We require that these subevents be consistent with natural
grouping principles. Looking at Figure 16, we can see 6 subevents of ‘being-500feet-from’:
(18)

<A,B,e1>
<B,A,e2>
<C,D,e3>
<D,C,e4>
<D,E,e5>
<E,D,e6>

If the principles of natural grouping provide the four pairs of neighbours (i.e.
substantive pluralities) in (19), Kratzer’s constraint in (20) means that the
available events (states) of ‘being-500-feet-from’ are as in (21).
(19)

A+B
B+C
C+D
D+E
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(20)

Constraint for quantification over states:
Quantification over states is restricted to sums of states whose participants
are substantive pluralities

(21)

A+B:
B+C:
C+D:
D+E:

<A,B,e1>; <B,A,e2>
none
<C,D,e3>; <D,C,e4>
<D,E,e5>; <E,D,e6>

But this would incorrectly predict that the sentence is true in this scenario,
because the events in (21) can sum to give the event required by (17):
<A+B+C+D+E, A+B+C+D+E, e1+e2+e3+e4+e5+e6>. What went wrong?
Here is one possibility: the assumption we made about what the available
substantive pluralities are was incorrect. What if we never have access to pairs of
neighbours as in (19)? The principle of proximity (or ‘being neighbours’ as a
basis for substantive plurality) never sees merely being a pair of neighbours as a
natural grouping. Consider pole D in Figure 18. What natural grouping principle
would group it with pole C but separate from pole E?
A---500---B -----700-------C---500---D---500---E
Figure 18: Telephone poles, with gap

If ‘being neighbours’ is the basis for the substantive pluralities, each pole should
be grouped with all of its neighbours. On this view, the substantive pluralities
we have to work are in (22)9. According to the constraint for quantification over
states, we only have access to states whose participants are these pluralities, as
9

Alternatively, we would also have access to the substantive plurality consisting of all of the
telephone poles (since they are of the same kind/artifact), i.e. A+B+C+D+E. This also leads to the
sentence being infelicitous: there is no state of being 500 feet apart that involves all of those
participants.
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shown in (23). Summing these five states does not result in an event that can
satisfy (17b): note that pole C is missing from the first argument position in (24).
(22)

A+B
B+A+C
C+B+D
D+C+E
D+E

(23)

A+B:
B+A+C:
C+B+D:
D+C+E:
D+E:

(24)

<A+B+D+E, A+B+C+D+E, e1+e2+e3+e4+e5>

<A,B,e1>; <B,A,e2>
none
none
<D,C+E,e3>
<D,E,e4>; <E,D,e5>

Alternatively, we might have it that the principle of proximity groups
A+B together and C+D+E together, because of the 700 foot gap between them. If
these are the substantive pluralities we have to work with, then the only states
allowed under the constraint for quantification over states are <A,B> <B,A> and
<D,C+E>. These cannot be summed to give the event required, hence the
sentence is false in this context. It is unclear to me whether this version and the
version where proximity groups an individual with all of its neighbours ever
make different predictions.
4.3.2 A preference for stronger readings?
This section looks at some relevant empirical evidence on the preferred
interpretations of reciprocal sentences in neighbour scenarios. Bott et al. (2011)
and Poortman (2011) both find evidence that stronger readings than WR are
available/preferred.
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Bott et al. (2011) had participants read a sentence like (25) and then
presented them with a picture like Figure 19’s (a) or (b). They had 10 seconds to
make a truth value judgement.
(25)

Exactly five dots are connected to each other10.

(a)

(b)

Figure 19: Intermediate (a) and Ambiguous (b) scenarios (Bott et al. 2011)

Rates of acceptance were fairly high for both11, but Bott et al. found that
sentences like (25) were accepted significantly more frequently in the Ambiguous
scenario than the Intermediate one. Bott et al. assume that there are two possible
readings of sentence (25): intermediate (which requires connectedness by a path)
and strong (which requires pairwise connection) 12. They interpret the preference
for the Ambiguous scenario as evidence that people sometimes arrive at the
strong interpretation13. This would explain why they reject the Intermediate

10

This experiment was conducted in German.

11

Reading off their graph (2011:7) it appears that sentences like (25) were accepted about 88% of
the time in the Intermediate scenario, and significantly more often (about 95% of the time) in the
Ambiguous scenario.
12

Their intermediate interpretation is like our neighbour interpretation (but disallowing
partitioning). They also allow for a ‘weak’ interpretation which involves partitioning, but since in
a picture completion task no participants provided such pictures, they ignore this
weak/partitioned interpretation in the rest of their experiments.
13

Overall in their experiment intermediate interpretations are preferred over strong ones.
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scenario (which only fits the intermediate interpretation) more often than the
Ambiguous one (which fits both strong and intermediate interpretations).
That is, Bott et al. interpret these results as saying that participants
sometimes arrive at an SR interpretation of (25) and hence reject the Intermediate
scenario, which only satisfies WR. This is a challenge to the argument that I am
making here, that the semantic representation is equivalent to WR. Both
scenarios satisfy WR.
Bott et al. point out that interpreting their experiments is complicated by
the fact that the relation ‘be connected to’ is transitive. If A is connected to B, and
B is connected to C, then A is connected (though not directly connected) to C.
This means that we cannot assume that accepting the sentence in the
Intermediate scenario means that a participant has arrived at an intermediate
(WR) interpretation – if be connected to is understood as ‘be directly or indirectly
connected to’, the sentence is also true on an SR interpretation. But this is
irrelevant to the problem for the WR account: if the semantic representation is
equivalent to WR, participants should accept both scenarios, whether be connected
to is understood as a transitive relation or not14.
For the WR account, the question is: why should people (slightly) prefer
the Ambiguous scenario? Since both scenarios fit with the WR semantics, we are
left to explain the preference for the Ambiguous scenario in some other way. One
possibility is that it is due to a preference for uniformity (further discussed below
in §4.7). That is, the Ambiguous scenario is more appealing than the Intermediate
14

If be connected to is understood to allow indirect connections, then WR predicts that the
sentence is true in the Intermediate scenario. If it is understood strictly as involving direct
connection, the WR account likewise predicts that it should be true in the Intermediate scenario
(via a neighbour interpretation: each dot is connected directly to its neighbour(s)).
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one, because of the way that each individual is in the relation with every other
one. This scenario is ‘uniform’ since each dot connects to every other dot; cf. the
non-uniform Intermediate scenario, where some dots are directly connected to
two other dots, and some are directly connected to only one other dot.
Another issue for the WR account is raised by Poortman (2011), who
tested the acceptability of reciprocal sentences as descriptions of individuals in
line configurations and open circle configurations (similar to our isosceles
triangle above), as shown in Figure 2015. She found that ‘A, B and C are holding
hands’16 was accepted significantly more often in the case of the line
configuration (71% of the time) compared with the open circle configuration
(44%), even though both scenarios involve exactly the same number of relations
holding between the individuals.

Figure 20: Poortman’s (2011) line and open circle configurations

15

The majority of Poortman’s test items were non-symmetric predicates, and the line and open
circle configurations involved relations that held in one direction only. Poortman found no
difference between line and open circle for these predicates – both had low rates of acceptability.
16

The experiment was conducted in Dutch. The English translation is most natural with the
implicit reciprocal (vs. A, B and C are holding hands with each other), but the Dutch sentence used in
the experiment (I assume) involved the reciprocal elkaar.
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Poortman concludes that the SMH is responsible for this difference. It insists on
the maximal number of relations, given the configuration of the individuals. The
problem with the open circle configuration is that A and C are not holding hands
– thus not maximizing the number of relations of holding hands. When the girls
stand in a line, the SMH respects the existing configuration: there is no way to
add another instance of holding hands (without changing the configuration).
Here is the issue for the WR account: the WR truth conditions predict that
both scenarios should be acceptable. In both cases, the very same relations hold,
as shown in (26). The events in (26) can be summed as in (28) to satisfy the WR
semantic representation in (27).
(26)

<A, B, e1>
<B, A, e2>
<B, C, e3>
<C, B, e4>

(27)

a. A, B and C are holding hands (with each other).
b. (∃e)(*hold.hands(e) ∧ <A+B+C, A+B+C, e> ∈ [{<f,g,e’> : C*Θ1(f)(e’) ∧
C
*Θ2(g)(e’) ∧ e’ ≤ e ∧ ¬f ο g}]

(28)

<A+B+C, A+B+C, e1+e2+e3+e4>

So why is it that the line scenario is much better than the open circle scenario?
Above, in the discussion the examples concerning the distance between
telephone poles, we saw a similar preference for a line configuration (where each
pole was 500 feet from its neighbours) over the open circle configuration (though
there, we called it an isosceles triangle). There, we relied on principles of natural
grouping to rule out the isosceles/open circle case: if being neighbours is the
basis for the grouping or the basis for the substantive pluralities, then each
individual should be grouped with all of their neighbours. In the line case, this
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holds. In the open circle case, there are two neighbours that are not grouped
together.
4.3.3 Chains
Sabato & Winter point out that The four circles contain each other is felicitous in
Figure 21’s scenario (a), but not in (b). The truth conditions of WR (plus endpoint
exceptions) would incorrectly allow both (a) and (b).

(a)

(b)

Figure 21: The four circles contain each other (Sabato & Winter 2012:224)

On Sabato & Winter’s view, the problem is that the (b) arrangement does not
allow the maximal number of containing relations. But it should be possible to
rule out (b) using principles of natural grouping. Notice that the scenario in
Figure 22 is similar to the (b) scenario, yet The boxes are stacked on top of each other
seems felicitous. Perhaps the circles scenario resists being split into the subevents
required because of the nature of the containment relation. (You cannot draw a
convex space around circle 1 and 2 without including circle 3 and 4.)
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Figure 22: Boxes stacked on top of each other haphazardly

4.4 The stative/eventive contrast: plurals and reciprocals
We have seen that cumulative analyses have to deal with the fact that not all
theoretically possible construals are actually possible. We saw that substantive
pluralities/principles of grouping can restrict possible interpretations. This
section looks at another area in which the WR analysis overpredicts: stative
predicates resist weak readings.
4.4.1 The stative/eventive contrast for reciprocals
As we have seen, some of the strongest evidence for SR interpretations of
reciprocals comes from sentences with stative predicates. For instance, Beck
(2001:98) argues for the existence of SR with example (29).
(29)

Susanne:
Ed:

We could take Amy, Bertha, Celia and Dave. They like
each other.
You’re kidding! Bertha can’t stand Dave!

As we saw in Chapter 2, unlike statives, eventive predicates do allow WR
interpretations. We saw that Kerem et al. (2009) modified the SMH to take
typicality into account: they explain that the WR interpretation can be the
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strongest interpretation compatible with the typicality preferences of the
predicate. Kerem et al. found a correlation between typicality preferences and the
acceptability of the WR interpretation, but only for eventive predicates, not
statives.
Evidence from intuitions seems to strongly confirm that stative reciprocals
like (30) resist WR interpretations and must be interpreted as SR.
(30)

The five kids {know/like/resemble} each other.

However, the results of Kerem et al. (2009) bring this into question. They gave
participants sentences like A, B and C verbed each other, and probed for a WR
interpretation by asking whether it is necessary to conclude that A verbed B.
They found similar rates of acceptance of WR (mostly less than 20%) for statives
and eventives alike.
Experiment 3, below, looks for evidence of the stative/eventive contrast
for reciprocals.
4.4.2 The stative/eventive contrast for plural sentences
There are some hints in the literature that this contrast between statives and
eventives holds not only for reciprocal sentences, but plurals in general.
Sauerland (1998) reports an observation made by Roger Schwarzschild that (31a)
means ‘Every student knows every professor’, while (31b) is preferably taken to
mean ‘The students talked to one professor each’. Thus, the stative (31a) receives
a strong interpretation, and the eventive (31b) a weak (cumulative) interpretation.
(31)

a. The students know the professors.
b. The students talked to the professors.
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This is not unexpected on the view that reciprocal sentences are a type of plural
sentence, but the mechanism is unclear: why is it that statives resist cumulative
interpretations?
Beck (2001), Winter (1996, 2001) and Dotlačil (2010) have argued that the
SMH applies not only to reciprocal sentences but also other plural sentences.
Beck (2001:136) argues that the cumulative interpretation is generally
dispreferred, and ‘seem[s] most natural when a doubly distributive
interpretation is for some reason implausible’. So (32a) prefers the interpretation
where both women know both men, while (32b) settles for the cumulative
interpretation.
(32)

a. The two women know the two men.
b. The two women married the two men.

The SMH approach faces the same issue with plural sentences as it does with
reciprocals: while it has an account of why statives like know require strong
readings, it overpredicts strong readings for eventives17. (Note Schwarzschild’s
observation about (31b).)

4.5 Experiment 3: Stative/eventive and weak interpretations
4.5.1 Introduction
This section describes an experiment designed to test two hypotheses. First, that
the WR interpretation is less felicitous in the case of stative reciprocals than
eventive reciprocals. (While evidence from intuitions suggests that this is the case,

17

As we saw in Chapter 2, Kerem et al. (2009) propose that this overprediction can be prevented
if the SMH takes into account typicality preferences.
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Kerem et al. (2009) did not find support for this.) The second hypothesis is that
there are parallels between reciprocal sentences and other plural sentences in this
regard. Experiment 3 looked at the acceptability of reciprocal sentences and those
with two definite plurals as descriptions of ‘cumulative/WR’ situations.
Participants were given a scenario, and were asked to decide whether the target
sentence was a ‘reasonable description’ of that scenario.
4.5.2 Method
Materials and design

The experiment made use of a 2x2 design, with

eventuality type (Stative/Eventive) and sentence type (Reciprocal/Plural) as
factors.
Each item consisted of a short paragraph outlining a scenario,
accompanied by a sentence which participants were asked to evaluate as a
description of that scenario. The paragraph named a group of three individuals
(in the case of the reciprocal condition, (33a/b)) or two groups of three
individuals (in the case of the plural condition, (33c/d)). The paragraph went on
to describe the relations that held between the individuals. In the reciprocal
condition (33a/b), each of the individuals took part in the relation once in the
first argument position and once in the second. In the plural condition (33c/d),
each of the individuals in the first group took part in the first argument position
once, and each of the individuals in the second group took part in the second
argument position once. Conditions (a) and (c) involved stative predicates;
conditions (b) and (d) were eventive.
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(33)

a/b. The magazine had three journalists at the press conference: Brown,
Stewart and Mulligan.
a. Brown hated Stewart. Stewart hated Mulligan. And
Mulligan hated Brown.
b. Brown quoted Stewart. Stewart quoted Mulligan. And
Mulligan quoted Brown.
c/d. The newspaper had three journalists at the press conference: Moore,
Martin and Thompson. And there were three actors: Tom Cruise, Brad Pitt
and Harrison Ford.
c.

Moore hated Tom Cruise. Martin hated Brad Pitt. And
Thompson hated Harrison Ford.
d. Moore quoted Tom Cruise. Martin quoted Brad Pitt. And
Thompson quoted Harrison Ford.
In the reciprocal condition, after reading the paragraph (33a/b), participants
were asked to judge whether a reciprocal sentence (as in (34a/b) was ‘a
reasonable description’; in the plural condition, the sentence contained two
definite plurals (as in (34c/d)). Participants could answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.
(34)

a. The journalists hated each other.
b. The journalists quoted each other.
c. The journalists hated the actors.
d. The journalists quoted the actors.
Fourteen items were constructed (see Appendix); there were fourteen

stative predicates and fourteen eventive predicates. None of the predicates were
symmetric, nor did they involve spatial/temporal ordering. This was important
because they needed to be open to a strong interpretation, while not ruling out a
weaker one. The diagnostic for stative predicates was awkwardness with the
progressive.
The experimental items were included in a questionnaire with
approximately 80 unrelated items. Two counterbalanced forms of the
questionnaire were prepared. The items were counterbalanced so that each
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participant saw two conditions of each item, but saw each predicate only once. A
given participant saw either (33a) or (33b), and either (33c) or (33d); if they saw
(33a) then they saw (33d).
Procedure

The materials were presented as part of a web-based

questionnaire. The items were presented in an individually randomized order.
Participants were unsupervised. They read the instructions, and then the
program presented items one at a time. Participants selected their chosen answer
by using the mouse to click one of two radio buttons (‘Yes’ or ‘No’). Only when
they had selected an answer would the program show the next item. Participants
could work at their own pace, but in case of a period of inactivity of 10 minutes,
the participant would be logged out and could not continue the experiment.
Participants

Forty-eight undergraduate students in Psychology courses at

the University of Massachusetts took part in the experiment for course credit.
4.5.3 Results
Table 9 presents the mean acceptability rates for the four conditions in
Experiment 3.

Sentence type

Reciprocal
Plural

Eventuality type
Stative
Eventive
61%
79%
71%
81%

Table 9: Acceptance rates in Experiment 3
Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of
eventuality type (Stative/Eventive) and sentence type (Reciprocal/Plural) as
well as a significant interaction.
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Sentences with stative predicates were accepted less often than sentences
with eventive predicates (F1(47)=17.08, p<.001; F2(26)=38.54, p<.001). The results
of simple effects tests confirm that this is the case for both reciprocals (t1(47)=4.46,
p<.001; t2(26)=6.96, p<.001) and plurals (t1(47)=2.74, p=.009; t2(26)=3.51, p=.004).
The main effect of sentence type was significant by items and marginal by
participants (F1(47)=3.88, p=.055; F2(26)=15.17, p=.002). And there was a
significant interaction between eventuality type and sentence type – while both
reciprocals and plurals showed a penalty for statives compared with eventives,
this penalty was larger for reciprocals than plurals (F1(47)=6.36, p=.02;
F2(26)=9.42, p=.009). Simple effects tests confirm that there was a significant
difference between reciprocals and plurals in the stative condition (t1(47)=2.56,
p=.02; t2(26)=4.45, p=.001), but not in the eventive condition (t1(47)=.6, t2(26)=.97,
p’s>.3). Figure 23 illustrates the interaction.

100!
80!

Recip!
Plural!

60!
40!
Stative!

Eventive!

Figure 23: Results of Experiment 3
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4.5.4 Discussion
4.5.4.1 Parallels between reciprocals and plurals
Experiment 3 found evidence that reciprocals and plurals pattern alike: for both,
eventive predicates are more acceptable than stative predicates in
cumulative/weak scenarios.
4.5.4.2 Weak readings of statives are harder for reciprocals
The experiment found an interaction between eventuality type and sentence
type: while reciprocals and plurals pattern alike, the effect of eventuality type is
greater for reciprocals. While there is no significant difference between
reciprocals and plurals with eventive predicates, with statives there is a
significant difference: reciprocals are accepted significantly less often.
In finding a contrast between stative and eventive reciprocals in terms of
the acceptability of WR, the results of Experiment 3 differ from those of Kerem et
al. (2009). It is likely that the difference is due to the fact that Experiment 3 had
participants judge the acceptability of a sentence in the context provided,
whereas Kerem et al. had participants read a reciprocal sentence (presumably
fixing on their preferred interpretation), and then asked them a question about
that interpretation18.
How are we to understand the interaction in Experiment 3? In order to
account for it, we need an account of why stative reciprocals and stative
sentences with plurals should differ. And in fact there are reasons to expect that

18

This would suggest that in Kerem et al.’s experiment, participants preferred SR interpretations
for both statives and eventives. Another difference between Experiment 3 and Kerem et al.’s
experiment is the subject type: definite plural vs. conjoined names. Pragmatic and other effects of
conjoined names will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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coming up with the appropriate justification for a weak reading should be easier
for the sentences with two plural DPs.
Let’s look at an example of a stative plural sentence from the experiment.
Given the context in (35), (represented in (36)) participants judged whether
sentence (37) was a reasonable description of the scenario.
(35)

There were three lawyers: Jesse, Mike and Robert. And there were
three judges: Judge Green, Judge Rubin and Judge Stickney. Jesse
understood Judge Green. Mike understood Judge Rubin. And Robert
understood Judge Stickney.

(36)

s1: <Jesse, Judge Green>
s2: <Mike, Judge Rubin>
s3: <Robert, Judge Stickney>

(37)

The lawyers understood the judges.

Now, compare the corresponding stative reciprocal item. The context in (38)
spells out the existence of the three states in (39), and participants judged
whether sentence (40) was a reasonable description.
(38)

There were three lawyers: Amy, Steven and Ian. Amy understood Steven.
Steven understood Ian. And Ian understood Amy.

(39)

s1: <Amy, Steven>
s2: <Steven, Ian>
s3: <Ian, Amy>

(40)

The lawyers understood each other.
There are some important differences. Note that in (36), each individual

takes part in only one of the states: each lawyer is paired with a judge. In contrast,
the individuals in (39) each take part in two states. It is easy to imagine a scenario
in which the pluralities in (36) are substantive – for instance, each lawyer is
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arguing before a different one of the judges as in (41). In contrast, the overlap
amongst the participants in (39) doesn’t allow such a scenario.
(41)

<Jesse, Judge Green, s1>
< Mike, Judge Rubin, s2>
<Robert, Judge Stickney, s3>

(in courtroom 1)
(in courtroom 2)
(in courtroom 3)

If this is what allows for the weak reading of (37), the prediction is that the
sentence will be less felicitous in a context that rules out the possibility that the
pairs are spatially/temporally separate. This seems to be the case – to my ears,
“The lawyers understood the judges” is an inappropriate description of (42).
(42)

There were some lawyers and judges standing by the fireplace. The
lawyers were Jesse, Mike and Robert and the judges were Green, Rubin
and Stickney. Jesse understood Judge Green. Mike understood Judge
Rubin. And Robert understood Judge Stickney.
My argument here suggests that if we could come up with a way of

justifying separate situations for the stative reciprocal case, the description
would be more acceptable. The scenario in (43) attempts to do just that, but as a
description The lawyers understood each other still seems slightly odd.
(43)

There were three lawyers: Amy, Steven and Ian. They took part in a mock
trial and each of them had to make a closing statement. When they made
the statement, there was only one other person in the room: one of the
other lawyers. That other lawyer gave them a pass-fail grade, based on
whether they understood the argument. Steven made his statement in
front of Amy. Ian made his statement in front of Steven. And Amy made
her statement in front of Ian. It turned out that they all did well: Amy
understood Steven’s argument. Steven understood Ian’s argument. And
Ian understood Amy’s argument.
“The lawyers understood each other’s arguments (so they all passed).”
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4.5.4.3 No difference on weak readings for eventives
In the weak/cumulative scenarios tested in the experiment, there was no
significant difference between the rates of acceptance of eventive reciprocals (The
journalists quoted each other) and eventive plurals (The journalists quoted the
celebrities).
The previous section explained the advantage that plural statives have
over reciprocal statives by way of the difference between the two kinds of
scenario: the reciprocal WR scenario has overlap, while the plural cumulative
scenario can be viewed as three separate situations. The question then is: why
does the plural advantage disappear in the eventive condition?
One possibility is that statives have a special requirement for substantivity.
Another is that it is more difficult to view the subevents as separate situations in
the case of statives versus eventives. Section 4.6 below explores these possibilities.
4.5.4.4 Comparison with a vagueness account
The experiment gave us two results to account for: first, the main effect that
eventive predicates allow weak readings more readily than stative predicates.
And second, the interaction between eventuality type and sentence type such
that stative reciprocals are accepted significantly less often than stative plural
sentences. This section looks at how an account that explains weak
interpretations in terms of SR truth conditions plus nonmaximality (e.g.
Dalrymple et al. 1998) fares against the results of Experiment 3.
The experiment can be seen to manipulate two factors that have been
observed to encourage or aid nonmaximal interpretations: the eventuality type of
the predicate, and the number of individuals described. Yoon (1996) claims that
compared to sentences with eventive predicates, those with statives are less
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likely to allow a nonmaximal interpretation. For example, the eventive predicate
in (44a) does not seem to require that every child got food-poisoning, but the
stative in (44b) does seem to require that all the children are 8 years old.
(44)

a. The children (who ate pizza here last night) got food-poisoned.
b. The children (who are playing in the garden) are eight years old.

And, as discussed earlier, it is commonly observed that the larger the number of
individuals described, the more acceptable nonmaximal interpretations become
(Brisson 1998). It is easy to accept (45) as a description of a scenario where there
are ten kids, and one happens to be not taking part in the raft building. It is much
harder to do so if there are only three kids and one is not taking part.
(45)

The kids are building a raft.
The scenarios used in the reciprocal and plural conditions of the

experiment differ in the number of individuals involved: in the reciprocal
condition, the paragraph described the relations that held between three
individuals. In the plural condition, there were six individuals. Thus, the
reciprocal vs. plural manipulation of the experiment is confounded with a
difference in the number of individuals described.
Recasting the experiment in this way, we might expect an advantage for
plural sentences over reciprocal sentences. This is because plural sentences were
tested in a scenario with a larger number of individuals, which should be
associated with a greater tolerance for the nonmaximal interpretation. The other
prediction is that (following Yoon 1996) there should be an advantage for
eventive predicates over stative predicates: eventives should more easily allow
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the nonmaximal interpretation. Putting these two predictions together, the
eventive plural condition should be accepted most often (because it involves
both factors hypothesized to aid nonmaximality). The eventive reciprocal and
stative plural should be accepted less often. And the stative reciprocal should be
accepted least.
On this view, the observed interaction – the lack of a difference between
the eventive plural and the eventive reciprocal – is unexpected. There is no
reason to expect the plural advantage to disappear in the eventive condition. The
results of the experiment do not fit with an account that sees weak readings as
arising from SR truth conditions via nonmaximality.
4.5.5 Conclusions
The results of Experiment 3 provide empirical support for the intuition that
stative and eventive reciprocals differ regarding the availability of WR
interpretations, with WR more difficult for statives. In addition, the experiment
found evidence of the same kind of contrast for plural sentences: weak
(cumulative) interpretations are more difficult for statives. The fact that the effect
was larger for reciprocal sentences than those with definite plurals was argued to
follow from the fact that the definite plural scenarios more readily allowed for a
construal with separate situations, providing a way for the participants in those
statives to be seen as substantive pluralities. It was left unresolved why this
characteristic should matter for statives but not eventives, and the next section
takes up this issue.
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4.6 Statives and cumulative readings
As we saw in §4.2 and §4.2.3, substantive pluralities or natural grouping
principles have been argued to restrict the possible interpretations that can arise
from cumulative semantic representations. The discussion of Experiment 3
suggested that we might deal with the stative/eventive contrast in the same way:
weaker readings are available for statives when the necessary subpluralities can
be viewed as substantive, but it did not go into detail. Section 4.6.1 looks at how
this kind of account might work. Section 4.6.2 compares this account with SMH
approaches, and §4.6.3 looks at work by Schein (2003) and Mari (2014). Section
4.6.4 summarizes.
4.6.1 Substantivity and the stative/eventive contrast
As we saw in §4.2.3, it seems that natural principles of grouping (Dotlačil 2010)
can account for neighbour/chain interpretations that are stronger than WR. This
section addresses the question of whether the same is true of the stative/eventive
contrast from Experiment 3.
Kratzer’s constraint for quantification over states (2001:63) seems relevant:
(46)

Constraint for quantification over states:
Quantification over states is restricted to sums of states whose participants
are substantive pluralities

Could this explain the problem with WR scenarios for stative reciprocals?
This approach would have it that the problem with using sentence (47) to
describe the WR scenario in (48) is that Amy+Steven, Steven+Ian, and Ian+Amy
are not substantive pluralities.

165

(47)

The lawyers understood each other.

(48)

s1: <Amy, Steven>
s2: <Steven, Ian>
s3: <Ian, Amy>

But these same states are part of the SR scenario in (49), and (47) can truthfully
describe this scenario. Is Amy+Steven a substantive plurality in (49) but not in
(48)?
(49)

s1: <Amy, Steven>
s2: <Steven, Ian>
s3: <Ian, Amy>
s4: <Amy, Ian>
s5: <Steven, Amy>
s6: <Ian, Steven>

If the lawyers are a substantive plurality, then the constraint for quantification
over states in (46) would seem to allow us to quantify over the states that they
participate in. If those states are as in (48), it is not clear why this is impermissible.
Here is how the constraint for quantification over states could disallow
WR interpretations for statives. In an SR scenario, it is possible to look at it as
involving three states:
(50)

<Amy, Steven+Ian>
<Steven, Amy+Ian>
<Ian, Amy+Steven>

In each case, the participants are a substantive plurality: the three lawyers. The
three lawyers are the only substantive plurality in this context, so this is the only
way satisfying the WR semantics and satisfying the constraint for quantification
over states. States like those in (49) are unavailable because none of those pairs
are substantive pluralities. This would account for why stative reciprocals
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demand SR interpretations: if the reciprocal’s antecedent is taken to be a
substantive plurality, and there are no other substantive pluralities, then only
states where each individual is in the relation with every other are states which
have participants that consist of substantive pluralities.
Angelika Kratzer (pc) has pointed out to me that the triangle scenario we
saw with the telephone poles in §4.3.1 causes some difficulty for this kind of
account. In Figure 24 we cannot rely on spatially defined principles of grouping
to exclude the B+C pair.

Figure 24: Love and hatred, in the triangle scenario

Imagine A is a polyamorous person with two partners. She loves both her
partners and they love her back. But her two partners hate each other. We cannot
say of these three people that they love each other. If each couple is a substantive
plurality, on the account I am suggesting we might have expected that this
would be possible. If we have access to the states of loving whose participants
are substantive pluralities, then we would have <A+B, B+A, s1> and <A+C, C+A,
s2>, and would predict that it is true that the people love each other. It is possible
that the couples are not salient enough when they are not explicitly mentioned.
While (51a) is false, it seems that (51b) is true in Figure 24.
(51)

a. #They love each other.
b. The couples love each other.
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As we saw in Experiment 3, plural sentences – like reciprocals – show a
stative/eventive difference when it comes to weak interpretations. If each girl
chased at least one of the boys (and each boy was chased), sentence (52a) is a
felicitous description. If each girl hated at least one of the boys (and each boy was
hated), sentence (52b) is not a good description.
(52)

a. The girls chased the boys.
b. The girls hated the boys.

One way of improving the stative sentence is to provide more context that pairs
up the girls with boys (and then each girl hates her partner). But it needs to be
noted that this is not merely a cumulative interpretation. It involves dependent
definites: each girl hated ‘her’ boy. Notice that the indexical and numeral in (53)
make the dependent definite analysis impossible, and while a weak reading is
available in the case of (53a), it seems quite difficult for (53b). Thus, it seems that
the weak reading of the stative reciprocal (52b) is because of the dependent
definite.
(53)

a. Those three girls chased those three boys.
b. Those three girls hated those three boys.
What we have just seen is that eventives can get a truly cumulative

interpretation, whereas statives need a dependent definite interpretation or
possibly a division into separate situations. This is because of the need for
statives to obey the constraint for quantification over states. A doubly
distributive interpretation (i.e. SR), where each girl hated each boy, satisfies the
constraint because the participants are the two substantive pluralities: <girls,
boys, e>. Any other grouping must be based on the participants in the state being
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a substantive plurality. For instance, if the boy+girl pairs are in different rooms,
then that could form the basis for the pairs being considered substantive.
This section has suggested that the stative/eventive contrast with respect
to WR/codistributive interpretations might be accounted for using Kratzer’s
constraint for quantification over states.
4.6.2 Comparison with the SMH
This section looks at how SMH accounts fare against the stative/eventive
contrast.
Dalrymple et al. (1998) can explain statives requiring SR by means of the
SMH. In fact the SMH predicts SR whenever possible, so their account does not
actually predict a stative/eventive contrast. They explain the weaker readings
that sometimes arise with eventive predicates (The men are hitting each other) as SR
truth conditions plus nonmaximality. I have argued against this (in §2.3.1), and
as pointed out in the discussion of Experiment 3, that experiment found no
evidence to support the nonmaximality approach to WR interpretations.
Beck (2001) and Winter (2001) claim that the cumulative interpretation is
dispreferred, and only chosen when it is required by the context or the particular
relation involved19. This applies not only to reciprocals, but plural sentences
generally. Beck and Winter both see this as an SMH effect, since the doubly
distributive (or SR) interpretation entails the merely cumulative (or WR)
interpretation. Dotlačil (2010) presents a similar view. Dotlačil assumes a
WR/cumulative semantics, and has the SMH choose strong (branching/SR)
interpretations when possible. Dotlačil sees the SMH as related to a preference
19

Winter (2001) doesn’t see it as cumulative, but as a weakened distributive.
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for every subevent to be exemplified (2010:173). Like other SMH accounts,
Dotlačil’s has no difficulty explaining the SR preference for stative predicates: the
SMH chooses the SR interpretation when possible, and statives are unrestricted
(Sabato & Winter 2012). Dotlačil (2010:173) seems amenable to modifying the
SMH to include typicality, so he might account for the acceptability of WR
scenarios for eventives in the manner of Kerem et al. (2009). But recall from
Chapter 2 that Kerem et al.’s account has a problem with statives: it seems that
typicality does not license weak readings for statives. For this reason, the
SMH+typicality approach does not provide a fully satisfactory account of the
stative/eventive contrast.
4.6.3 Schein (2003) and Mari (2014)
This section looks at two accounts of reciprocal interpretations that specifically
address the difference between events and states.
Schein (2003) follows Heim, Lasnik & May (1991) in analyzing each other as
involving the distributive quantifier each and the definite description the other.
On this type of account, the reciprocal requires the relation to hold between each
member of the group denoted by the antecedent and ‘the other(s)’ (that is, the
group denoted by the antecedent minus the individual that is being looked at in
terms of the distribution). What is novel about Schein’s analysis is his use of
events. Consider Schein’s (2003:346) analysis of the sentence The plates are stacked
on top of each other:
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(54)

∃E[the X: plates[X]](stack[E} & Theme[E,X] & [ιX: Theme[E,X]]
[Each x: Xx][ιE’: Overlaps[E’,E] & Theme[E’,x]] [∃E’’: t(E’’) ≤ t(E’)][ιY:
Others[x,Y] & Theme[E’’,Y]] on-top-of[E’,x,Y])

Schein provides the following paraphrase of (54): ‘The plates stack, (with) them
each stacking on top of the others stacked’. That is, according to Schein, this
sentence truthfully describes a stack of plates because we can imagine a set of
stacking events where each plate is stacked on top of the others that have already
been stacked20.
Schein says of the stative/eventive contrast regarding the availability of
WR:
If there is no unfolding event and evolution of prevailing conditions,
reference to those in place at one moment coincides with reference to
those in place at any other, from which the fundamental contrast between
stative and eventive reciprocity follows. (2003:346-347)
That is, the aspectual difference between statives and eventives means that for a
stative like know or like, ‘the others’ is always going to pick out all of the others
for each individual. With an eventive predicate like hit or photograph, ‘the others’
will pick out any others (if any) that have already hit or photographed someone,
in this temporally ordered set of events that we are positing. States specifying
temporal/spatial location (like ‘being stacked on top of’) are treated like events,
since they can be viewed as ‘unfolding in time’ like events21.

20

Schein has it that the definite description in ‘the others’ should not actually be taken to assert
the existence of any others – so e.g. the plate on the bottom of the stack is stacked on top of
whatever others there are that have been stacked, which in this case is no other plates.
21

Schein suggests that looking at the state in terms of events could be a sort of perspective
adopted by the speaker.
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The analysis of Mari (2014), though quite different in many respects from
Schein (2003), makes use of a similar insight about the difference between stative
and eventive predicates. In particular, Mari’s analysis shares the idea that it is
because statives do not unfold over time that the weakest interpretation available
to them is SR.
As we saw in Chapter 3, in Mari’s system the requirements of the
reciprocal can be satisfied by events that do not occur in the actual world, but
might occur in ‘reasonable futures’. According to Mari’s analysis, the truth
conditions of the sentence The two boxes are stacked on top of each other are
equivalent to SR. This works because we are allowed to consider not only the
actual world, but also non-actual but reasonable futures. If the boxes are stacked
as in Figure 25’s (a), but might be arranged as in (b) at some point after speech
time, then we are allowed to count this as satisfying SR: Box 1 is stacked on top
of Box 2, and Box 2 is (i.e. could be) stacked on top of Box 1.

(a)

Box 1
Box 2

(b)

Box 2
Box 1

Figure 25: Stacked boxes, actual and non-actual
Mari accounts for weak readings of eventive predicates in the same way:
sentence (55) is true in the scenario in Figure 26 by virtue of the fact that there are
events in the reasonable future that would make SR true. (That is, B could
photograph A, C could photograph B, and A could photograph C.)22

22

In the interests of space, I am only discussing present tense examples here. Mari’s system treats
events prior to speech time differently: they are subject to a constraint similar to the SMH
(2014:233-235).
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(55)

The kids are photographing each other.
A!B
B!C
C!A

Figure 26: Kids photographing each other
However, according to Mari, it is not always possible to satisfy the
reciprocal using events that occur in the reasonable future. Sometimes there is no
reasonable future in which the relevant event occurs. This is the case with
relations that are considered to be permanent, such as structures being of a
certain height as in (56). There is no reasonable future in which one of the
structures changes height23.
(56)

#The Eiffel Tower and the Empire State Building are taller than each
other.

In Mari’s analysis, stative predicates such as like and know are similarly
permanent. They ‘denote a relation that holds permanently’, and ‘permanent
properties close possibilities’ (2014:236). Thus, we cannot judge (57) to be true if
it is merely the case that John likes Mary, even though Mary might come to like
John at some point after speech time.
(57)

John and Mary like each other.
It is not strictly true that a stative predicate such as like denotes a relation

holds permanently. After all, my liking something begins at some point and can
end. Mari does not go into detail on this point. We might understand it this way:
23

Any such scenario (a catastrophe, height being added/subtracted) doesn’t count as a
reasonable future. Mari cites Dowty’s (1979) notion of inertia.
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states describe a relation that simply holds, without beginning or end. (The
beginning and end of a state are events.)
Both Schein (2003) and Mari (2014) link the stative/eventive contrast with
respect to WR to statives holding permanently, not unfolding over time. In both
analyses, this means that there is no choice but for SR to hold, because both
analyses have an SR requirement that can only be escaped when the predicate is
of a type that can change over time. Although both of them link the
stative/eventive contrast regarding WR to the aspectual difference, both
accounts require additional commitments24.
4.6.4 Summary
So far in this chapter we have seen that the WR semantics can handle neighbour
cases, if we assume principles of natural grouping as suggested by Kratzer (2001)
and Dotlačil (2010).
Experiment 3 showed that reciprocal and other plural sentences both
show a stative/eventive contrast when it comes to weak readings: stative
reciprocals resist WR interpretations, and stative plural sentences resist
cumulative/codistributive interpretations. However, the effect is stronger for
reciprocals. This is because stative plural sentences are open to an interpretation
where the subevents are viewed as separate situations (e.g. separate in
space/time). This is not readily available for stative reciprocals because of the
overlapping nature of the scenario. The importance of being able to be viewed as
separate situations may be related to Kratzer’s constraint for quantification over

24

Chapter 3 raised some issues for Mari’s account.
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statives: the subevents cannot be arbitrary, they must have participants which
are substantive pluralities.
Section 4.6.1 suggested that stative reciprocals reject the WR interpretation
because the only viable way of satisfying the cumulative semantics and also
satisfying the constraint for quantification over statives is for the subevents to
each involve all of the members of the antecedent.
Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 looked at competing accounts of the
stative/eventive contrast. Section 4.6.2 pointed out that SMH accounts have no
difficulty with requiring SR interpretations for statives, but run into trouble
explaining weaker interpretations for eventives. Section 4.6.3 looked at the
accounts of Schein (2003) and Mari (2014), which both link the contrast in
availability of WR to the aspectual difference, but require additional
commitments to do so.

4.7 Cumulativity and the language processor
This chapter, and this dissertation, in assuming a cumulative/WR semantics for
the reciprocal, assumes that the grammatical representation underspecifies the
intended interpretation. This section looks at work on the collective/distributive
ambiguity as a model for how the processor deals with such semantic
representations. It is argued that the processor obeys economy principles at the
level of discourse representation. These principles can account for the collective
default, as well as preferences for branching over merely cumulative
interpretations. It is proposed that the stative/eventive contrast can be accounted
for using economy principles, moderated by plausibility considerations.
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4.7.1 Semantic accounts of collective vs. distributive
In much work on this topic, the distinction between collective and distributive
interpretations has been analyzed in terms of the presence or absence of a
distributive operator. Consider the sentence in (58), which is ambiguous between
a collective and distributive interpretation.
(58)

The kids ate a pizza.

On a collective interpretation, the kids shared one pizza. On a distributive
interpretation each kid had their own pizza. The difference is often attributed to
the presence of a DIST operator like the one in (59). For the collective reading,
where they shared one pizza, ‘ate a pizza’ is simply predicated of the group of
kids, (60a). But for the distributive reading, where each kid had their own pizza,
DIST applies to the predicate as in (60b). This results in the predicate distributing
down to each of the individual kids, as in (61).
(59)

DIST = λPλx∀y[y∈x ! P(y)]

(60)

a. ate.a.pizza (the.kids)
b. DIST(ate.a.pizza)(the.kids)

(61)

∀x[x∈the.kids ! ate.a.pizza(y)]
Kratzer (2001, 2005) presents a different view. She assumes a neo-

Davidsonian, event-based semantics, and follows Link (1983) in assuming that
the domain of individuals is cumulative, and includes atomic individuals and
their sums (plural individuals). The domain of eventualities25 works the same

25

The term ‘eventuality’ covers both events and states.
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way: it is cumulative, and consists of atomic eventualities and their sums (plural
eventualities).
Link uses the *-operator in (62) for pluralization. To see how it works,
consider the predicates cat and cats in a world with only three cats: Tiger, Felix
and Doug. The denotation of cat is the set of cats, as shown in (63a). The
denotation of cats involves pluralization with the *-operator, as in (63b). The *operator outputs all the pluralities that can be formed from the set of cats.
(62)

For any P, *P is the smallest property such that:
i. P ⊆ *P
ii. if a ∈ *P and b ∈ *P, then a+b ∈ *P

(63)

a. ++cat++ = {Tiger, Felix, Doug}
b. ++cats++ = *{Tiger, Felix, Doug}

(64)

*{Tiger, Felix, Doug} = {t, f, d, t+f, t+d, d+f, t+d+f}
But in Kratzer’s system, all predicates are plural from the start. The

semantic representation of a sentence like (65a) is as in (65b)26. All of the
predicates (kid, agent, box, lift) are inherently plural (they are marked with ‘*’ to
remind us of this). The representation in (65b) can be read ‘There is a possibly
plural event of lifting two boxes, with two kids as plural agent’.
(65)

a. Two kids lifted two boxes.
b. ∃e∃x∃y[*kid(x) & |x|=2 & *agent(x)(e) & *box(y) & |y|=2 & *lift(y)(e)]

This covers any collective, cumulative or iterative construal, as long as two kids
did the lifting and two boxes were lifted in total. For example, imagine that Amy
lifted Box 1 twice and then Amy and Bella together lifted Box 2. We have three
26

This still needs to be refined to account for subject/object distributives.

177

events as in (66). But because predicates are plural from the start, there are more
than just three events. As shown in (67), there are many events of lifting.
Sentence (65a) is true in this scenario because there are several variable
assignments that make (65b) true, including that shown in (68).
(66)

e1: Amy lifted Box1
e2: Amy lifted Box1
e3: Amy+Bella lifted Box2

(67)

++*agent++ = <Amy, e1> , <Amy, e2>, <Amy+Bella, e3>, <Amy, e1+e2>,
<Amy+Bella, e1+e3>, <Amy+Bella, e2+e3>, <Amy+Bella,
e1+e2+e3>
++*lift++= <Box1, e1>, <Box1, e2>, <Box2, e3>, <Box1+Box2, e1+e2>,
<Box1+Box2, e1+e3>, <Box1+Box2, e2+e3>, <Box1+Box2,
e1+e2+e3>

(68)

e = e1+e3
x = Amy+Bella
y = Box1+Box2

The cumulative semantic representation in (65b) even covers the case where two
kids each lifted the same two boxes (the branching reading, a distributive
without variation). What it doesn’t allow for is a distributive reading with
variation, e.g. Amy lifted a pair of boxes and Bella lifted some other pair of boxes
(i.e. the subject distributive reading). Such a plural event could have four boxes
in it, not two as required by (65b). Nor does it cover the object distributive case
where there are two boxes, each of which is lifted by two kids (so there might be
four kids in all). These readings require phrasal cumulativity.
Traditionally, subject and object distributive readings are due to the
presence of a DIST operator. For the subject distributive, the distributive
predicate ‘lift two boxes’ applies to each of the atoms in the subject. For the object
distributive, the object has wide scope and the distributive predicate is ‘two kids
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lift t1’. Kratzer (2001) argues that rather than involving a DIST operator, such
readings are due to a phrasal *-operator. Applying the plural operator at the
phrasal level works much like a DIST operator would, except distribution does
not have to be down to atoms. But a further difference is that pluralizing the
predicate as in (69) does not just result in a subject distributive interpretation:
pluralizing with the *-operator always retains the original extension. So (69)
allows for all of the interpretations we saw before, plus subject distributive ones.
(69)

*λxλe∃y[*box(y) & |y|=2 & *lift(y)(e) & *agent(x)(e)]

Likewise, the object distributive interpretation arises when the object moves over
the subject and then its sister predicate is pluralized as in (70). Again, this allows
for all of the interpretations we saw before, but this time with the addition of
object distributive ones.
(70)

*λxλe∃y[*kid(y) & |y|=2 & *lift(x)(e) & *agent(y)(e)]
Analyses that use DIST operators typically see them as optionally inserted,

but in Kratzer’s analysis, the presence of phrasal cumulativity is not optional: in
her (2005) account, plural DPs bring along an extra plural operator – this plural
operator obligatorily pluralizes the DP’s sister predicate. On this view, a sentence
like Two kids lifted two boxes has two distinct interpretations. Both of them allow
collective/cumulative/iterative construals, but one groups these together with
the subject distributive, and the other groups them with the object distributive.
Kratzer (2005:17) predicts that the object distributive version should be
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dispreferred, due to economy considerations27. This leaves the subject
distributive version as the default LF; this LF gives rise to collective, cumulative,
iterative and subject distributive construals (2005:17-18).
4.7.2 Psycholinguistics and collective/distributive
In Brooks & Braine’s (1996) acquisition study, participants were given a sentence
(e.g. Three boys are building a boat) along with two pictures illustrating a
distributive reading with variation (each boy is building his own boat) and a
collective reading (the boys are working together on a single boat). Participants
were asked to choose the picture that went best with the sentence. The adults
tested overwhelmingly preferred the collective reading (97.5% collective vs. 2.5%
distributive).
In a series of questionnaire studies, Ussery (2008) investigated the
preferred interpretation of sentences with plural subjects and objects. Ussery
provided participants with sentences like (71), and asked them to select the
number of buildings that were designed (with two options: 4 or 12).
(71)

Three architects designed four buildings.

Choosing ‘4’ fits with a collective (or cumulative) interpretation, while ‘12’ is a
subject distributive. Ussery looked at a number of factors including the form of
the subject DP and the presence of a multiple-event bias (i.e. predicates that
prefer/require a noncollective interpretation), and found a reliable preference for
the non-distributive construal, regardless of these manipulations.

27

The object distributive is clearly a dispreferred interpretation (Gil 1982).

180

Frazier, Pacht & Rayner (1999) present evidence that the language
processor commits to the collective reading during online processing. Their eye
movement study compared sentences with distributive (each) or collective
(together) disambiguations in either pre-verb or post-verb position, as shown in
(72).
(72)

a. Sam and Maria {each/together} carried one suitcase…
b. Sam and Maria carried one suitcase {each/together}…

They found evidence of a garden path effect when sentences were disambiguated
to a distributive interpretation, but only when the disambiguation appeared in
post-verb position. In pre-verb position, there was no significant difference
between collective and distributive disambiguations. Frazier et al. interpret the
interaction between distributivity and position thus: the processor fixes on a
collective interpretation at the predicate. At the subject DP, the sentence is still
vague as to distributive/collective and hence neither disambiguation is
disruptive in the early position. But by the predicate, the processor has made a
commitment to the collective interpretation, and so is garden-pathed if the
sentence is then disambiguated to the distributive interpretation.
Brasoveanu & Dotlačil (2012) raise some worries about Frazier et al.’s use
of each to disambiguate28. Their eye movement study has the same design as
Frazier et al.’s, but they use individually to disambiguate. Like Frazier et al., they
found that the distributive disambiguation in post verb position caused difficulty,
and they interpret the results as showing that there is an online preference for the
collective reading.
28

They argue that pre- and post-verbal each are distinct lexical items
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Frazier & Clifton (2001) provide further evidence of an advantage for the
collective interpretation. In a self-paced reading experiment, they compared two
kinds of predicates: predicates biased towards a distributive interpretation (e.g.
resign, cough, put on makeup), and unconstrained predicates which could receive
either a collective or distributive interpretation (e.g. call, arrive, dance). They
found evidence of a penalty for the distributive predicates. Specifically, there was
an interaction such that sentences with a conjoined subject and an unconstrained
predicate (73a) were read faster than their controls (73b,c), while those with
distributive predicates (74a) were read marginally slower than their controls
(74b,c).
(73)

a. Jenny and David called.
b. Jenny called and David did too.
c. Jenny called. David did too.

(74)

a. The accountant and the bookkeeper resigned.
b. The accountant resigned and the bookkeeper did too.
c. The accountant resigned. The bookkeeper did too.
Frazier & Clifton interpret the interaction as evidence that when the

language processor encounters a sentence with a plural subject, it by default
constructs a collective interpretation. There is a penalty associated with
distributive predicates because the processor must give up the initial collective
interpretation.
Brasoveanu & Dotlačil (2012) likewise investigated predicates that are
pragmatically biased towards a distributive interpretation, like drink an espresso.
Their eye movement study compared the effect of definite plural subject (75a),
definite plural plus all (b), and definite plural plus each (c).
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(75)

During the lunch break,
a. the managers drank an espresso in the newly opened coffee shop.
b. the managers all drank an espresso in the newly opened coffee shop.
c. the managers each drank an espresso in the newly opened coffee
shop.

Brasoveanu & Dotlačil found evidence of processing difficulty in the case of the
definite plural (a) and all (b) compared with each (c). There were more
regressions from the sentence final region for (a) and (b), and higher rereading
time and total time on the predicate. This fits with Frazier & Clifton’s (2001)
results: even when the predicate is pragmatically biased towards a distributive
interpretation, the processor appears to initially fix on a collective interpretation.
We have seen evidence in this section that there is a preference for
collective (or non-distributive) interpretations, both in terms of the preferred
final interpretation of an ambiguous sentence, and in online processing, where
the processor appears to fix on a collective reading by default – even when it is
pragmatically unlikely.
4.7.3 The view from lexical cumulativity
This section looks at how to explain the previous section’s results in an account
that assumes lexical cumulativity. On a view of the semantics where a
distributive interpretation requires the presence of a distributive operator, the
psycholinguistic results we saw in the previous section have a simple
explanation: collective and distributive interpretations have distinct LFs (with
the distributive requiring a DIST operator), and the collective LF is preferred for
economy reasons. According to Frazier et al.’s (1999) MSC hypothesis, the
psycholinguistic evidence supports the conclusion that collective/distributive is
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a necessary semantic decision; collective and distributive interpretations arise
from grammatical representations that are distinct/uncollapsible.
But on the lexical cumulativity account, the preference for a collective
interpretation over a distributive one does not necessarily come from (economy
considerations based on) the grammar. As we saw above, lexical cumulativity
allows for both collective and distributive interpretations. Example (76a) can be
interpreted collectively (77a) or distributively (77b); both interpretations arise
from a single grammatical representation, (76b).
(76)

a. Two kids danced.
b. ∃e∃x[*kid(x) & |x|=2 & *agent(x)(e) & *dance(y)(e)]

(77)

a. <Amy+Ben, e1>
b. <Amy, e1> <Ben, e2>

The question then is how to account for the collective preference. One possibility
is to note that collective and distributive interpretations differ in the mental
representation of the discourse: the collective interpretation (77a) requires adding
only one event to the mental model, whereas the distributive (77b) requires two.
A preference for conceptual economy means that the processor should not
instantiate more discourse entities (in this case events) than necessary29. (Frazier
& Clifton (2001) suggest this as one possible account of their results30.) Thus, the
collective could be preferred for economy reasons even in a lexical cumulativity
account (though it would be an economy preference at the level of

29

This is related to Crain & Steedman’s (1985) Principle of Parsimony. Dotlačil (2010) casts it as a
*REFERENT constraint.
30

Frazier & Clifton do not assume lexical cumulativity, so their other suggestion is that the
collective has a simpler LF than the distributive (which requires a DIST operator).
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discourse/mental representation rather than at LF as in e.g. Frazier et al.’s (1999)
account).
Explaining the preference for collective interpretations via economy at the
level of the mental model means that we need to reevaluate Frazier et al.’s MSC.
According to the MSC, barring misleading context, errors in interpretation are
diagnostic of necessary grammatical choice points. But on the lexical
cumulativity account, when the processor wrongly commits to a collective
interpretation it is not because of a grammatically necessary choice. We might
consider modifying the MSC, so that it operates at the level of mental/discourse
representation.
Here’s the picture we are working with: the processor builds a cumulative
semantic representation and simultaneously instantiates a corresponding mental
model. That mental model is built by a process that obeys economy: the
processor by default instantiates a single event in the mental model.
Ussery (2008) showed that even with predicates that disprefer collective
interpretations as in (78), the distributive interpretation with covariation is
dispreferred. The preferred interpretation is cumulative. (Ussery’s experiment
does not tell us whether the preferred interpretation is branching (each of the
boys kissed each of the girls) or merely cumulative.) The point is that in addition
to a preference for collective interpretations, we also need the distributive with
covariation to be dispreferred. This can also be explained using economy: the
distributive with covariation is dispreferred because it requires the introduction
of more individuals to the mental model (Dotlačil 201031).
31

Dotlačil also discusses competition / the division of pragmatic labour in accounting for the
effect of different kinds of subject DP on this preference.

185

(78)

a. Three boys kissed two girls.
b. How many girls were kissed? [Two (not six)]
While Ussery’s experiment using materials like (78) did not distinguish

between branching and merely cumulative interpretations, Gil (1982) provides
evidence that branching interpretations are preferred over merely cumulative
ones. Gil’s questionnaire study looked at sentences like Three boys saw two girls in
Dutch, Hebrew and Bengali. Gil found a significant difference between the two
scenarios in (79). Scenario (79a) illustrates the branching reading; scenario (79b)
illustrates a cumulative reading. Participants judged the sentence to be true in
scenario (79a) 90-98% of the time, but judged it true in scenario (79b) significantly
less often (40-80% of the time32).
(79)

a. Boy 1 saw Girl 1, Girl 2
Boy 2 saw Girl 1, Girl 2
Boy 3 saw Girl 1, Girl 2
b. Boy 1 saw Girl 1
Boy 2 saw Girl 2
Boy 3 saw Girl 2
Gil (1982) discusses only one predicate: see. One characteristic of see is that

it can easily take a collective object – the most economical construal of Three boys
saw two girls involves positing the existence of three events of seeing (where the
pair of girls is seen together)33. Thus the branching and cumulative scenarios Gil
used both minimally require three events of seeing. But consider the predicate
kiss – the branching interpretation of Three boys kissed two girls would involve 6

32

This difference was significant for Dutch and Hebrew, but only approaching significance for
Bengali.
33

I’m excluding collective interpretations (e.g. where the boys are in teams)
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events, while the cumulative would only require 3 events. If branching is still
preferred over cumulative, then our economy-based account has something to
explain. It would tell us something about economy: either we are measuring it
incorrectly, or else there is another preference that is stronger. We could see the
branching reading as more economical – despite involving more events – because
of the uniformity: each boy kisses the same girls. It would be interesting to have
some data on examples like Gil’s, but with the same number of individuals in
subject and object (Two boys kissed two girls), because a preference for one-one
pairings might plausibly affect economy calculations too.34 That is, it is plausible
that the difference between the branching scenario in (80a) and the merely
cumulative scenario with one-one pairing in (80b) is not so stark as the contrast
between Gil’s examples in (79).
(80)

a. Boy 1 kissed Girl 1, Girl 2
Boy 2 kissed Girl 1, Girl 2
b. Boy 1 kissed Girl 1
Boy 2 kissed Girl 2
Gil provides evidence that merely cumulative interpretations are

dispreferred compared with branching cumulative interpretations. But it appears
that merely cumulative interpretations are not dispreferred in general. In one of
Ussery’s (2008) experiments, participants were given two paraphrases of a
sentence like (81) (merely cumulative (a) and collective (b)), and asked to select
their preferred paraphrase. Ussery found no significant difference between the
two.
34

Recall Schwarzschild’s example of the students talking to the teachers. A one-one preference
might be involved in arriving at the cumulative interpretation that Schwarzschild says is
preferred.
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(81)

Two tailors made four suits.#
a. Altogether they made four suits. For example, the tailors work for
different designers and each tailor made fewer than four suits. The total
number of suits made added up to four.#
b. They made four suits together. For example, the tailors work for the
same designer and they worked as a team to make each of the four suits.
This is surprising, since in the previous section we saw evidence of a very

strong preference for collective interpretations. But notice that both of the
scenarios in (82) involve four events of suit-making. And both involve the same
number of individuals.
(82)

a. e1: Tailor 1 made Suit 1
e2: Tailor 1 made Suit 2
e3: Tailor 2 made Suit 3
e4: Tailor 2 made Suit 4
b. e1: Tailor 1+2 made Suit 1
e2: Tailor 1+2 made Suit 2
e3: Tailor 1+2 made Suit 3
e4: Tailor 1+2 made Suit 4

Thus, the economy preferences we have talked about so far do not choose
between the two. This result makes sense if we see the collective interpretation as
an extreme version of cumulative, with groups rather than atoms. Either (82a) or
(82b) can be chosen, depending on what the cover is. (Schwarzschild (1996)
assumes that a definite plural DP makes both covers salient – one with
individuals in different cells (which we would need for the cumulative
interpretation), and one with all in one cell (which would give the collective
interpretation).)
Ussery’s experiment is unnatural in that participants were given only two
options: one (the collective) is hypothesized to be the most preferred, the other
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(merely cumulative) is – based on Gil (1982) – hypothesized to be the least
preferred. The scenarios disallow the branching interpretation, which is typically
preferred over merely cumulative (Gil 1982). Nevertheless, the fact that the
merely cumulative interpretation is not chosen significantly less frequently than
the most preferred interpretation is interesting. It goes against all the claims (e.g.
Beck 2001, Winter 2001, Dotlačil 2010) that (merely) cumulative interpretations
are dispreferred and only chosen when necessary. But on an account where both
arise from the same LF, and without a SMH that consistently disprefers merely
cumulative interpretations, it is not too surprising. Both the collective and merely
cumulative interpretations in (82) involve the same number of individuals and
the same number of events, so they are equally economical.
Here’s the picture we have arrived at: a single cumulative LF that gives
rise to collective/cumulative/iterative (and subject distributive) readings. The
processor prefers to instantiate the fewest individuals in the mental model. This
means the possibly plural event in the semantic representation is by default
instantiated as a single event in the mental representation. This shows up as a
preference for collective (online and offline).
As for non-collective interpretations, the branching interpretation is
preferred over a merely cumulative interpretation (Gil 1982). But Ussery (2008)
suggests that merely cumulative interpretations are more readily available than
would be predicted by SMH proponents (Beck, Winter, Dotlačil).
4.7.4 The question of phrasal cumulativity
So far, I have followed Kratzer (2005) in assuming that a plural subject
automatically results in phrasal cumulativity. On this view, a sentence with a
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plural subject has a single LF that allows collective/cumulative/iterative
interpretations as well as subject distributive35. This view led me to explain the
collective default (e.g. Frazier, Pacht & Rayner 1999) in terms of an economy
preference for adding the fewest events to the discourse representation.
There is an alternative. It could be the case that phrasal cumulativity is
optional in the presence of a plural DP. If so, if the processor obeys economy in
building LFs, then we expect that a sentence like (83) will by default receive an
LF without phrasal cumulativity, and that does not allow for a subject
distributive interpretation.
(83)

Sam and Maria carried one suitcase

This makes the processor’s preference for collective over subject distributive a
result of economy at LF.
But it is not the case that we should abandon the idea that economy at the
level of the mental model is needed. The default LF for (83) without phrasal
cumulativity still allows for cumulative ‘distributive’ interpretations without
variation (e.g. Sam carried the suitcase, then Maria carried it.). Economy explains
why the preferred interpretation is collective.
4.7.5 Processing reciprocal sentences
We saw that, assuming lexical cumulativity, we no longer can explain the
collective preference using economy at the level of LF. Instead, we can explain it

35

This is the default, since the version that allows object distributive requires movement and is
dispreferred.
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using economy in the mental model. The collective interpretation is the most
economical because only one event is instantiated in the model.
What happens when the processor encounters a reciprocal predicate, as in
example (84)? Economy predicts that a single event is added to the discourse
representation36. It is reasonable to assume that the processor adds to the
discourse representation a single event, with the kids as agent and theme of that
event. The semantic representation requires that that event’s subevents must add
together, via cumulativity (and respecting the reciprocal’s non-identity
condition) to give the correct result.
(84)

The kids in that class photographed each other yesterday.
I am proposing that the processor treats a reciprocal sentence like any

other sentence with a plural subject: by default it commits to a single event. In
non-reciprocal sentences, that leads to the collective default/preference.
If the reciprocal were incompatible with the processor’s collective default,
the results of Frazier, Pacht & Rayner (1999) might predict processing difficulty
in the post-verb region. Recall that they found a garden path effect when the
processor encountered the distributive disambiguation each in the post-verb
region, suggesting that it had already committed to the collective interpretation
by that point. A complication here is that each other is both the ‘disambiguation’
to the reciprocal interpretation and the object of the verb. Frazier, Pacht &
Rayner’s results only tell us that at the point in the sentence after both the verb
and object, the processor is committed to the collective interpretation. If the
36

I am assuming no special cover (e.g. where the kids are in pairs). Chapter 5 addresses
partitioned interpretations.
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processor does not make this commitment on the verb itself but only after the
object, it is possible that each other, as the object of the verb, comes early enough
to head off any garden path effect.
Experiment 2 (in Chapter 2) provides some relevant eye movement data.
Although it was testing another hypothesis, it provides data on reciprocal vs.
non-reciprocal sentences like (85). As discussed in Chapter 2 (§2.5.2), the
experiment found no sign of processing difficulty for the reciprocal in the postverb region. (There was however a marginal main effect of reciprocal on the
sentence final region: reciprocal sentences had longer total times in this region37.)
We can at least say that Experiment 2 found no evidence of an immediate garden
path effect in the post verb region.
(85) The editors | teased | {each other/the intern} about the spelling | errors
I assume that by default the processor adds a single event to the discourse
representation. In this respect the reciprocal is treated like a collective. It is
possible that in some – perhaps many – cases (especially where the antecedent
numbers greater than two) the representation is left that underspecified. We
know that the subevents of that event must add up by cumulativity to give the
right result, and that the reciprocal’s non-identity condition must be respected.
But I don’t know of any clear evidence that the processor must instantiate these
subevents in the mental model.
By taking this position, my account runs into the issue of the contrast
between reciprocals and reflexives. Both have co-reference between subject and
37

In Chapter 2 I speculate that this is a sentence wrap-up effect for reciprocals but it is not clear
what is responsible for this effect.
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object, but they differ on the identity/non-identity condition. Is identity/nonidentity something that is immediately added to the mental representation?
Something to think about is that according to Cable’s (2014) analysis, reflexives
in English, except for in certain circumstances, need to be interpreted with a Doperator (i.e. phrasal cumulativity) 38.
In terms of preferences related to more fully spelled out interpretations,
the preference for uniformity is relevant. We saw this preference above,
explaining Gil’s result where branching interpretations have an advantage over
merely cumulative ones. I suggested that this can be seen as an economy
preference, speculating that it is more economical to in effect apply the same
‘predicate’ to each individual in the antecedent. This preference favours SR
interpretations. As I just mentioned, there is little evidence that this is a necessary
decision39. If we think of Gil’s experiment, participants were given a sentence
and a scenario and asked if it was true in that scenario. A higher rate of
acceptability in the branching scenario than in the merely cumulative scenario
does not necessarily mean that the language processor has fixed on a fleshed out
branching interpretation of the sentence. It could instead mean that the
branching scenario is a more attractive/economical way of satisfying the

38

Cable argues that the English reflexive is Focus-marked. There are two possible LFs:
cumulative and distributive (i.e. with phrasal cumulativity). In a context that does not provide
contrasting individuals, the cumulative LF is uninterpretable. The cumulative interpretation of a
reflexive sentence – which can be satisfied by mixed scenarios i.e. reflexive or reciprocal – is only
available in a context that provides contrasting individuals. For example, in the context of the
question Did the parents wash the kids? the reflexive sentence No, the kids washed themselves is true
in a mixed scenario where one kid washes herself and other kids wash/are washed by other kids.
39

The strongest evidence that it is necessary is that statives seem to invite/require SR. But as we
shall see in §4.8 below, evidence from exceptives suggests that stative reciprocals rarely receive
fully spelled out SR interpretations.
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cumulative/WR truth conditions because it satisfies the preference for
uniformity.
Another relevant preference concerns substantivity. There is a large body
of work related to substantivity in the psycholinguistics literature, mostly using
plural anaphors as a probe of mental representations. This work finds that
individuals that are ontologically homogenous (Koh & Clifton 2002), that share a
location and goals (Carreiras 1997, Kaup & Kelter 2002), or that fill the same
thematic roles (Koh & Clifton 2002) are more easily grouped into plural discourse
entities. I see all this as evidence that plural discourse entities prefer for their
individual parts to share as many characteristics as possible. Turning from
individuals to events, Moltmann (1992:428) argues for a preference for plural
events to be what she calls ‘integrated wholes’ (i.e. substantive pluralities):
Entities that are semantic reference objects are ‘better’ the
more they are integrated wholes, where the integrity of
events can be constituted on the basis of connectedness in
time or in space or on the basis of causal relations or the
participation of other entities in the event.
Much like a plural discourse entity prefers the individuals that constitute it to be
of the same kind and share location/goals/thematic roles, a plural event prefers
its subevents to be close together in time/space etc.
The preference for uniformity and the preference for ‘event integrity’ are
expected to come into conflict with plausibility. In many cases, the SR
interpretation favoured by uniformity is going to involve many subevents. If five
kids photographed each other, uniformity favours the scenario where there are
20 photographing events. Event integrity requires all of those photographings to
be close together in space/time. This is implausible.
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But not all kinds of events will be implausible: if there are a small number
of individuals, if the event does not take much time or involve
movement/physical contact, or especially if it is stative, then we expect that
preferences for event integrity and uniformity (i.e. the SR construal) will not lead
to an implausible interpretation. This brings us back to the familiar
stative/eventive contrast with respect to WR.
As we saw in Chapter 2, Kerem et al. (2009) provide evidence that there is
a correlation between the strength of a predicate’s preference for a single patient
per agent, and the acceptability of the WR interpretation. E.g. stab strongly
prefers a single patient, and has a higher rate of acceptance of WR; see does not
have a strong preference for a single patient, and has a lower rate of acceptance
of WR. According to Kerem et al. the SMH takes into account typicality: in their
MTH system, a reciprocal sentence can truthfully describe a scenario if it
contains the maximal number of relations consistent with typicality preferences.
A problem for Kerem et al.’s account is that there is no correlation between
typicality and the availability of WR for stative predicates. Kerem et al. have no
account of this fact.
If we look at Kerem et al.’s typicality data in a different light, we can make
sense of the lack of a correlation for statives. Kerem et al. do not draw attention
to this, but one of the hidden assumptions here is that their typicality judgements
for eventives involve the typicality or plausibility of the agent interacting with
two patients simultaneously. In one of their studies determining typicality
preferences, participants were given the sentence ‘The boy is hitting’, and in a
forced choice task chose the scenario where the boy is hitting one patient over the
one where he is hitting two patients. Kerem et al. take this as evidence that hit
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has a preference for a single patient. But we could just as well take it as evidence
that a single agent preferably does not take part in two hitting events
simultaneously. If this is what is at issue, rather than the number of patients, then
we have an answer to why typicality is irrelevant for statives. The question of
how typical/plausible it is for multiple states of some kind to hold
simultaneously is different, presumably because of the fact that states simply
hold at a time rather than taking time.
On a sentence completion task, hate might have a high percentage of
singular objects. But that does not provide any information about the plausibility
of hating multiple things simultaneously. In contrast, I am arguing that the same
measure does tell us something about the plausibility of simultaneous eventives.
I think that for eventives, part of the calculation that goes into arriving at a
typicality judgement involves the likelihood of an agent taking part in two
events of that kind simultaneously or close in time. For statives, this part is
irrelevant.
I have argued that a reciprocal sentence has a cumulative semantic
representation equivalent to WR. The processor by default posits a single event
in the mental representation (via economy). That single event must satisfy WR
(any subevents must sum together via cumulativity to give the appropriate result,
and the reciprocal’s non-identity condition must be respected). If the mental
model goes into more detail about the subevents of that single event, there is a
preference for uniformity (which favours a branching/SR scenario over merely
cumulative). In addition, there is a preference for events to have integrity
(Moltmann 1992). The preferences for uniformity and event integrity can conflict
with plausibility. When there is no conflict with plausibility (statives, eventives
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without physical contact e.g. see) uniformity favours SR. When there is a conflict
with plausibility, the preference for SR will be weaker.
4.7.6 Economy in mental models
I have argued that economy in mental models plays a part in both the fact that
distributive interpretations with variation are dispreferred (Ussery 2008; Dotlačil
2010) and that collective interpretations are preferred for sentences with plural
subjects (Frazier et al. 1999; Frazier & Clifton 2001; Brasoveanu & Dotlačil 2012).
An issue for this kind of approach is whether we can find any empirical evidence
regarding the contents of mental models.
In fact, as we will see in Chapter 5, there has been quite a lot of work on
the conceptual representations associated with plural DPs. But an issue of
particular interest to us in this chapter – the conceptual representation associated
with events – is less well studied.
Huffman (2011) introduced an interesting new methodology for
investigating the mental model. She uses an experimental task used by
Berent, Pinker, Tzelgov, Bibi & Goldfarb (2005), where participants are shown
either a single word or two words, and their task is to judge how many words
they have been shown. Berent et al. found that when a single word appeared,
participants were slower to make the ‘one’ judgement when that word was
plural. That is, the number information associated with the plural interfered with
the judgement task. Huffman (2011) extends the same methodology to words
appearing in sentential contexts.
In one experiment, she looked at collective and distributive sentences like
those in (86). Of interest was the contrast between the singular indefinites in (86a)
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and (86b). On a distributive interpretation as in (86a), the sentence probably
describes multiple boxes. On a collective interpretation as in (86b), there is one
box. Huffman’s experiment looked at whether the conceptual plural information
associated with box in (86a) interfered with the task in the same way as the
number information in Berent et al.’s study.
(86)

a. Each of the men carried a box up the stairs.
b. Together the men carried a box up the stairs.
c. Each of the men carried some boxes up the stairs.
d. Together the men carried some boxes up the stairs.

Sentences were presented incrementally in chunks of one or two words in
response to the participant pressing a button. At each button press, either the
next word or pair of words appeared. When a word or words appeared in blue,
this was a cue for the participant to make a judgement about how many words
they saw. Huffman found that as expected, the ‘one’ decision took longer when
the word was plural marked (e.g. boxes in (86c,d)) than singular (e.g. box in
(86a,b)). But of interest to the question of mental models, she also found an
interaction between number marking and collective/distributive. It took longer
for participants to make the ‘one’ decision about box in the distributive sentence
(86a) vs. the collective sentence (86b). Huffman concludes that in the distributive
sentence the singular box is associated with a plural conceptual representation,
and this is what interferes with the judgement task.
Huffman also looked at whether having multiple events in the mental
model might similarly interfere with the judgement task. This experiment
involved intransitive verbs that are biased towards a distributive interpretation,
like sleep.
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(87)

The {cat/cats} slept on the rug.

The idea was that in a sentence like (87) with a singular subject, there is only one
sleeping event. With a plural subject, there is one sleeping event per cat. If the
mental model makes this distinction between a single event vs. multiple events,
then participants should be slower to make the ‘one’ judgment on the verb when
the subject is plural. However, Huffman found no such difference.
Huffman (2011:85,88) suggests that this may be interpreted as evidence
that the processor leaves the number of sleeping events underspecified in
sentences like (87). She speculates that the distributive bias of the predicate may
not be a strong enough cue to the processor to instantiate multiple events, and
that a distributive quantifier might be a stronger cue.
Her recent work (Patson & Warren, forthcoming) finds evidence that
distributive quantifiers as in (88b), complex reference objects (i.e. conjoined DPs)
as in (89b), and frequency adverbials as in (90b) all interfere with the judgement
task on the verb. In each case, the ‘one’ judgement on the verb takes longer in the
(b) version than the (a) version. Patson & Warren argue that the presence of these
linguistic markers leads comprehenders to add multiple subevents to the mental
model.
(88)

a. Together the hikers calmly pitched a small tent
b. Each of the hikers calmly pitched a small tent

(89)

a. The dogs lazily sat in the sun
b. The cat and the dog lazily sat in the sun

(90)

a. On Saturday, the soldier excitedly returned for a weekend
b. Every Saturday, the soldier excitedly returned for a weekend
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Huffman’s (2011) null result with sentences like (87) contrasts with Frazier
& Clifton’s (2001) study which found that predicates biased towards a
distributive interpretation (e.g. resign) were read slower than neutral ones. Above
in §4.7.3, I suggest that Frazier & Clifton’s result can be seen as evidence that the
processor by default instantiates a single event in the mental model; predicates
biased towards a distributive interpretation require revising the mental model.
The results of Patson & Warren (forthcoming) suggest that the contrast between
these two results may hinge on the difference in subject DPs; Huffman’s study
used definite plurals while Frazier & Clifton’s study involved conjoined DPs (i.e.
complex reference objects).
In conclusion , the methodology introduced by Huffman (2011) is a
promising tool for investigating the mental model.
4.7.7 Conclusion
I have argued that a preference for a strong (doubly distributive/SR) construal of
reciprocals does not mean that their semantic representation has such strong
truth conditions. Rather, strong readings can be derived from weak semantic
representations via preferences to do with natural groupings (in the case of
neighbour/chain predicates) and economical ways of spelling out the
underspecified LF (in the case of the uniformity preference, which favours
branching/SR interpretations). My account is similar to that of Dotlačil (2010),
who uses a version of the SMH to choose branching/SR interpretations over
merely cumulative/WR ones. Dotlačil sees this as a preference for events to
exemplify the strongest proposition (2010:73). On my view, it is possible to see
the preference for uniformity as an economy preference: applying the same
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‘predicate’ to each of the individuals in the subject/antecedent of the reciprocal is
the most economical way of spelling out the subevents. Compared with a nonuniform scenario like a merely cumulative one, a uniform (branching/SR)
scenario involves adding more events to the mental model, and in this respect a
preference for uniformity is not obviously a type of economy preference. Yet a
uniform scenario can be seen as more economical than a non-uniform one, in that
it is simpler than a non-uniform one: there are no arbitrary differences between
the individuals; each individual takes part in the same way.
The approach that I am arguing for sees strong/SR scenarios as having a
certain attractiveness or simplicity that merely cumulative/WR ones lack. When
the language processor is called upon to spell out the underspecified cumulative
truth conditions in more detail, this kind of scenario is most economical. I predict
that the processor need not fully instantiate all of the subevents that verify a
reciprocal sentence. Preferences like that for uniformity, which chooses SR
interpretations over WR ones, do not always come into play.
The next section looks at some evidence from exceptives. I argue that
exceptives provide evidence in support of the idea that reciprocal sentences
rarely are associated with fully spelled out interpretations equivalent to SR.

4.8 Reciprocals and exceptives
This section looks at evidence from free exception phrases40. On Moltmann’s
(1995) analysis, exceptives require the presence of universal quantification, either

40

As opposed to connected exception phrases: Every boy except John came (Moltmann 1995)
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an actual universal or negative universal quantifier (91a), or at the level of
implications (91b).
(91)

a. Except for John, {every boy/all boys/no boy /*a lot of boys/*three
boys/(?) most boys/(?)few boys} came.
b. The place is deserted except for a cat.

On Moltmann’s analysis, the free exception phrase in (92) is applying at the level
of implications. Because came is interpreted distributively, at this level there is in
effect a universal quantifier ranging over the boys, and thus the exception
phrases can felicitously modify the sentence.
(92)

The boys came except for John.

If we assume Moltmann’s analysis of exceptives, felicity with an exceptive can be
seen as diagnostic of the presence of a universal. In the case of reciprocals, an SR
interpretation should make available the necessary universal.
4.8.1 Unmodified reciprocal sentences rarely co-occur with exceptives
It turns out that in naturally occurring text41, it is rare for a reciprocal to co-occur
with an exceptive in the absence of an explicit universal or all. And removing the
universal or all tends to result in an infelicitous sentence, as shown in (93) - (95).
(93)

a. All of the students screwed each other except Screech42
b. ?#The students screwed each other except Screech

41

My evidence is Google searches for the string ‘each other except’. (I have not investigated cases
where the exceptive is not adjacent to each other.)
42

http://www.sickchirpse.com/saved-by-the-bell-the-truth/ (accessed 16 May 2014)
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(94)

a. …a group of 39 Indiana friends and neighbors formed a train of 11
wagons and headed west... They were all related to each other except
the J. A. Tiffany family, who were missionaries43.
b. ?#They were related to each other except the J. A. Tiffany family,
who were missionaries.

(95)

a. Everybody was talking to each other except the two of us44.
b. #{We/Our group of friends} were talking to each other except the
two of us.

This is surprising since we assume that stative reciprocals usually, and eventive
reciprocals at least sometimes, prefer SR interpretations. That should be enough
to satisfy the exceptive.
Google searches do turn up a handful of cases with a definite plural
antecedent without a universal or all. For the most part they involve lexically
stative predicates as in (96) and (97).
(96)

The two families really don’t like each other, except for all us younger
cousins because we don’t know any better45.

(97)

Walter Jackson’s skit, ‘Space High School’, is a story about a group of
planets, portrayed as the Roman gods for which they’re named, who were
friends with each other except for Pluto, who was no longer part of their
group.

It is difficult to find naturally occurring examples with an eventive predicate (in
simple past) and without a universal quantifier or all46. Dalrymple et al.

43

http://www.kancoll.org/articles/martin/westliberty.htm (accessed 16 May 2014)

44

http://uk.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20120306114414AAV5RR9 (Accessed 8
April 2013)
45

A quote from the novel The Perks of Being a Wallflower. Found via:
http://www.freewebs.com/shirtsleeves/quotes/perks.html (Accessed 8 April 2013)
46

Here is an example that may be of this kind, but I think it is open to an analysis where
annihilating is paraphrased as ‘killing everyone’, and that is the universal that the exception
phrase operates on (like Moltmann’s ‘deserted’ example (91b)):
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(1998:165) provide the constructed example in (98). It has a lexically eventive
predicate, but note that the sentence is grammatically stative (habitual). Likewise,
the naturally occurring example in (99) is grammatically stative, with progressive
aspect.
(98)

House of Commons legislators refer to each other indirectly, except the
most senior one addresses the most junior one directly47.

(99)

A scuffle broke out between the Baltimore Ravens and San Francisco
49ers during Superbowl XLVII… The players were pushing and shoving –
each other. Except for Ravens cornerback Cary Williams, who gave one of
the referees a pretty good shove48.

Brisson (2003:175) does provide an example of this kind, however, and to my
ears her example, in (100), sounds felicitous49.
(100) The students recognized each other, except for Jenny.
It is not clear what the relevant difference is between (100) and (101).
(101) ?#The kids {hit/saw} each other, except for Anna.
It is possibly related to the fact that The students recognized each other seems to
more strongly prefer an SR interpretation than The kids hit each other does (but
In The Apocalypse Troll, two entire Standard Sci-Fi Fleet battle groups, each crewed by
thousands of individuals of one race or another, end up annihilating each other except for a single
cyborg for the bad guys and a single human fighter pilot for the good guys.
(http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/SoleSurvivor) (Accessed April 8 2013)
47

This needs to be altered slightly to more closely parallel the exceptives we are looking at in this
section:
House of Commons legislators refer to each other indirectly, except for the most senior one. He or she
addresses the most junior one directly.
48

http://www.zap2it.com/blogs/raven_cary_williams_shoves_ref_in_super_bowl_should_he_ha
ve_been_ejected-2013-02 (Accessed 10 May 2014)
49

Despite this grammaticality judgement, it is not clear to me what this sentence means exactly.
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note that The kids saw each other seems to prefer SR). Given how hard it is to find
acceptable or naturally occurring examples of this kind, I see this as evidence
that eventive predicates in natural text almost never receive fully spelled out SR
interpretations.
4.8.2 Brisson: exceptives require distributivity
Brisson (2003) argues that exceptives require the presence of a quantificational
element, e.g. a DIST operator. One of the pieces of evidence she uses to justify
this claim concerns Taub’s generalization50. She notes that Taub’s generalization
holds for exceptives: while collective activities and accomplishments can cooccur with exceptives, collective states and achievements cannot.
(102) a. #The girls are a big group, except for Kim and Hannah.
b. #The students elected Mike, except for the sophomores.
c. The campers built rafts every summer, except for the youngest ones.
d. The students built a raft, except for Maggie and Josh.
Brisson (1998, 2003) argues that activities and accomplishments have two sites
for a DIST operator. The higher one results in an ordinary distributive
interpretation, while the lower one is compatible with a collective interpretation:
there is a single collective event, but the distribution results in each individual
having their own subevent within that event. Because states and achievements
do not have the lower site for the DIST operator, there is no collective
interpretation compatible with a DIST operator.
Brisson (1998) originally made this argument about all, which can occur
with collective activities and accomplishments (The girls all carried the piano
50

Taub (1989) observed that all is compatible with collective activities and accomplishments but
not collective states and achievements.
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upstairs) but not collective states and achievements (#The girls are all a big group).
(This is Taub’s generalization.) According to Brisson, all requires the presence of
a quantificational element, namely DIST. Because collective states and
achievements cannot co-occur with DIST, they cannot co-occur with all. Since
exceptives also obey Taub’s generalization, Brisson (2003) suggests that they too
require the presence of DIST. Both all and exceptives operate on the domain of
quantification.
On Brisson’s (2003) view, reciprocals always contain a quantificational
element equivalent to DIST since they always involve distribution over the parts
of the antecedent51. (In this respect they contain ‘hidden distributivity’.) This
predicts that reciprocal sentences will always be compatible with exceptives
(2003:176). But as we saw in §4.8.1, most naturally occurring examples of
reciprocal sentences with exceptives include all, and are degraded when all is
removed. It seems that the reciprocal itself is not enough to license the exceptive.
If exceptives require the presence of DIST, a possible account of the
reciprocal facts is that first, any ‘hidden distributivity’ within the reciprocal is not
sufficient for the exceptive, and second that by default there is no DIST operator
present in sentences like (103a,b). (On an account where distributive
interpretations come about via phrasal cumulativity: these sentences by default
do not involve phrasal cumulativity.)
(103) a. The kids photographed each other.
b. ??The kids photographed each other except Amy.
c. The kids all photographed each other except Amy.

51

Brisson favours an account like Beck’s where reciprocal sentences contain a DIST operator
(2003:176).
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When all is present as in (103c), it forces the presence of the necessary DIST
element. It seems that the reciprocal itself cannot do this.
4.8.3 Conclusions about exceptives
This section looked at evidence from exceptives relevant to the interpretation of
reciprocal sentences. On the view (e.g. Moltmann 1995) that exceptives require
the presence of a universal or all (either explicitly or at the level of implications)
the fact that reciprocal sentences modified by exceptives almost always seem to
require the presence of a universal/all supports the idea that such sentences
(without a universal/all) are rarely associated with fully spelled out
interpretations equivalent to SR.
On Brisson’s (2003) view, exceptives require the presence of a
quantificational element, namely DIST, and since reciprocals inherently involve
distribution, they should license exceptives. We saw that naturally occurring
reciprocal sentences with exceptives almost always also have all, and are
degraded when all is removed. I conclude that any ‘hidden distributivity’ within
the reciprocal is not enough to satisfy the exceptive. Rather, what is required is a
DIST operator (or phrasal cumulativity). It may be that the evidence from
reciprocals and exceptives can be accounted for if phrasal cumulativity is
optional, and is not present in the default LF.
In conclusion, the exceptive facts seem to fit the account I have presented
here: that reciprocal sentences are associated with WR/cumulative semantic
representations, and that fully spelled out SR interpretations are rarer than SMH
account would have us believe.
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4.9 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that cumulative semantic representations, despite
having weak truth conditions, can nevertheless favour strong interpretations.
The chapter argues that extragrammatical preferences for natural groupings, or
for uniformity, result in interpretations stronger than that required by the
semantics.
A requirement for pluralities to be substantive, or principles of natural
grouping, can account for the stronger-than-WR interpretations of
neighbour/chain examples.
Experiment 3 showed that reciprocals and other plurals show a tendency
for stative predicates to resist cumulative/WR interpretations. I suggested that
Kratzer’s constraint for quantification over states may explain why statives resist
weak readings, and why reciprocals show this tendency more strongly than
other plural sentences.
The chapter looked at plural sentences from the perspective of sentence
processing. It argued that economy preferences favour mental/discourse
representations of reciprocal (and plural) sentences that posit a single event. For
plural sentences, that equates to a preference for collective interpretations. For
reciprocals, that single event must have subevents that via cumulativity satisfy
the WR truth conditions. But there is little proof that the processor must fully
instantiate those subevents in all cases. When the processor is called upon to
fully instantiate those subevents, certain scenario types (i.e. SR) are attractive
because they are economical – not in terms of the number of events posited, but
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rather in the way that each individual takes part in the event in the same way (I
call this the preference for uniformity).
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CHAPTER 5
PARTITIONING AND THE SINGLE EVENT PREFERENCE
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter argued that, due to the influence of extragrammatical
preferences, a cumulative semantic representation equivalent to WR may give
rise to stronger interpretations than required by the semantics. Two types of
preferences were discussed: a preference for pluralities to be substantive or
based on natural grouping principles, and a preference for uniformity in the
mental model. These preferences were argued to result in interpretations
stronger than WR in the case of neighbour/chain predicates and statives
generally. Chapter 4 argued that evidence regarding the online processing of
plural sentences supports the idea that economy principles favour adding the
fewest individuals and events to the mental model. It was argued that reciprocal
sentences, like other sentences with plural subjects, are by default represented in
the mental model by a single event.
The chapter addresses two main topics. The first one is related to the idea
that a reciprocal sentence by default introduces a single event to the mental
model. Fiengo & Lasnik (1973) observe that reciprocal sentences prefer an
interpretation where they describe ‘one general event’; the subevents are
preferably simultaneous or close in time. In fact, in some cases it seems that this
is the only felicitous interpretation: it does not seem possible for a sentence like
Amy and Ben stared at each other to describe a scenario where Amy stared at Ben
for a while, and then later Ben stared at Amy. From the perspective of the
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cumulative semantics, this is somewhat unexpected. If A saw B, and C saw D,
then via cumulativity we can conclude that it is true that A and B saw C and D.
But the inference in (1) does not go through.
(1)

Amy stared at Ben (from 1 to 2 pm).
Ben stared at Amy (from 3 to 4 pm).
_______________
Amy and Ben stared at each other.

As in Chapter 4, economy principles at the level of the mental model, and a
preference for pluralities to be substantive, are argued to be responsible for this
preference.
The second topic addressed in this chapter concerns the possibility of
partitioned interpretations. Fiengo & Lasnik (1973) observe that stative reciprocal
sentences disallow partitioned interpretations. As discussed in Chapter 4, a
sentence like The kids love each other receives an SR interpretation, where each kid
loves every other kid. But Fiengo & Lasnik’s observation concerns partitioned SR
interpretations, where SR holds within subsets. Such interpretations are rejected
for stative reciprocal sentences. If we assume a cumulative semantics, this is
surprising. If A and B ate pizza, and B and C ate pizza, then by cumulativity it is
true that A, B, C and D ate pizza. Likewise, the cumulative account would predict
that the inference in (2) should be valid.
(2)

Kid 1 and Kid 2 love each other.
Kid 3 and Kid 4 love each other
_______________
The kids love each other.
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I argue that this restriction on stative reciprocals has the same source as the
restriction on WR interpretations seen in Chapter 4: statives have special
requirements regarding substantivity.
Sabato & Winter (2010) propose that the reciprocal itself never licenses
partitioned interpretations. In their view, partitioned interpretations of reciprocal
sentences only ever arise through implicit quantification of the antecedent. This
chapter defends the idea that partitioned interpretations should always be
available, given cumulativity.

5.2 Preference for a single event
A reciprocal sentence like Those two cars crashed into each other can describe a
number of different scenarios. It could be that car #1 and car #2 collided (which
seems to be the preferred interpretation), or it could be that car #1 crashed into
car #2, and then some time later, car #2 crashed into car #1. In both cases there
are two instances of crashing; the difference is that in the case of the collision, the
two crashes happen simultaneously.
Section 5.2.1 concerns the intuition that such sentences prefer a construal
where the two crashing events are subparts of a single larger event (i.e. they are
simultaneous, or at least, close together in time). This observation is due to
Fiengo & Lasnik (1973). Section 5.2.2 looks at proposals by Fiengo & Lasnik
(1973) and Moltmann (1992) to distinguish between reciprocal sentences and
their near paraphrases with each-the-other in this regard. Section 5.2.3 discusses
the findings of Haas (2008, 2010), who provides relevant evidence from a corpus
study. Haas favours a functionalist approach, which sees the more marked form
(each-the-other) preferably expressing the multiple event interpretation. In a
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similar vein, §5.2.4 discusses a possible account in terms of manner implicatures.
Section 5.2.5 looks at the influence of predicate type on the strength of the
preference.
5.2.1 The intuition
Fiengo & Lasnik (1973:450-1) observe that reciprocal sentences typically require
that the events described occur simultaneously or ‘in the same general time span’.
They point out that (3) is infelicitous.
(3)

The men stared at each other; #John stared at Bill for 3 hours and then Bill
stared at John for 3 hours.

Fiengo & Lasnik note a contrast between sentences with the reciprocal each other,
and their seeming paraphrases with each and the other. Example (4) (following
Fiengo & Lasnik, we’ll call this an each-the-other sentence) can felicitously
describe a scenario where the two events are not simultaneous.
(4)

Each of the men stared at the other; John stared at Bill for 3 hours and then
Bill stared at John for 3 hours.
Fiengo & Lasnik make the generalization that ‘the events characterized by

reciprocal sentences are regarded as one general event’ (1973:451). They argue
that this is not a special characteristic of reciprocal sentences, but rather a fact
about sentences with plural subjects in general. For example, they claim that (5a)
preferably describes a single climb by the group of men. (This observation seems
to be related to the collective default discussed in Chapter 4.) They note that the
degree of this preference depends on the particular predicate involved, claiming
that the multiple-events interpretation is not difficult for example (5b) (1973:451).
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(5)

a. The men climbed Mt. Everest.
b. The women left.

They point out that the choice of predicate makes a difference for reciprocals, too.
Unlike (3) which requires simultaneity, (6) need not describe events that are
simultaneous or close in time (1973:451).
(6)

The candidates criticized each other.
On Fiengo & Lasnik’s analysis, each-the-other sentences like (4) are not

affected by the preference for sentences with plural subjects to describe one event
because at Deep Structure they have a singular subject (1973:452).
5.2.2 Accounting for the single event preference
Like Fiengo & Lasnik, Moltmann (1992) argues that the preference for the single
event construal of reciprocal sentences is best explained in terms of a more
general preference. Moltmann sees it as just another reflex of a preference for
substantive pluralities (which she calls ‘integrated wholes’). In Moltmann’s
system, simple sentences with plurals (including reciprocal sentences) are
associated with a single event argument1. That event argument may be a group
event, and while in principle the subevents of a group event can be separated in
time and space, Moltmann assumes a preference for the event to be an integrated
whole:

1

The contrast here is with sentence with quantifiers, which do not have a single event argument.

214

Entities that are semantic reference objects are ‘better’ the
more they are integrated wholes, where the integrity of
events can be constituted on the basis of connectedness in
time or in space or on the basis of causal relations or the
participation of other entities in the event. (1992:428)
In Moltmann’s account, the preference for a single event interpretation of
reciprocal sentences like (7a) or non-reciprocal plural sentences like (7b) comes
about because the event argument is preferably taken to have ‘a certain degree of
integrity’ – for instance, any subevents of the event argument are close in space
and time.
(7)

a. The men stared at each other.
b. The men climbed Mt. Everest.
c. The men each stared at the other.

On Moltmann’s analysis, the representation of an each-the-other sentence like (7c)
– because it is not a simple plural sentence, but rather involves the quantifier each
– does not involve a single event argument, and hence the preference for the
event argument to be an integrated whole is irrelevant.
As discussed in Chapter 4, there is solid evidence that the processor by
default fixes on a collective interpretation of sentences with plural subjects. There
we saw that, given a cumulative semantic representation, a way of explaining
this default was in terms of an economy preference at the level of mental
representation: the processor by default posits a single event. I made use of
Moltmann’s idea that events should have integrity: if that single event has
subevents, those subevents should be close in space or time, etc.
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5.2.3 Haas
Haas (2008, 2010) finds empirical support for Fiengo & Lasnik’s intuition that the
reciprocal prefers to describe a single event. Haas (2010:123) emphasizes that the
single event / multiple event contrast is not always reducible to a contrast
between simultaneity and non-simultaneity. His corpus study focused on a small
set of predicates that are biased towards a reciprocal interpretation with distinct
events, but this bias did not take the form of a preference for non-simultaneity.
The set of biased predicates included accuse, blame and suspect. Haas (2010:125126) sees them as biased towards a multiple event interpretation in this way: ‘If
person A suspects person B of property X and B likewise suspects A of X, there is
unlikely to be mutual agreement’. That is, if I suspect you of breaking the
window and you suspect me of it, we cannot have a joint belief: they are
necessarily distinct suspicions (and in this sense distinct events). Haas’ corpus
study compared the biased predicates with a set of ‘neutral’ predicates
(understand, love, help, trust)2. He looked at the frequency with which they cooccurred with each other and each-the-other. He found that the neutral predicates
rarely co-occurred with each-the-other: e.g. the corpus contained 225 instances of
trust co-occurring with each other, compared with only 8 where it co-occurred
with each-the-other. That is, 3.4% of all reciprocal scenarios of trusting were
described using each-the-other (and this was the highest frequency among the
neutral predicates). In contrast, the biased predicates showed significantly higher
rates of each-the-other co-occurrence, ranging from 21% to 100% of all reciprocal
scenarios.
2

This study was conducted on The Corpus of Contemporary American English.
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Haas summarizes his findings thus: ‘the less easily a reciprocal situation
can be conceptualized as a single, collective event for a given verb, the more
frequently this verb is combined with the analytic3 strategy’ (2008:4).
Haas (2010) is a wide-ranging study of the concept of reciprocity, both in
present day English and diachronically. Haas views the expression of the concept
of reciprocity as a system in which various constructions (not only each other and
each-the-other, but also intransitive uses of symmetric (meet) or prototypically
reciprocal (kiss) verbs) are in competition. Haas (2010:118) notes that the single
event interpretation is associated with the ‘light’ form, and the multiple event
interpretation with the ‘heavy’ form (on this he cites Kemmer 1993 and Safir
2004). But what counts as ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ depends on which constructions are
in competition. The well known contrast in (8), where (8a) describes a single
event but (8b) may describe distinct events, is explained if the intransitive is the
light form, and the reciprocal the heavy form.
(8)

a. Alex and Brett kissed.
b. Alex and Brett kissed each other.

But when there is no intransitive construction, as in (9), the reciprocal counts as
the light form, and each-the-other is the heavy form. Thus (9b) prefers to describe
a single event, while (9c) may describe distinct events.
(9)

3

a. *Alex and Brett saw.
b. Alex and Brett saw each other.
c. Alex and Brett each saw the other.

i.e. each-the-other
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This functionalist approach does not distinguish between possible and
preferred interpretations. Notice that for the light form in (8a), a distinct events
interpretation is impossible (it must describe a mutual kiss)4. In contrast, for the
light form in (9b), the distinct events interpretation is merely dispreferred.
5.2.4 Manner implicatures
In Haas’ approach, the single event interpretation is associated with the light
(less marked) form each other, and the multiple event interpretation with the
heavy (more marked) form each-the-other. We might account for the link between
markedness and the number of events using manner implicatures.
Consider Levinson’s (2000) M-principle in (10) (also see Horn 1989).
(10)

The M-Principle:
Speaker’s maxim: Indicate an abnormal, nonstereotypical situation by using
marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe
the corresponding normal, stereotypical situation.
Recipient’s corollary: What is said in an abnormal way indicates an
abnormal situation, or marked messages indicate marked situations

We can reasonably assume that each other is less marked than each-the-other.
Explaining the single event preference for each other would then require it to be
the case that having two events of the same kind (and with the same
participants) occur together is more typical than having them occur separately.
We can’t take this for granted, but it seems plausible. Consider Fiengo & Lasnik’s
example of two cars bumping into each other. The scenario where this describes
a single collision seems more typical than one where car A bumps into car B, and
then some time later car B bumps into car A. There is something implausible
4

See Rubinstein (2009).
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about the universe arranging things such that those same cars come back in
contact again, and take part in the same kind of event (with their roles reversed).
But it is unclear that this holds in general, especially if we are not talking about
strangers, but people that know and come into regular contact with each other,
and about non-accidental events. (e.g. People return favours – if someone invites
you to dinner, you probably will invite them in return some time later. This is
more typical than the two of you exchanging simultaneous invitations.)
A simple version of the manner implicatures account would predict that
the unmarked form (each other) suits the more typical scenario (one general
event), while the marked form (each-the-other) suits the less typical scenario (two
distinct events). The opposite pairings (one event + each-the-other, two events +
each other) should be less acceptable.
5.2.5 The effect of predicate type
As Fiengo & Lasnik point out, the strength of the preference for a single general
event interpretation depends on the predicate. Stare at strongly prefers the two
events to be simultaneous, while criticize allows them to be far apart in time.
(11)

The men {stared at/criticized} each other.

This seems reminiscent of the stative/eventive contrast in the availability of WR,
and it is true that statives strongly prefer the simultaneous interpretation:
(12)

They loved each other; #she loved him when they were in high school
and he loved her years later.
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But there does not appear to be a strict correlation between a preference for SR
and a preference for simultaneity. See tends to prefer SR in (13a), but allows nonsimultaneity in (13b).
(13)

a. The three kids saw each other.
b. The men saw each other; Bill saw Ted at the library and then Ted
saw Bill at the movies.
Note that it is possible for the reciprocal clause in (12) to describe two non-

simultaneous states, but it requires the presence of an adverbial as in (14). Thus it
seems that simultaneity is defeasible.
(14)

They loved each other, but at different times.

Interestingly, the same strategy does not work as well for see in (15). However,
(16) provides some naturally occurring examples of this kind5.
(15)

a. ??They saw each other, but at different times.
b. ?They saw each other, but not at the same time.
c. ?They saw each other, but not simultaneously.

(16)

a. I love how they both look at each other but at different times6
b. Unbeknownst to each other, they spot each other but at different
times never meeting each other’s eye7.

5

I could find no naturally examples of this kind with see, only spot and look at.

6

This is describing a pair of sequential photos: in one, Spock looks at Kirk, and in the other Kirk
looks at Spock. http://www.pinterest.com/pin/339388521890228027/ [Accessed June 22 2014]
7

http://www.examiner.com/review/mo-olelo-s-kita-y-fernanda-is-a-journey-worth-taking
[Accessed June 22 2014]
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5.3 Experiment 4: Single event preference
This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis (as per Fiengo & Lasnik’s
(1973) evidence from intuitions) that simple reciprocal sentences with each other
have a stronger preference for the single event construal than do each-the-other
sentences.
5.3.1 Method
Materials and design

A set of 24 items was constructed. Each item had two

parts: a context and a description. There were two forms of context: one occasion
scenarios as in (17a), and two occasion scenarios as in (17b). The context was
followed by a description of the situation, in one of two sentence types: each other
as in (18a) or each-the-other as in (18b). It was a 2x2 design (Number of occasions x
Sentence type).
(17)

a. Richardson sued Summers, and Summers sued Richardson. They are
both songwriters. It was a dispute about which of them wrote the hit
song.
b. Richardson sued Summers about 10 years ago, and then recently
Summers sued Richardson over another matter. They are both
songwriters.

(18)

a. Those songwriters sued each other.
b. Those songwriters each sued the other.
All predicates were eventive. In order to test a hypothesis about manner

implicatures (to be discussed in §5.3.3.3 below), the items included two types of
predicates. Half of the items involved event-types that according to my intuitions
occur simultaneously and reciprocally relatively often. For the most part, these
were predicates describing physical impact (bump, crash into) or verbal
confrontations (yell at). The other half of the items involved events that were
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judged to occur simultaneously and reciprocally more rarely (bite, help, feed). The
full set of items, including this classification into two groups, appears in the
Appendix.
The 24 experimental items were included in a questionnaire along with 22
unrelated items. There were 4 counterbalanced forms of the questionnaire, each
with 6 experimental items in each of the 4 conditions. The same pseudorandomization was applied to each of the 4 questionnaire forms.
Participants

Forty-six University of Massachusetts undergraduates in

introductory Linguistics and Psychology courses took part in the experiment for
course credit.
Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the

four versions of the written questionnaire. They were instructed to rate the
description part of the item in terms of ‘how good it sounds as a description’ of
the context part of the item. Participants rated the description on a scale from 1 –
7 (where 1 was ‘terrible’ and 7 was ‘perfect’).
5.3.2 Results
Two types of data were excluded from the analysis: the data of participants who
were not native speakers of English, and those who answered incorrectly on at
least one of two comprehension questions included in the questionnaire. In total,
six participants were excluded, leaving the data of 40 participants. The mean
ratings appear in Table 10.
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Number of
occasions

One
Two

Sentence type
each other
each-the-other
5.76 (1.15)
5.47 (1.34)
5.10 (1.26)
5.16 (1.32)

Table 10: Participant means (SDs), Experiment 4.
Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs revealed an interaction between
sentence type and number of occasions that was marginally significant by
participants and fully significant by items (F1(1,39)=3.7, p=.06; F2(1,23)=8.8,
p=.007). The interaction is illustrated in Figure 27. In addition, there was a main
effect of number of occasions, with the descriptions rated as more acceptable in
the one occasion condition than in the two occasion condition (F1(1,39)=15.8,
p<.001; F2(1,23)=9.6, p=.005). There was also a main effect of sentence type that
was marginal by items (F1(1,39)=1.6, p=.2; F2(1,23)=3.5, p=.075).

Rating!

5.8!
5.6!

each
other!

5.4!
5.2!
5!
one!

two!

eachtheother!

Number of occasions!

Figure 27: Experiment 4 interaction.
The difference between each other and each-the-other was predicted to
appear as an interaction, with the two occasion context having more of a
negative effect on each other than on each-the-other. The results of simple effects
tests were consistent with this prediction. Ratings were higher in the one
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occasion condition than the two occasion condition for both each other
(t1(1,39)=3.9, p<.001; t2(1,23)=4.3, p<.001) and each-the-other (t1(1,39)=2.2, p=.03;
t2(1,23)=1.7, p=.1). But while each other was rated significantly higher than eachthe-other in the one occasion condition (t1(1,39)=2.5, p=.015; t2(1,23)=4.8, p<.001)
there was no significant difference in the two occasion condition (p’s>.5).
As mentioned above, half of the items (the ‘bump’ class) were judged to
occur simultaneously and reciprocally more often than the other half of the items
(the ‘bite’ class). Table 11 presents the means by item class.

Number of
occasions

Sentence type
each other
each-the-other
‘bump’ class ‘bite’ class ‘bump’ class ‘bite’ class
One 5.69
5.83
5.47
5.47
Two 4.9
5.31
4.96
5.37

Table 11: Participant means, Experiment 4, 'bump' class vs. ‘bite’ class.

An ANOVA with number of occasions and sentence type as within-items
factors, and item class as a between-items factor found no significant interactions
between item type and any other factor (p’s>.2). It may be that the experiment
did not have enough power to reveal such an interaction. Numerically there
appears to be an interaction between item class and number of occasions, with a
larger difference between the ‘bump’ class and the ‘bite’ class in the two occasion
condition than in the one occasion condition.
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5.3.3 Discussion
5.3.3.1 Reciprocals have a stronger preference for one occasion
Experiment 4 provides empirical support for Fiengo & Lasnik’s (1973) evidence
from intuitions: compared with each-the-other sentences, reciprocal sentences with
each other have a stronger preference for the interpretation where the events
occur on a single occasion.
5.3.3.2 An overall preference for describing one occasion
In Experiment 4, both sentence types were rated more highly when they
described one occasion scenarios, compared with two occasion scenarios.
Given certain assumptions about the experiment, this result can be seen as
evidence that the default construal of both kinds of sentence involves a single
occasion. I think it is reasonable to assume that, at least to some extent,
participants came up with a rating by reading the description sentence, fixing on
their default construal, and comparing that construal with the scenario spelled
out in the context. On this view, the rating task tells us about the preferred
construal of the description sentence8.
The overall preference for describing a single occasion scenario is not
predicted by previous accounts such as Fiengo & Lasnik (1973) or Moltmann
(1992). Both of those accounts sought to distinguish between, on the one hand,

8

Let’s consider an alternative view: participants might be basing their ratings on how many
details of the context are captured or left out by the description. The experiment exhibits a
potential confound in this regard, because the one occasion vs. two occasion manipulation
simultaneously involves manipulating the amount of information in the context. (The two
occasion scenario conveys more information, in that there are two times/locations described.)
While this would correctly predict the penalty associated with the two occasion context, it fails to
predict the interaction between sentence type and number of occasions.
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simple reciprocal and plural sentences which have such a preference, and on the
other, sentences involving quantifiers (such as each-the-other sentences) which do
not. But the experiment found evidence that while reciprocal sentences may
show a stronger preference for the single event construal, each-the-other sentences
show the same preference, albeit weaker.
If both types of sentence have a preference for the single event construal,
then the question is: why should the preference be stronger in the case of
reciprocals?
While previous researchers have focused on the strength of this preference
for each other, an alternative is that it is the relative weakness of the preference in
the case of each-the-other that calls for further explanation. Tunstall (1998) gives us
reason to think that sentences with the quantifier each will have a preference for
describing events with distinct subevents. Tunstall proposes that the
Differentiation Condition in (19) is part of the lexical meaning of each.
(19)

The Differentiation Condition:
A sentence containing a quantified phrase headed by each can only be true
of event structures which are totally distributive. Each individual object in
the restrictor set of the quantified phrase must be associated with its own
subevent, in which the predicate applies to that object, and which can be
differentiated in some way from the other subevents.

If each-the-other sentences are subject to the demands of the Differentiation
Condition, that could explain their weaker preference for a single occasion9. They
would be subject to competing preferences: a general preference for describing a

9

Haas (2010:150, endnote 6) has a similar view. He agrees with Fiengo & Lasnik (1973) that there
is a general preference for sentences with plural subjects to describe a single event. In the case of
each-the-other sentences the single event preference is ‘overridden by the overt indication of
distributivity that the quantifier each provides for’.
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single occasion, and the Differentiation Condition which requires distinct
subevents. The single occasion condition does not provide distinct subevents10.
5.3.3.3 Little support for a manner implicatures hypothesis
Experiment 4 found no support for the predictions of a simple manner
implicatures hypothesis (as in Table 12) that assumes that each other is unmarked,
each-the-other is marked, and that it is more typical for two events of the same
kind with the same participants to occur on a single occasion rather than separate
occasions.

typical (one occasion)
less typical (two occasion)

unmarked
(each other)
good
bad

marked
(each-the-other)
bad
good

Table 12: Predictions of a simple manner implicature hypothesis

Number of
occasions

One
Two

each other
5.76 (1.15)
5.10 (1.26)

Sentence type
each-the-other
5.47 (1.34)
5.16 (1.32)

Table 13: Participant means, Experiment 4
Crucially, the experiment found that in the two occasion condition, there was no
significant difference between each other and each-the-other. If the two occasion
scenario is less typical, then it should prefer the marked form each-the-other.
Though the results do not pattern as in Table 12, it may still be possible to
explain them using manner implicatures. Let’s take the ratings for the one
10

As for each other, I take the position that while historically the reciprocal derives from the
combination of the quantifier each and other, the fact that it has been grammaticalised means that
the Differentiation Condition does not apply in this case.
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occasion condition as a baseline. Each other receives higher ratings, and we might
explain this using the fact that each other is the unmarked form, whereas each-theother is marked. Then in the two occasion condition, instead of the expected
penalty for the marked form each-the-other, we see that the two forms receive
similar ratings. The penalty disappears because each-the-other receives a boost for
manner implicature reasons. The difference between this story and the one that
leads to the predictions in Table 12 is that this story assumes that the marked
form is always penalized just for being marked, regardless of the number of
occasions being described.
As discussed above in §5.2.4, it is far from clear that a two occasion
scenario is always less typical than a one occasion scenario. It seems reasonable
to assume that typicality is going to depend on a number of factors including the
particular predicate involved. For instance, while Fiengo & Lasnik’s example of
cars bumping into each other suggests that the one occasion scenario is more
typical, I don’t have the intuition that the one- and two-occasion scenarios in (20)
differ in typicality11.
(20)

a. In June, Leo recommended Jenny for the employee-of-the-month
award, and Jenny recommended Leo.
b. In June, Leo recommended Jenny for the employee-of-the-month
award, and in July, Jenny recommended Leo.

Experiment 4 looked for an effect of typicality differences of this kind. Half of the
items used predicates (like bump into) where the one occasion scenario was
judged to be high in typicality (the ‘bump’ class). The other half were like

11

This is a ‘bite’ class item from Experiment 4.
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recommend, where the one occasion scenario was not judged to be typical (the
‘bite’ class).
If the typicality preferences associated with the predicate are part of the
manner implicature calculations, then the ‘bump’ class should work as described
in the simple manner implicature hypothesis above: the one occasion scenario is
typical and should prefer the unmarked each other, and the two occasion scenario
is atypical and should prefer the marked form each-the-other. But for the ‘bite’
class, if the scenarios do not differ in typicality, then the manner implicature
cannot work the same way. We should see an interaction only for the ‘bump’
class. That is, there would be a three-way interaction between sentence type,
number of occasions and verb class. But there was no sign of such an interaction.
Rather, there was a numerical (non-significant) interaction between verb class
and number of occasions. The numerical interaction was such that in the two
occasion condition, the ‘bite’ class received higher ratings than the ‘bump’ class.
If this interaction were significant, it could be explained in terms of a penalty for
deviating from the typical one occasion interpretation in the case of the ‘bump’
class. Crucially, an interaction of this kind would provide no evidence for the
manner implicature account outlined above.
If typicality preferences that vary by predicate go into the manner
implicature calculations, the numerical interaction argues against the revised
account above. Recall that the explanation for the lack of a significant difference
between each other and each-the-other in the two occasion condition was that the
marked form each-the-other received a boost for manner implicature reasons (thus
obscuring the baseline penalty for being the marked form). Now, the numerical
interaction between verb class and number of occasions suggests that the ‘bump’
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class has a stronger preference for the stereotypical single occasion scenario than
the ‘bite’ class. This means that in the ‘bite’ class, without such a stereotype, we
would not expect the manner implicature boost – we should see the penalty for
using the marked form each-the-other, unobscured, yet this is not the case. As
shown in Table 14, numerically each other and each-the-other receive similar
ratings in the two occasion condition for the ‘bite’ class, just as they do for the
‘bump’ class.
Sentence type
Number of
occasions

each other
‘bump’ class ‘bite’ class
One 5.69
5.83
Two 4.9
5.31

each-the-other
‘bump’ class ‘bite’ class
5.47
5.47
4.96
5.37

Table 14: Participant means, Experiment 4, 'bump' class vs. 'bite' class
5.3.4 Conclusion
Experiment 4 found support for Fiengo & Lasnik’s evidence from intuitions that
reciprocal sentences have a preference for describing ‘one general event’. But it
found that each-the-other sentences likewise show this preference, albeit weaker.
The next section looks at how best to capture this preference.

5.4 No Extra Times (NET)
In Chapter 4, I argued that in a lexical cumulativity account, the collective default
can be explained using an economy principle. The processor by default adds a
single event to the discourse representation. There, I used Moltmann’s idea that
events should have integrity (for instance, subevents of a single event should be
close in time) to explain why a preference for uniformity (which favours SR)
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comes into conflict for certain types of events (those that involve physical contact,
take time) but not others (statives, see).
In this chapter, we saw that Moltmann explains the difference between
each other and each-the-other using the preference for event integrity. An each other
sentence has a single event argument, whose subevents should have integrity
(e.g. be close in time). An each-the-other sentence, with quantifier each, does not
have a single event argument. Hence event integrity is irrelevant for each-theother sentences.
Experiment 4 suggested that there is a general preference for the single
occasion condition for both each other and each-the-other. This is unexplained on
Moltmann’s account. It is also unexplained by the account put forward in
Chapter 4 – we cannot derive the preference for a single occasion from the
economy preference for adding a single event to the mental representation,
because each (in the each-the-other sentence) requires multiple events to be added.
In which case, if there are multiple events in the discourse representation, we
cannot use integrity/substantivity to make them prefer to be close in time. And
in fact, each is associated with a preference for the events to be distinct (Tunstall
1998).
We can account for the results of Experiment 4 with another reflex of the
preference for conceptual economy, which I call No Extra Times:
(21)

No Extra Times (NET):
A sentence describes a single occasion (unless there is evidence to the
contrary).

As it is stated in (21), NET is a pre-theoretical statement of the intuition that
conceptual economy should apply not only to discourse referents such as
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individuals and events, but also occasions/reference times/situations. As we
shall see, the preference that NET is trying to capture is somewhat
overdetermined.
In the case of the reciprocal, the preference for a single occasion can be
explained if a single event is added to the representation (as Chapter 4
suggested) and its subevents are taken to be close in time because of the
preference for event integrity (Moltmann 1992). The evidence that suggests a
preference like NET is necessary is when there are necessarily multiple distinct
events, as with each. In the case of a sentence with each, we need NET to explain
why a sentence like Those workers each recommended the other prefers for the
individual events of recommending to occur close in time. The discourse
representation contains multiple events (one for each worker) but a single
(unspecified) reference time (or occasion). The events take place within that
reference time. In Experiment 4, the two occasion scenario was dispreferred –
this is because it spelled out two distinct reference times.
If we assume that economy favours adding the fewest events to the
discourse representation, then NET is not needed to account for preferences for
episodic interpretations over habitual ones, or non-iterative interpretations over
iterative ones. Consider a sentence like (22).
(22)

Amy drove to work.

An episodic interpretation and a habitual one both can be seen to have a single
reference time. The episodic interpretation has the event of driving take place
within a salient reference time (e.g. yesterday). The habitual interpretation has a
state of habitually driving to work overlapping a salient reference time (e.g last
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year). But the habitual interpretation can be seen to involve a plurality of events
of driving to work, whereas the episodic interpretation probably involves a
single event. Thus it seems we can derive a preference for episodic over habitual
interpretations via economy in event representation12. Likewise for non-iterative
interpretations over iterative ones: example (23) allows both kinds of
interpretation, but the default should be that Ben lifted the box once, rather than
over and over again. Again, both of these interpretations would have a single
reference time or occasion, and a better way to distinguish them is using
economy: a single event of lifting is preferred over a plurality of liftings.
(23)

Ben lifted a box.
Harris, Clifton & Frazier (2013) apply the predictions of NET to the

question of how the processor arrives at an interpretation of sentences involving
variable quantificational domains. They focus on mostly, which can quantify over
individuals/parts as in (24a), or over times as in (24b). They provide evidence
that mostly does not appear to be lexically biased towards one or other of these.
(24)

a. This apple is mostly green.
b. Today I was mostly at home.

In a sentence like (25a), the two interpretations differ in the number of occasions
required. Quantification over individuals/parts is consistent with the sentence
describing a single occasion. Quantification over times of course requires
multiple times. NET thus favours quantification over individuals/parts in this

12

There will be other ways to do this, e.g. episodic interpretations of simple past tense sentences
are probably much more frequent than habitual ones.
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case. Harris et al. present the results of an eye movement study that found that
sentences open to the quantification over individuals/parts interpretation like
(25a,c) were easier than those where quantification over times was the only
pragmatically plausible interpretation, as in (25b).
(25)

a. The army was mostly in the capital.
b. The inspector was mostly in the capital.
c. The attack was mostly in the capital.
We can use conceptual economy to favour adding the fewest entities

(individuals, events or times) to the mental model. Although in some cases, the
effect of NET could be derived without reference to times (or occasions), I have
suggested that it is necessary for conceptual economy to refer to times or
occasions based on examples with each. But ultimately, in many cases there are
several ways of using a preference for economy to get to the same result. Take
sentence (26), which on first reading sounds slightly contradictory.
(26)

(?)The Tigers and the Eagles defeated each other.

Here are two possible explanations. First, NET favours a default interpretation
where the sentence describes a single occasion. We naturally think of a single
match, but two teams cannot defeat each other in one match, hence the air of
contradiction. The other possibility is that the processor adds a single (reciprocal)
event to the discourse representation. To satisfy event integrity, the subparts of
that event should be close in time. But this leads to trying to have two defeats be
part of the same event. There need to be multiple matches, which work best as
separate events.
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Or take sentence (27). It describes multiple events of suitcase carrying that
most likely occurred at the same place/time. Is this because of NET (the
processor posits a single time/occasion)? Or could it be derived from a
preference for the plurality of women to have ‘integrity’ in Moltmann’s sense. (If
we have grouped the women together in this plurality, then one way for this
grouping to have integrity is if they are close in space/time13.)
(27)

The women each carried a suitcase.
In conclusion, the results of Experiment 4 suggest that there is an overall

preference for a sentence to describe a single occasion. I call this preference NET,
and suggest that it is a kind of economy preference. This section has looked at
how, given other economy principles and a preference for substantivity, this
preference is somewhat overdetermined.

5.5 Limits on partitioning for reciprocals
This section addresses two proposals that limit the availability of partitioned
interpretations for reciprocal sentences. Cumulativity predicts that partitioned
interpretations should always be available, so these proposals by Fiengo &
Lasnik (1973) and Sabato & Winter (2010) challenge the notion that the
cumulative/WR semantics is sufficient to account for the interpretation of
reciprocal sentences. Section 5.5.1 looks at Fiengo & Lasnik’s observations about
stative reciprocals and partitioning. Section 5.5.2 looks at Sabato & Winter’s claim

13

It should be noted that later in this chapter, in §5.7.2, I suggest that definite plurals like the
women do not show this preference for integrity as strongly as conjoined DPs like Anne and Beth
do.
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that reciprocals always require connectedness. Section 5.5.3 summarizes the
issues for the cumulative/WR semantics.
5.5.1 Stative reciprocals disallow partitioning
Fiengo & Lasnik (1973) were the first to point out that stative reciprocals resist
partitioned interpretations. They note (1973:453) that eventive predicates allow a
partitioned SR (part-SR) reading – that is, where there is a partition such that
within each subset SR holds. For instance, sentence (28) (with the eventive
predicate hit) might describe a situation where there are two pairs of men in the
room: A and B are hitting each other, and C and D are hitting each other, as in
(29).
(28)

The men in the room are hitting each other.

(29)

A↔B
C↔D
They point out that, in contrast, sentences with stative predicates do not

permit the partitioned SR reading. A sentence like (30) requires that every man in
the room know every other man14. That is, it is not possible for (30) to describe
the kind of situation depicted in (29).
(30)

The men in the room know each other.
Fiengo & Lasnik claim that the generalization here is that stative

predicates do not allow the antecedent of the reciprocal to be partitioned. They
do note a class of exceptions: when the antecedent involves a ‘natural pairwise
14

This is with the appropriate caveats about exceptions – it holds as long as we are dealing with
a small number of men.
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relationship’, statives permit partitioning (e.g. The husbands and wives in the room
are similar to each other) (1973:454)15. Apart from this, their generalization is that
eventive predicates do, and stative predicates do not, permit the partitioned SR
reading16.
5.5.2 Reciprocals and connectedness
Sabato & Winter (2010) make a more general argument about partitioned
interpretations of reciprocal sentences, namely that the reciprocal itself cannot
give rise to a partitioned interpretation. They argue that reciprocal
interpretations always obey connectivity:
(31)

Connectivity: Let A be a set and let R be a binary relation. If the oneplace predicate R each other holds of A, then the graph induced by R on A
is connected (=not partitioned).
Specifically, they argue that partitioned interpretations (such as part-SR)

only arise by virtue of the anaphoric properties of the antecedent. They contrast
(32a) and (32b), noting that only (32a) seems a possible description of the
situation in (33).
(32)

a. The planks are stacked atop each other.
b. Planks 1, 2, 3, and 4 are stacked atop each other.

(33)

Plank 1
Plank 2

Plank 3
Plank 4

15

Although Fiengo & Lasnik’s observations are all about pairs , the same point holds for
groupings of other sizes. (The triplets in the room are similar to each other.)
16

Matsuo (2000) provides experimental evidence of the contrast in the case of English speaking
children (mean age 4;4) and an adult control group.
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On their view, the partitioned interpretation comes about when the
definite combines with implicit quantification, resulting in distribution to subsets.
(‘In each group of planks g, the planks in g are stacked on top of each other.’) The
conjunction of proper names as in (32b) does not allow for the subject to be
dependent on an implicit quantifier17. Their argument is that if the reciprocal
itself were able to license the partitioned interpretation required by the situation
in (33), then there would not be a contrast in acceptability between (32a) and (b).
Therefore the reciprocal itself does not allow partitioning.
Another of Sabato & Winter’s examples is in (34). They observe that while
example (34a) can describe the scenario in (35), example (34b) is an infelicitous
description (2008:4). Again, they point to the fact that conjoined names disallow
the implicit quantification required for this interpretation.
(34)

a. The singers are looking into each other's eyes in this photo.
b. #John, Paul, George and Ringo are looking into each
other's eyes in this photo.

(35)

John ↔ Paul
George ↔ Ringo

5.5.3 The problem for the cumulative/WR semantics
The issue for the cumulative/WR analysis is that cumulativity predicts that these
are valid inferences:
(36)

17

Man 1 and Man 2 like each other.
Man 3 and Man 4 like each other.
_______________
The men like each other.

Winter (2000)
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(37)

Plank 1 and Plank 2 are stacked on top of each other.
Plank 3 and Plank 4 are stacked on top of each other.
_______________
Planks 1, 2, 3 and 4 are stacked on top of each other.
Schwarzschild (1996:126-7) discusses a similar issue. He points out that

the following inference is dubious:
(38)

The cows talked to each other.
The pigs talked to each other.
_______________
The cows and the pigs talked to each other.

Schwarzschild notes that The cows and the pigs talked to each other preferably
describes the relation holding between the two groups (i.e. the cows talked to the
pigs and the pigs talked to the cows). These are the salient pluralities in the
context: the cover contains a bovine cell and a porcine cell. On Schwarzschild’s
analysis, the reciprocal is a free variable over functions. The function can be
provided by or salient in the context. He proposes that the domain and range of
the function should make use of the preexisting partition. But for the cumulative
inference in (38) to work, The cows and the pigs talked to each other would have to
have the reciprocal predicate interpreted distributively. This would require two
covers: one with a bovine cell and a porcine cell, and the other with
subpluralities of cows and subpluralities of pigs. If there is a preference for the
reciprocal to use the same partition as the cover variable, this is dispreferred.
As we saw in Chapter 4, there are limits on cumulativity. In §4.2.1 we saw
another of Schwarzschild’s examples (The prisoners on the two sides of the room
could see each other). I follow Schwarzschild in assuming that there is a preference
for the interpretation of the reciprocal to make use of existing salient pluralities.
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In terms of the cumulative semantics, we cannot freely sum any collection of
subevents that happens to give the correct result – our choice is constrained by
which subpluralities are salient. But neither Fiengo & Lasnik’s observation about
statives (§5.5.1), nor Sabato & Winter’s about sentences with conjoined names
(§5.5.2) can be explained simply by restricting ourselves to summing
eventualities participated in by salient pluralities. Fiengo & Lasnik’s observation
concerns a contrast between statives and eventives in a given context. And
Sabato & Winter’s observation concerns a contrast between definite plural and
conjoined name antecedents in a given context.
Section 5.6 accounts for the stative/eventive contrast using Kratzer’s
constraint for quantification over states. Section 5.7 looks at the definite
plural/conjoined name contrast in terms of pragmatic effects and evidence from
processing. Section 5.8 introduces some new data on the effect of contrast in
licensing previously unavailable partitioned interpretations, and argues that the
effect of contrast is unexplained by previous accounts that limit partitioning for
reciprocals.

5.6 Stative/eventive and partitioning
Let’s begin with Fiengo & Lasnik’s observation that one kind of stative reciprocal
sentence does allow the partitioned-SR interpretation: those where the
antecedent involves a ‘natural pairwise relationship’ as in (39). If A, B, C and D
are the twins, (39) is true in the scenario in (40) if A and B are twin siblings and C
and D are twin siblings. Each person is only similar to their twin.
(39)

The twins are similar to each other.
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(40)

A↔B
C↔D

This can be accounted for using Kratzer’s (2001:63) constraint in (41). The twin
siblings are substantive pluralities, and (41) allows quantification over the states
they participate in.
(41)

Constraint for quantification over states:
Quantification over states is restricted to sums of states whose participants
are substantive pluralities
This suggests that the problem with Fiengo & Lasnik’s example (42a) – the

reason it cannot describe a scenario like (40) – is that even if the men are grouped
in pairs, those pairs do not constitute substantive pluralities.
(42)

a. The men in the room know each other.
b. The men know each other.

It seems to me that example (42a) exaggerates the strength of this intuition. I
think it might be possible to accept (42b) as describing a part-SR scenario where
there are pairs of men and each knows only his partner. Why should this be? For
the part-SR interpretation, the sentences in (42) need to be understood as
describing multiple subpluralities. Those subpluralities should be substantive.
But the additional difficulty faced by (42a) is that the presence of in the room
suggests that the salient plurality should be (all) the men in the room. That is, it
is more difficult to accommodate the necessary subdivision (into pairs) when this
information is provided.
It seems that for a stative like know or like, merely being grouped in pairs
or standing together is not typically enough for the participants to be considered
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substantive. But more elaborate contexts can make subpluralities substantive
enough to allow the part-SR interpretation, as (43) shows.
(43)

(The shipping company is transporting a bunch of dogs. They’ve been
split up, two to a crate.)
Luckily the dogs like each other so it’s okay.
Do we have to say anything special about stative reciprocals? If this is

because of the constraint for quantification over states, it should hold for other
plural sentences too. We have already seen evidence on this point: Experiment 3
in Chapter 4 showed that co-distributive interpretations were more acceptable
with eventive predicates (44a) than stative predicates (44b).
(44)

a. The journalists quoted the actors.
b. The journalists hated the actors.
Thus, Fiengo & Lasnik’s stative/eventive contrast has the same source as

the stative/eventive contrast we saw in Chapter 4. Statives have special
requirements regarding substantivity.

5.7 Conjoined names and partitioning
Sabato & Winter (2010) base their argument that reciprocals require connectivity
(and don’t themselves license partitioned interpretations) on examples like (45),
repeated from above. They point to the fact that (45a) is a felicitous description of
the scenario in (46) but (45b) is not, as evidence that the partitioned
interpretation only comes about via implicit quantification which is possible with
the definite plural in (45a) but not in (45b) with conjoined names.
(45)

a. The planks are stacked atop each other.
b. Planks 1, 2, 3, and 4 are stacked atop each other.
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(46)

Plank 1
Plank 2

Plank 3
Plank 4

The cumulative/WR account has no explanation of the contrast in (45). Both are
predicted to be acceptable. Instead, this section will investigate pragmatic (§5.7.1)
and processing (§5.7.2) effects that might be associated with conjoined names.
Rather than seeing the conjoined names case as showing us the reciprocal’s true
character when it comes to partitioning (as Sabato & Winter (2010) assume), I
argue that a conjoined name antecedent should be expected to have effects of its
own that can explain the preference for non-partitioned interpretations.
5.7.1 Conjoined names and pragmatics
It has been observed that conjoined names resist nonmaximal interpretations
(Brisson 1998:50-51). Consider Brisson’s examples in (47). If we assume that the
subjects of the sentences in (47) are coreferent, a difference between them is that
it is much easier for (47a) to describe a situation where one of the girls happened
to not eat a sandwich. This seems to be a Gricean effect – as Brisson puts it, ‘if we
went to all the trouble of mentioning Alice, Betty, Carmen and Diane by name, it
is hard to exclude them’.
(47)

a. The girls ate a sandwich.
b. Alice, Betty, Carmen and Diane ate a sandwich.
In Brisson’s system, listing the names like this favours a cover that does

not exclude any of the individuals. If it is distributive, each girl occupies a
singleton set of the cover. If it is collective, {a,b,c,d} is a cell. Brisson’s suggested
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Gricean explanation is that if you had in mind a cover that excluded one of the
individuals, it would be more cooperative to not name them.
Dalrymple et al. (1998:168) claim that there is a difference between the
sentences in (48), such that (48b) allows less imprecision (i.e. it disallows
nonmaximality): ‘the reciprocal is interpreted more strictly when its antecedent
group is referred to by listing the members’. They claim that both sentences have
the semantics of SR, but only (48a) can be interpreted imprecisely18.
(48)

a. The men were hitting each other.
b. John, Paul, George, Ringo and Stu were hitting each other
These observations by Brisson and Dalrymple et al. do not help with

Sabato & Winter’s planks example. The planks example does not involve
nonmaximality; rather the issue is that conjoined names seem to rule out a
partitioned interpretation.
I think that it is likely that conjoined names are associated with a number
of pragmatic effects. Not only does listing names discourage nonmaximality, but
we might also expect that enumerating the individuals in this way leads the
hearer to expect that the individuals are going to form a single substantive
plurality. The next section will look at evidence from psycholinguistics that
conjoined DPs are associated with conceptual representations distinct from those
associated with simple definite plurals.
We should expect that any such pragmatic effects should be able to be
overridden, and example (49), from Schwarzschild (1996:54) shows that this is
18

I disagree; I don’t think example (b) requires there to be hitting going on between each pair.
But I agree that there is a contrast between (a) and (b) with respect to the point made by Brisson:
only (a) allows for some man not to take part.
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the case19 – the partitioned construal is available despite the fact that the
antecedent consists of conjoined names20.
(49)

Despite their current membership in a common market, only 50 years ago,
Germany, England, France and Italy were battling each other in one of the
worst wars in history.

5.7.2 Psycholinguistics and plural DPs
There has been a considerable amount of research on the processing of plurals
and anaphora (e.g. Albrecht & Clifton 1998; Kaup et al. 2002; Moxey et al. 2004).
In particular, much of this work has argued that studying anaphora resolution
gives us an insight into the conceptual representation associated with the
referents of plural DPs.
Consider the ‘split antecedent’ discourse in (50). The first sentence
introduces two individuals, and the second sentence has pronominal reference
back to either one or both of them. Work in this area has found evidence of a
‘conjunction cost’ associated with using a singular pronoun in discourses like
(50). It is argued that the conjoined subject is associated with a particular
conceptual representation: it is a Complex Reference Object (CRO) (Sanford &
Moxey 1995; Moxey et al. 2004). Referring back to one of the atomic individuals
with a singular pronoun incurs a cost either because of difficulty associated with

19

Notice that this sentence is much more complicated than Sabato & Winter’s planks example
(45), with the contrast between the present and the past. This is possibly related to the contrast
examples to be discussed in §5.8.
20

This example is fine on Sabato & Winter’s account because it describes a connected scenario. Its
relevance to my account is that whatever pragmatic effects may be associated with conjoined
names, they are (as is to be expected) able to be overridden.
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decomposing the CRO, or possibly because the CRO is in discourse focus and the
individual parts are not (Moxey et al. 2004).
(50)

Amy and Ben went out. {They/She} had a nice day.
Moxey et al. claim that the individuals parts of a CRO generally share a

role21 in the discourse; grouping individuals in a CRO ‘decreases the degree to
which the individuals are distinguished from one another in the mental
representation of the discourse, and increases the likelihood of readers inferring
that the …individuals will be involved in a common activity’ (2004:351).
In a discourse like (50), the fact that Amy and Ben are introduced by a
conjoined DP and share a thematic role is argued to be the basis for constructing
a CRO. Work in this area has looked at other factors such as ontological
homogeneity (Koh & Clifton 2002), shared location and goals (Carreiras 1997;
Kaup & Kelter 2002) and symmetry (Koh & Clifton 2002).
Patson & Ferreira (2009), Patson & Warren (2011) and Huffman (2011)
show that CROs – but not undifferentiated plural objects (e.g. the mental
representations associated with plural DPs like the lovers, the two lovers) – block
the garden path effect in sentences like (51b)22.
(51)

a. After Jose and the bride signaled the party began in earnest.
b. After Jose and the bride kissed the party began in earnest.

As shown in Figure 28, the idea is that a CRO has ‘pointers’ to the individuals.
This means that when the processor hits a verb like kissed, with ambiguous
21
22

This is possibly but not necessarily a thematic role.
From Ferreira & McClure (1997)
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argument structure (either intransitive (i.e. reciprocal) or transitive), the
individuals in the CRO are immediately available to satisfy the thematic roles of
the reciprocal argument structure. In contrast, an undifferentiated plural object
has no pointers, so cannot immediately satisfy those thematic roles, which leads
to the garden-path effect of taking the following DP as object. As we have seen,
conjunction is one way of introducing a CRO; as Patson & Warren (2011) show,
differentiating the individuals (two cats, one of whom was white) is another way.

Figure 28: Complex reference object (Patson & Warren 2011)

Figure 29: Undifferentiated plural object
Work in this area provides evidence that different kinds of DP23 are
associated with different conceptual representations, and/or different numbers
of available referents. CROs differ from undifferentiated plural objects in that the
23

My focus here is on the question of conjoined DPs vs. definite plurals, but Patson and
colleagues show that non-structural differences are also relevant (e.g. differentiating the
individuals can create a CRO; they also show (Patson & Warren 2011) that the garden-path effect
is blocked in sentences where the subject is an anaphor, if that anaphor refers back to
differentiated individuals) .
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individuals within the CRO are available referents, while those referred to by an
undifferentiated plural are not (as shown by Patson and colleagues). But CROs
also have the entire group as a possible referent (even a preferred referent, as in
split-antecedent cases). It seems that CROs have a dual nature: compared with
undifferentiated plural objects, CROs are argued to ‘highlight distributivity
within a group’ (Patson & Warren 2014:419) but at the same time there is a lot of
evidence that CROs are constructed based on similarity between the members of
the group (Carreiras 1997; Kaup & Kelter 2002; Koh & Clifton 2002). These two
opposing tendencies are not in conflict; they can be seen as a result of the
complex structure of a CRO: simultaneously a group, and a set of individuals.
Now that we have seen some of the evidence that psycholinguists have
amassed regarding the conceptual representation of plural DPs, we can look at
the relevance of this work to Sabato & Winter’s examples in (52). Recall their
observation that the definite plural (52a) is a felicitous description of the scenario
in (53), while (52b) is not.
(52)

a. The planks are stacked atop each other.
b. Planks 1, 2, 3, and 4 are stacked atop each other.

(53)

Plank 1
Plank 2

Plank 3
Plank 4

The observation is that the CRO (the conjoined names) prefers to describe a
scenario where there is a single stack of planks. The undifferentiated plural
object (the planks) does not have as strong a preference in this regard. Why
should this be? If the conjoined names are associated with a CRO in the mental
model, and CROs characteristically involve a high degree of similarity between
their members, then this might lead to a preference for the individuals to all take
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part in the same event. In this case, an event corresponds to a stack; the problem
with (53) is that the individuals within the CRO are taking part in two distinct
events. In contrast, if the planks is represented as an undifferentiated plural object
then the individual planks are not represented, and there is thus no expectation
that the individual planks should have a high degree of similarity.
As a side note, the fact that Patson & colleagues’ experiments used
reciprocal verbs (like kissed) to investigate the conceptual representation
associated with plural DPs raises the question of whether/how this relates to
reciprocal sentences (with each other). Does this work make predictions about
how the form of the antecedent might affect the available interpretations of
unambiguously reciprocal sentences? First, it should be pointed out that from
their experiments, we cannot conclude anything in particular about reciprocal
verbs like kiss (for instance, it is tempting but incorrect to conclude that the
experiments show that reciprocal verbs have particular requirements regarding
the conceptual representation of their subjects). The garden-path effect (or its
blocking) has to do with whether, during online processing, the subject is
associated with a representation that allows immediate satisfaction of the
thematic role needs of a verb with ambiguous argument structure (i.e. kissed can
be transitive or intransitive/reciprocal). A CRO allows immediate satisfaction of
the intransitive/reciprocal thematic role needs, and blocks the garden path effect;
an undifferentiated plural object does not.
In a reciprocal sentence with each other, both CROs and undifferentiated
plural objects are suitable antecedents. But CROs probably make certain
interpretations more likely. As I outlined above, there may be a preference for
the individuals within the CRO to take part in the same event.
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5.8 The effect of contrast
The previous section suggested that conjoined names should be expected to have
certain pragmatic effects, and that Sabato & Winter’s (2010) examples should be
explained in this way. This section presents an argument against Sabato &
Winter’s claim that reciprocal sentences with conjoined name antecedents require
connected interpretations.
5.8.1 Conjoined names, partitioning and contrast
Consider the examples in (54), which add to Sabato & Winter’s examples some
participants taking part in a contrasting activity. These sentences felicitously
describe the scenarios in Figure 30 and Figure 31.
(54)

a. Planks 1, 2, 3 and 4 are stacked on top of each other, while Planks 5,
6, 7 and 8 are leaning against each other.
b. In this photo, John, Paul, George and Ringo are looking into each
other's eyes, while Mick and Keith have their backs to each other.
1 -----------2 ------------

3 -----------4 ------------

5

6

7

8

Figure 30: Planks stacked on top of and leaning against each other

J⇔P
G⇔R

M K

Figure 31: A photo of the Beatles and some Rolling Stones
On Sabato & Winter’s (2010) account, this is quite unexpected. The added
linguistic material has not changed the anaphoric possibilities of the antecedent. I
see this as evidence against Sabato & Winter’s claim that reciprocal sentences
require connectivity.
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5.8.2 Statives, partitioning and contrast
Recall Fiengo & Lasnik’s observation that (55) is an infelicitous description of
scenario (56).
(55)

The men in the room like each other.

(56)

A↔B
C↔D

But it seems that sentence (57) can felicitously describe the scenario in (58), where
there is a contrast between the pairs of men inside and those outside24.
(57)
(58)

The men in the room like each other, but the ones outside hate each other.
A↔B
C↔D

E↔F
G↔H

The change in acceptability associated with adding the contrasting set of men
outside is not easily explained on a view such as Fiengo & Lasnik’s, where
partitioning is simply disallowed for stative predicates. Why should adding a
contrasting set of men have the effect of allowing partitioning? We might
reasonably expect that it would make it easier to partition the men into the two
groups of those inside and those outside. But something different is going on
here – the partitioning we are concerned with in scenario (58) is into the subsets
(i.e. pairs) of men in each place.

24

It works similarly with The men (=A+B+C+D) like each other and the women (=E+F+G+H) hate
each other.

251

5.8.3 Explaining the effect of contrast
As I have pointed out, the effect of contrast is unexpected on both Sabato &
Winter’s account and Fiengo & Lasnik’s. On my account, The men in the room like
each other does not allow the part-SR interpretation because of the constraint for
quantification over states. Any subevents must have participants who form a
substantive plurality. In this case that is all the men in the room, so each
subevent must contain all of them. This equals the non-partitioned SR
interpretation.
Now, when it comes to the example with the added contrast set of men
outside, I will not argue that the addition of the contrast set makes the pairs of
men into substantive pluralities. As was just mentioned, while we might expect
the men inside and the men outside to form substantive pluralities, there is no
reason to expect that the subsets (pairs) within each of these pluralities would
likewise be made substantive by the addition of the contrast set. Instead, I think
that the acceptability of this sentence in this scenario actually has nothing to do
with partitioning into pairs based on substantive pluralities. I don’t think that the
hearer need come up with a construal that involves partitioning into pairs at all,
in order to accept this sentence in this scenario. Rather, the contrast set
encourages a construal that goes no further than the pluralities of men inside,
and men outside. The sentence is about the men inside doing one thing, and the
men outside doing a different thing. On this view, the presence of contrast can
have the effect of encouraging a particularly underspecified construal.
The problem with this approach – where the presence of the contrast
makes the substantivity (or not) of the pairs of men irrelevant – is that it suggests
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that another construal ruled out by the requirement for substantivity should be
allowed: WR. If it is the case that the construal is as underspecified as I suggest,
we would wrongly predict that sentence (59) is true in scenario (60). Thus it
seems that not all requirements are ignored in the presence of contrast.

(59)

The men in the room like each other, but the ones outside hate each other.

(60)

<A,B>
<B,C>
<C,A>

<D,E>
<E,F>
<F,G>

I think it is reasonable to assume that a stative reciprocal is worse in a WR
scenario than in a part-SR scenario, (61). After all, if we can come up with some
way of having the pairs in the part-SR scenario be substantive, the scenario can
satisfy the constraint for quantification over states. In contrast, the WR scenario
involves three overlapping states (as argued in Chapter 4, this makes it difficult
to see them as three separate situations). It only consists of three states, none of
which has participants which are a substantive plurality. According to my
intuitions, the sentence The men like each other is completely infelicitous in the WR
scenario in (61), but merely questionable in the part-SR scenario.
(61)

WR scenario:
Part-SR scenario:

A likes B, B likes C, C likes A
A+B like each other, C+D like each other

If there is this difference in how far the two scenarios are from satisfying the
substantivity requirements, then perhaps we have an explanation for why the
scenario in (60) is not rendered acceptable by the presence of contrast. The
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contrast allows a certain relaxation of the substantivity requirements, but WR is
too far from being felicitous to be allowed.
As for Sabato & Winter’s conjoined name examples (The planks/Planks 1, 2,
3 and 4 are stacked atop each other), recall that on my account the problem with
their original examples is that there are certain pragmatic effects associated with
conjoined names. In particular, and related to the work on complex reference
objects we saw in §5.7.2, I suggested that we might expect the version with
conjoined names to prefer to describe a scenario where the four planks have a
high degree of similarity (for instance, where they take part in the same event). In
this case, a stack is equivalent to an event. Now, consider the effect of adding the
contrasting set of planks:
(62)

Planks 1, 2, 3 and 4 are stacked on top of each other, while Planks 5,
6, 7 and 8 are leaning against each other.
1 -----------2 ------------

3 -----------4 ------------

5

6

7

8

Figure 32: Planks stacked on top of and leaning against each other
Now we are talking about 8 planks. They are split into two substantive
pluralities: the stacked, and the leaning. If conjoined names prefer interpretations
where the conjuncts form a substantive plurality (or exhibit a high degree of
similarity, e.g. by all taking part in the same event), this scenario satisfies that
requirement. This is because now the scenario can be construed as involving two
events: one consists of all the stacked planks; the other consists of all the leaning
planks. Previously (in the original example from Sabato & Winter), each stack
was construed as a separate event. The effect of introducing the contrasting set of
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leaning planks is to enable this scenario to be viewed as two larger events: the
stacking event (which includes both stacks) and the leaning event (which
includes both leaning configurations). Thus, the CROs associated with the
conjoined name antecedents in (62) can have their preference for having the
individual conjuncts take part in the same event satisfied in the scenario in
Figure 32.

5.9 Conclusion
The first part of the chapter focused on the preference for a reciprocal sentence to
describe ‘one general event’. It was argued that this reflects a general preference
for economy: not only reciprocals and plural sentences (as predicted by Fiengo &
Lasnik (1973) and Moltmann (1992), as well as the collective preference we saw
in Chapter 4) but also sentences with quantification (e.g. each) prefer to describe
one occasion.
The second part of the chapter looked at proposals to limit partitioned
interpretations for reciprocal sentences. We saw that restrictions on partitioned
interpretations for stative reciprocal sentences arise from the same source as the
restrictions on WR discussed in Chapter 4: statives have special requirements
regarding substantivity, as captured by Kratzer’s constraint for quantification
over states. As for Sabato & Winter’s (2010) claim that apparent partitioned
interpretations of reciprocal sentences are all attributable to the anaphoric
properties of particular antecedents, I argue that conjoined name antecedents do
not provide a neutral way of ascertaining the reciprocal’s true capabilities
regarding partitioning (as Sabato & Winter assume). I show that adding a
contrasting set of individuals/events makes available a previously dispreferred
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partitioned interpretation, and argue that the current account (which allows for
the possibility of partitioned interpretations) can explain the effect of contrast
better than previous accounts (which rule them out).
Overall this chapter, and this dissertation, have argued that the
cumulative/WR semantics gives rise to the appropriate reciprocal interpretations,
as long as it is supplemented by certain extragrammatical preferences.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has argued that the various interpretations of reciprocal
sentences all arise from a single semantic representation equivalent to WR. In
contrast to most contemporary accounts of the semantics of reciprocals, it does
not see a place for the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH).
The dissertation began with an investigation of SMH-type approaches.
Chapter 2 presented the results of two eye movement studies which failed to find
evidence that the processor by default commits to a strong interpretation of
reciprocal sentences during online sentence processing. These null results fit with
previous studies that suggest that language users do not commit to the strong
readings predicted by the SMH.
The rest of the dissertation assumes that all reciprocal interpretations arise
from a cumulative semantic representation equivalent to WR. The need for an
SMH is obviated by the influence of various economy principles and
substantivity requirements.
There are two main problems for the WR account: interpretations weaker
than WR, and interpretations that are necessarily stronger than WR. Chapter 3
addressed the issue of interpretations weaker than WR (chain interpretations). It
was argued that approaches that assign chain reciprocals truth conditions
weaker than WR (e.g. Dalrymple et al. 1998, Sabato & Winter 2012) fail to
account for the variability in acceptability judgements of sentences with
antecedents denoting two individuals. In contrast, such variability is a natural
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consequence of an approach where chain interpretations arise via pragmatic
weakening from the WR semantics.
Chapter 4 defended the WR semantics against the opposite problem: cases
where reciprocal sentences are necessarily interpreted more strongly than WR. It
argued that despite the weak truth conditions of the cumulative semantic
representation, extragrammatical preferences for natural groupings and
uniformity result in stronger interpretations than required by the semantics.
Experiment 3 showed that reciprocals and other plural sentences show a
tendency for stative predicates to resist cumulative/WR interpretations. I argued
that Kratzer’s constraint for quantification over states could explain why statives
resist WR readings, and why reciprocals show this tendency more strongly than
other plural sentences.
Chapter 4 looked at cumulative semantic representations of reciprocal and
other plural sentences from the perspective of sentence processing. It argued that
economy preferences at the level of the mental representation of discourse favour
positing that a plural sentence is associated with a single event. For plural
sentences, that equates to a preference for collective interpretations. For
reciprocals, that single event must have subevents that via cumulativity satisfy
the WR truth conditions (as well as the reciprocal’s non-identity condition). But
there is little proof that the processor must fully instantiate those subevents in all
cases. When the processor is called upon to fully instantiate those subevents,
certain scenario types (i.e. SR) are attractive because they are economical – not in
terms of the number of events posited, but rather in the way that each individual
takes part in the event in the same way (I call this a preference for uniformity).
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Chapter 5 focused on two challenges to the cumulative account: the
preference for a single occasion, and limits on partitioning. As we saw earlier in
the dissertation, by their very nature cumulative semantic representations are
always in danger of overpredicting available interpretations. Chapter 4 proposed
that economy preferences and substantivity requirements act to limit the
available interpretations, and Chapter 5 argued likewise. The preference for a
reciprocal sentence to describe ‘one general event’ was argued to reflect a general
preference for economy in representation. Restrictions on partitioned
interpretations for stative predicates were argued to arise from the same source,
potentially, as the restrictions on WR discussed in Chapter 4: statives have
special requirements regarding substantivity, as captured by Kratzer’s constraint
for quantification over statives. The chapter addressed Sabato & Winter’s (2010)
proposal that reciprocal sentences require connected interpretations, and only
receive apparent partitioned interpretations via the anaphoric possibilities of the
antecedent. This proposal is a strong attack on cumulativity. I argued that Sabato
& Winter’s examples have another explanation (pragmatic effects associated with
conjoined names), and showed that examples predicted by Sabato & Winter not
to allow partitioned interpretations actually become acceptable when a
contrasting set of individuals/events is introduced.
This dissertation has argued that reciprocal sentences are a kind of plural
sentence. Apart from the non-identity condition, we should not expect to have to
say anything special about reciprocals – the cumulative semantics that gives rise
to interpretations of other plural sentences is enough.
The dissertation has argued that the cumulative semantics radically
underspecifies, and that in order to arrive at an interpretation, the language
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processor makes use of economy principles at the level of the mental model. The
processor also must make decisions about the substantiveness of various
pluralities. There is no need for a SMH to select among possible reciprocal
meanings. The cumulative/WR semantics, supplemented by extragrammatical
preferences, gives rise to the appropriate interpretations.
This dissertation has used psycholinguistic evidence and processing
considerations in order to ask questions about where the grammar ends and nongrammatical influences on interpretation begin. It has presented an argument
that the task of assigning interpretations to reciprocal sentences does not require
a principle like the SMH. It argued that effects claimed to be due to the SMH
could instead arise from a set of extragrammatical preferences.
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APPENDIX
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
Experiment 1A: SR default questionnaire pilot
1. I saw a group of kids playing. The kids hit each other on the arm. Each kid hit
{every other kid / one of the other kids.}
2. The team was training at the gym. The players helped each other with the
various machines. Each player helped {every other player / one of the other
players.}
3. Yesterday, nominations closed for the employee award. The clerks nominated
each other secretly. Each clerk nominated {every other clerk / one of the other
clerks.}
4. There were a bunch of journalists at the conference. The journalists quoted
each other approvingly. Each journalist quoted {every other journalist / one of
the other journalists.}
5. A few people took part in the 'Interview experiment'. The participants
interviewed each other while being recorded. Each participant interviewed
{every other participant / one of the other participants.}
6. The biologist watched the family of gorillas. The gorillas fed each other fruit.
Each gorilla fed {every other gorilla /one of the other gorillas.}
Experiment 1: SR default eye movement study
1.
a. I saw a group of kids playing. Each kid hit every other kid. The kids
hit each other on the arm.
b. I saw a group of kids playing. The kids hit each other on the arm. Each
kid hit every other kid.
c. I saw a group of kids playing. Each kid hit one of the other kids. The
kids hit each other on the arm.
d. I saw a group of kids playing. The kids hit each other on the arm. Each
kid hit one of the other kids
2. The team was training at the gym.
a/c. Each player helped {every other player/one of the other players}. The
players helped each other with the various machines.
b/d. The players helped each other with the various machines. Each
player helped {every other player/one of the other players}.
3. All the clerks were filling in forms.
a/c. Each clerk nominated {every other clerk/one of the other clerks}. The
clerks nominated each other secretly.
b/d. The clerks nominated each other secretly. Each clerk nominated
{every other clerk/one of the other clerks}.
4. Those four workers were talking to the boss.
a/c. Each worker praised {every other worker/one of the other workers}.
The workers praised each other loudly.
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b/d. The workers praised each other loudly. Each worker praised {every
other worker/one of the other workers}.
5. There were a bunch of journalists at the meeting.
a/c. Each journalist quoted {every other journalist/one of the other
journalists}. The journalists quoted each other approvingly.
b/d. The journalists quoted each other approvingly. Each journalist
quoted {every other journalist/one of the other journalists}.
6. All the participants were in the room.
a/c. Each participant interviewed {every other participant/one of the
other participants}. The participants interviewed each other briefly.
b/d. The participants interviewed each other briefly. Each participant
interviewed {every other participant/one of the other participants}.
7. The biologist watched the family of gorillas.
a/c. Each gorilla fed {every other gorilla/one of the other gorillas}. The
gorillas fed each other fruit.
b/d. The gorillas fed each other fruit. Each gorilla fed {every other
gorilla/one of the other gorillas}.
8. Nina saw five little girls on the sofa.
a/c. Each girl tickled {every other girl/one of the other girls}. The girls
tickled each other happily.
b/d. The girls tickled each other happily. Each girl tickled {every other
girl/one of the other girls}.
9. The pack of dogs played in the park.
a/c. Each dog bit {every other dog/one of the other dogs}. The dogs bit
each other playfully.
b/d. The dogs bit each other playfully. Each dog bit {every other dog/one
of the other dogs}.
10. The six contestants waited for the results.
a/c. Each contestant hugged {every other contestant/one of the other
contestants}. The contestants hugged each other nervously.
b/d. The contestants hugged each other nervously. Each contestant
hugged {every other contestant/one of the other contestants}.
11. The panel of judges met yesterday.
a/c. Each judge questioned {every other judge/one of the other judges}.
The judges questioned each other harshly.
b/d. The judges questioned each other harshly. Each judge questioned
{every other judge/one of the other judges}.
12. I watched the litter of kittens.
a/c. Each kitten cleaned {every other kitten/one of the other kittens}. The
kittens cleaned each other thoroughly.
b/d. The kittens cleaned each other thoroughly. Each kitten cleaned
{every other kitten/one of the other kittens}.
13. All the suspects were at the station.
a/c. Each suspect identified {every other suspect/one of the other
suspects}. The suspects identified each other by sight.
b/d. The suspects identified each other by sight. Each suspect identified
{every other suspect/one of the other suspects}.
14. All the nominees were on the stage.
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a/c. Each nominee thanked {every other nominee/one of the other
nominees}. The nominees thanked each other personally.
b/d. The nominees thanked each other personally. Each nominee thanked
{every other nominee/one of the other nominees}.
15. Everyone in the room was angry.
a/c. Each person annoyed {every other person/one of the other people}.
The people annoyed each other accidentally.
b/d. The people annoyed each other accidentally. Each person annoyed
{every other person/one of the other people}.
16. All the boys were telling riddles.
a/c. Each boy tricked {every other boy/one of the other boys}. The boys
tricked each other easily.
b/d. The boys tricked each other easily. Each boy tricked {every other
boy/one of the other boys}.
17. The five models were unhappy.
a/c. Each model criticized {every other model/one of the other models}.
The models criticized each other viciously.
b/d. The models criticized each other viciously. Each model criticized
{every other model/one of the other models}.
18.All the children hid, unsuccessfully.
a/c. Each child spotted {every other child/one of the other children}. The
children spotted each other quickly.
b/d. The children spotted each other quickly. Each child spotted {every
other child/one of the other children}.
19. Six cars were involved in the accident.
a/c. Each driver cursed at {every other driver/one of the other drivers}.
The drivers cursed at each other angrily.
b/d. The drivers cursed at each other angrily. Each driver cursed at {every
other driver/one of the other drivers}.
20. The art class did portraits today.
a/c. Each student drew {every other student/one of the other students}.
The students drew each other in crayon.
b/d. The students drew each other in crayon. Each student drew {every
other student/one of the other students}.
Experiment 2: Chain/non-chain eye movement study
1.
a/b. At noon,| the children |followed |{each other/the teacher}
through the door | and into the classroom.
c/d. As soon as the teacher left the room,| the children | teased | {each
other/the visitor} meanly | and made a lot of noise.
2.
a/b. When the bell rang,| the biologists | followed | {each other/the
speaker} into the auditorium | for the lecture.
c/d. When the manuscript was printed out, | the editors | teased |{each
other/the intern} about the spelling | errors.
3.
a/b. To receive their awards,| the players | lined up behind |{each
other/the stage} and waited |very patiently.
c/d. When the problem arose,| the nurses | helped |{each other/the
patient} and showed |great professionalism.
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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

a/b. In the photo of the fairground, |the customers | are lined up
behind |{each other/the gates} waiting |to enter.
c/d. Last night,| the lawyers |helped |{each other/the client} in
preparation| for the big case.
a/b. As all the owners watched,| the dogs |chased| {each other/the
squirrel} out of the park | and across the street.
c/d. Right before the important race,| the cyclists | observed | {each
other/the coach} closely | as the crowd roared.
a/b. When the zookeeper opened the door,| the hawks | chased |
{each other/the pigeon} up into the sky,| unfortunately.
c/d. When the blueprints arrived,| the engineers | observed |{each
other/the builder} while the boss | looked at the plans.
a/b. When Dave mopped the floor,| the chairs | were stacked on top
of |{each other/the table} so nothing |was in the way.
c/d. When they were all in the store,| the teenagers | insulted | {each
other/the clerk} and somebody | called the manager.
a/b. When Chris got home,| the packages| were stacked on top of|
{each other/the counter} neatly | so he was relieved.
c/d. After the final siren sounded,| the fans | insulted | {each other/the
referee} obnoxiously | and loudly.
a/b. When we got there,| the boxes |were placed inside |{each
other/the crate} so they didn't |take up too much space.
c/d. When they all reached the summit,| the hikers | photographed
|{each other/the scenery} with disposable | cameras.
a/b. When Karen moved,| the bowls |were placed inside {each
other/the carton} and protected | with crumpled newspaper.
c/d. When the lights came on,| the artists | photographed| {each
other/the statue} from across | the room.
a/b. As the mother cat watched,| the kittens | ran after |{each
other/the mouse} and tumbled |down the stairs.
c/d. When the boss asked for comments,| the managers | complimented
|{each other/the janitor} in an insincere | manner.
a/b. When Kim said "Go",| the girls | ran after | {each other/the
horse} as fast | as they could.
c/d. When the faculty meeting started,| the professors | complimented
|{each other/the guest} before starting | to work.
a/b. The last time Mike was at the site,| the planks | were lying on top
of |each other/the pipes} in a disorganized |way.
c/d. Today at the meeting,| the neighbors | complained about| {each
other/the factory} while the mayor | read the newspaper.
a/b. When we arrived,| the fallen trees |were lying on top of |{each
other/the vehicle} as the wind | continued to howl.
c/d. After the boss suggested a compromise,| the workers |
complained about | {each other/the factory} just like | always.

Experiment 3: Stative/Eventive questionnaire
1.
a/b. There were three kids in the yard: Stacey, Mark and Leah.
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Stacey {liked/hit} Mark. Mark {liked/hit} Leah. And Leah {liked/hit}
Stacey.
c/d. There were three girls and three boys in the yard. Missy {liked/hit}
Tom. Anne-Marie {liked/hit} Carl. And Caroline {liked/hit} David.
a/b. Description: The kids {liked/hit} each other.
c/d. Description: The girls {liked/hit} the boys.
a/b. There were three baseball players at the gym: Bill, Jerry and Dave.
Bill {knew about/helped} Jerry. Jerry {knew about/helped} Dave. And
Dave {knew about/helped} Bill.
c/d. There were three athletes at the gym: Steve, Will and Eric. And there
were three celebrities: Paris, Britney and Madonna. Steve {knew
about/helped} Paris. Will {knew about/helped} Britney. And Eric {knew
about/helped} Madonna.
a/b. Description: The baseball players {knew about/helped} each other.
c/d. Description: The athletes {knew about/helped} the celebrities.
a/b. There were three boys: Jason, Tim and Louis. Jason
{believed/recommended} Tim. Tim {believed/recommended} Louis. And
Louis {believed/recommended} Jason.
c/d. There were three boys and three girls. Jason
{believed/recommended} Sarah. Tim {believed/recommended} Maria.
And Louis {believed/recommended} Angela.
a/b. Description: The boys {believed/recommended} each other.
c/d. Description: The boys {believed/recommended} the girls
a/b. There were three girls: Emily, Anna and Lizzie. Emily
{appreciated/criticized} Anna. Anna {appreciated/criticized} Lizzie. And
Lizzie {appreciated/criticized} Emily.
c/d. There were three girls: Amelia, Michelle and Carrie. And there were
three teachers: Mr. Waters, Ms. Clayton and Ms. Williams. Amelia
{appreciated/criticized} Mr. Waters. Michelle {appreciated/criticized} Ms.
Clayton. And Carrie {appreciated/criticized} Ms. Williams.
a/b. Description: The girls criticized each other.
c/d. Description: The girls appreciated the teachers
a/b. The magazine had three journalists at the press conference: Brown,
Stewart and Mulligan. Brown {hated/quoted} Stewart. Stewart
{hated/quoted} Mulligan. And Mulligan {hated/quoted} Brown.
c/d. The newspaper had three journalists at the press conference: Moore,
Martin and Thompson. And there were three actors: Tom Cruise, Brad Pitt
and Harrison Ford. Moore {hated/quoted} Tom Cruise. Martin
{hated/quoted} Brad Pitt. And Thompson {hated/quoted} Harrison Ford.
a/b. Description: The journalists hated each other.
c/d. Description: The journalists quoted the actors.
a/b. There were three staff members involved in the project: Stevenson,
Waters and Macdonald. {Stevenson respected Waters. Waters respected
Macdonald. And Macdonald respected Stevenson./ On Monday,
Stevenson contacted Waters. Waters contacted Macdonald. And
Macdonald contacted Stevenson. }
c/d. There were three staff members involved in the campaign: Stevens,
Wright and Collins. And there were three clients: Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones
and Mr. Brown. {Stevens respected Mr. Smith. Wright respected Mr. Jones.
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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

And Collins respected Mr. Brown./ On Monday, Stevens contacted Mr.
Smith. Wright contacted Mr. Jones. And Collins contacted Mr. Brown.}
a/b. Description: The staff members {respected/contacted} each other.
c/d. Description: The staff members {respected/contacted} the clients.
a/b. There were three songwriters: Lucy Hart, Georgie Donnelly, and
Shannon Rogers. Hart {envied/sued} Donnelly. Donnelly {envied/sued}
Rogers. And Rogers {envied/sued} Hart.
c/d. There were three songwriters: Melinda Young, Kevin Harris, and
Missy Turner. And there were three singers: Cher, Beyonce and Pavarotti.
Young {envied/sued} Cher. Harris {envied/sued} Beyonce. And Turner
{envied/sued} Pavarotti.
a/b. Description: The songwriters {envied/sued} each other.
c/d. Description: The songwriters {envied/sued} the singers.
a/b. There were three lawyers: Amy, Steven and Ian. {Amy
understood Steven. Steven understood Ian. And Ian understood Amy. /
On Thursday, Amy consulted Steven. Steven consulted Ian. And Ian
consulted Amy.}
c/d. There were three lawyers: Jesse, Mike and Robert. And there were
three judges: Judge Green, Judge Rubin and Judge Stickney. {Jesse
understood Judge Green. Mike understood Judge Rubin. And Robert
understood Judge Stickney./ On Thursday, Jesse consulted Judge Green.
Mike consulted Judge Rubin. And Robert consulted Judge Stickney.}
a/b. Description: The lawyers consulted each other.
c/d. Description: The lawyers understood the judges.
a/b. There were three women in the studio: Megan, Angela and
Kathryn. Megan {could hear/recorded} Angela talking. Angela {could
hear/recorded} Kathryn talking. And Kathryn {could hear/recorded}
Megan talking.
c/d. There were three technicians in the studio: Megan, Adam and Kate.
And there were three priests: Father O'Reilly, Father Buckley and Father
Masterson. Megan {could hear/recorded} Father O'Reilly talking. Adam
{could hear/recorded} Father Buckley talking. And Kate {could
hear/recorded} Father Masterson talking.
a/b. Description: The women {could hear/recorded} each other talking.
c/d. Description: The technicians {could hear/recorded} the priests
talking.
a/b. The experiment had three participants. Participant #1
{trusted/interviewed} participant #2. Participant #2 {trusted/interviewed}
participant #3. And participant #3 {trusted/interviewed} participant #1.
c/d. The experiment had three participants. And there were three lab
assistants: Frank, Greg and Danny. Participant #1 {trusted/interviewed}
Frank. Participant #2 {trusted/interviewed} Greg. And participant #3
{trusted/interviewed} Danny.
a/b. Description: The participants {trusted/interviewed} each other.
c/d. Description: The participants {trusted/interviewed} the lab assistants.
a/b. There were three criminals on the loose: 'Scarface' Lee, Dan
Mackenzie, and Billy Bowen. Scarface {feared/shot} Mackenzie.
Mackenzie {feared/shot} Bowen. And Bowen {feared/shot} Scarface.
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c/d. There were three criminals on the loose: Bill 'Bones' McGee, Jimmy
Knuckles, and Little Max Walker. And there were three police officers on
the case: Detective Cohen, Detective d'Erico and Sergeant Rafferty. McGee
{feared/shot} Detective Cohen. Jimmy Knuckles {feared/shot} Detective
d'Erico. And Walker {feared/shot} Sergeant Rafferty.
a/b. Description: The criminals {feared/shot} each other.
c/d. Description: The criminals {feared/shot} the police officers.
a/b. There were three friends: Sam, Chrissy and Adam. Sam
{loved/spotted} Chrissy. Chrissy {loved/spotted} Adam. And Adam
{loved/spotted} Sam.
c/d. There were three friends: Justin, Ingrid and Paul. And there were
three new people: Meg, Max and Miriam. Justin {loved/spotted} Meg.
Ingrid {loved/spotted} Max. And Paul {loved/spotted} Miriam.
a/b. Description: The friends {loved/spotted} each other.
c/d. Description: The friends {loved/spotted} the new people.
a/b. The school had three bullies: Annie, Mike and Louise. Annie {was
scared of/betrayed} Mike. Mike {was scared of/betrayed} Louise. And
Louise {was scared of/betrayed} Annie.
c/d. The school had three bullies: Chris, Mike and Amy. And there were
three hall monitors: Monitor Stanley, Monitor Owen and Monitor
Madison. Chris {was scared of/betrayed} Monitor Stanley. Mike {was
scared of /betrayed} Monitor Owen. And Amy {was scared of /betrayed}
Monitor Madison.
a/b. Description: The bullies {were scared of/betrayed} each other.
c/d. Description: The bullies {were scared of/betrayed} the hall monitors.
a/b. There were three actors in the play: Luke, Michelle and Heather.
Luke {couldn’t stand/slapped} Michelle. Michelle {couldn’t
stand/slapped} Heather. And Heather {couldn’t stand/slapped} Luke.
c/d. There were three actors in the play: Patrick, Tony and Sylvie. And
there were 3 directors: the script director, the art director and the costume
director. Patrick {couldn't stand/slapped} the script director. Tony
{couldn't stand/slapped} the art director. And Sylvie {couldn't
stand/slapped} the costume director.
a/b. Description: The actors {couldn’t stand/slapped} each other.
c/d. Description: The actors {couldn't stand/slapped} the directors.

Experiment 4: Single event preference questionnaire
Items 1-12: The ‘bump’ class
1.
a/b. At 12.05 pm, the SUV bumped into the sedan, and the sedan
bumped into the SUV.
c/d. The SUV bumped into the sedan on Monday, and the sedan bumped
into the SUV on Thursday.
Description: {Those cars bumped into each other./Those cars each
bumped into the other.}
2.
a/b. Two players got in a fight in the first quarter, and both of them
ended up with broken bones.
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c/d. The goalie broke the forward's nose a few years ago, and in the finals
last year, the forward gave the goalie a concussion.
Description: {Those players injured each other./Those players each
injured the other.}
a/b. At the fair, Lisa and Paula went on the bumper-cars. Just after
they started, Lisa crashed into Paula, and Paula crashed into Lisa.
c/d. At the fair, Lisa and Paula went on the bumper-cars. Just after they
started, Lisa crashed into Paula. Then, just before the end, Paula crashed
into Lisa.
Description: {Those girls crashed into each other. / Those girls each
crashed into the other.}
a/b. At the meeting, Max and Walter got into a loud argument in front
of everybody. They were yelling.
c/d. At the meeting, Max yelled at Walter, and then afterwards Walter
yelled at Max.
Description: {Those men yelled at each other. / Those men each yelled at
the other.}
a/b. At noon on Monday, the cruise ship smashed into the ferry, and
the ferry smashed into the cruise ship.
c/d. When they were leaving the dock, the cruise ship smashed into a
ferry. Then, when they reached the open sea, the ferry smashed into the
cruise ship.
Description: {Those boats smashed into each other. / Those boats each
smashed into the other.}
a/b. The two boys had a pretend boxing match. The tall boy punched
the short boy on the arm, and the short boy punched the tall one on the
shoulder.
c/d. The tall boy punched the short boy on the arm. And then a while
later, the short boy punched the tall one.
Description: {Those boys punched each other. / Those boys each punched
the other.}
a/b. There was an accident at the cycle track this morning: the red bike
hit the blue bike, and the blue bike hit the red bike.
c/d. There were some accidents at the cycle track this week. The red bike
hit the blue bike on Tuesday. On Saturday, the blue bike hit the red bike.
Description: {Those bikes hit each other. / Those bikes each hit the other.}
a/b. The two criminals went outside to settle their argument. Scarface
smashed a garbage can over Slim's head, and Slim bashed Scarface's head
into a wall.
c/d. The two criminals have fought twice. First, Scarface smashed a
garbage can over Slim's head. A week later, Slim bashed Scarface's head
into a wall.
Description: {Those criminals beat each other up. / Those criminals each
beat the other up.}
a/b. Two kids damaged their go-karts during the race. They were
speeding out of control, and they collided.
c/d. Two kids damaged their go-karts recently. Max was speeding out of
control, and he hit Mike. The next day, Mike's brakes malfunctioned, and
he smashed full-speed into Max.
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Those kids ploughed into each other. / Those kids each ploughed into the
other.
a/b. Liz and Kelly were walking around in socks on the new carpet.
Then they touched, and got a jolt of static electricity.
c/d. Liz and Kelly were walking around in socks on the new carpet. Liz
rubbed her feet really fast on the floor, and then touched Kelly, giving her
a jolt of static electricity. Kelly got her back later: she did the same thing to
Liz.
Description: {Those girls jolted each other with static electricity./Those
girls each jolted the other with static electricity.}
a/b. At midnight, the two vandals took the riding mowers from the
shed. The guy on the green mower rammed into the guy on the red
mower, and at the same time the guy on the red mower rammed into the
guy on the green one.
c/d. At midnight, the two vandals took the riding mowers from the shed.
The guy on the green mower rammed into the guy on the red mower. And
then the guy on the red mower rammed into the guy on the green one.
Description: {Those vandals rammed into each other. / Those vandals
each rammed into the other.}
a/b. When Cameron and Jake went down the water-slide together,
Cameron slammed into Jake and Jake slammed into Cameron.
c/d. Cameron went down the water-slide and at the bottom he slammed
into Jake. Then Jake went down the slide, and slammed into Cameron.
Description: {Those boys slammed into each other./Those boys each
slammed into the other.}

Items 13-24: The ‘bite’ class
13.
a/b. Richardson sued Summers, and Summers sued Richardson. They
are both songwriters. It was a dispute about which of them wrote the hit
song.
c/d. Richardson sued Summers about 10 years ago, and then recently
Summers sued Richardson over another matter. They are both
songwriters.
Description: {Those songwriters sued each other./Those songwriters each
sued the other.}
14.
a/b. At kindergarten today, Melissa and David were pretending to be
dogs. She bit him, and he bit her.
c/d. Melissa bit David at kindergarten last week, and it seems he learned
the bad habit from her: he bit her this morning.
Description: {Those children bit each other./Those children each bit the
other.}
15.
a/b. Amy wanted to drive to Montreal, but she hates driving alone.
And Sarah needed to get to Montreal too, but she had no car and no
money. So Amy gave her a ride.
c/d. Sarah got Amy a ticket to a concert, and a few weeks later, Amy
loaned Sarah her Biology notes.
Description: {Those girls did each other a favor./Those girls each did the
other a favor.}
16.
a/b. Earlier, my friends Francis and Carly had to carry the heavy
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21.

22.

23.

suitcases to the car. Francis helped Carly, and Carly helped Francis.
c/d. My friend Francis helped my friend Carly carry some heavy suitcases
to the car. And then Carly helped Francis prepare dinner.
Description: {My friends helped each other./My friends each helped the
other.}
a/b. The biologist observed the two chimps sitting together, grooming.
The big chimp groomed the little one, and the little one groomed the big
one.
c/d. The biologist observed the big chimp grooming the little one. The
previous day, the little one had groomed the big one.
Description: {Those chimps groomed each other. /Those chimps each
groomed the other.}
a/b. Two little girls ended up with skinned knees. They were playing
jump rope, and somehow Eloise tripped Janie and Janie tripped Eloise.
c/d. Two little girls ended up with skinned knees. Eloise tripped Janie this
morning. Janie got her revenge: she tripped Eloise at lunch.
Description: {Those little girls tripped each other. / Those little girls each
tripped the other.}
a/b. At sunrise this morning the bird-watcher noticed that the male
robin fed the female, and the female fed the male.
c/d. This morning the bird-watcher noticed that the male robin fed the
female robin some worms. And this evening he noticed that the female fed
the male some bugs.
Description: {Those robins fed each other./Those robins each fed the
other.}
a/b. The mission was over: the agency spy spotted the foreign spy, and
the foreign spy spotted the agency spy.
c/d. At the crowded train station, the agency spy spotted the foreign spy.
And at the art museum, the foreign spy spotted the agency spy.
Description: {Those spies spotted each other./Those spies each spotted the
other.}
a/b. In the lead-up to the recent election, the governor endorsed the
senator, and the senator endorsed the governor.
c/d. Several years ago, the governor endorsed the senator. And in the
lead-up to the recent election, the senator endorsed the governor.
Description: {Those politicians endorsed each other./Those politicians
each endorsed the other.}
a/b. Immediately after they left the courtroom, the prosecutor
criticized the defense attorney, and the defense attorney criticized the
prosecutor.
c/d. Five years ago, the prosecutor criticized the defense attorney. Then,
after they clashed in a recent court case, the defense attorney criticized the
prosecutor.
Description: {Those lawyers criticized each other. / Those lawyers each
criticized the other.}
a/b. In June, Leo recommended Jenny for the employee-of-the-month
award, and Jenny recommended Leo.
c/d. In June, Leo recommended Jenny for the employee-of-the-month
award, and in July, Jenny recommended Leo.
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Description: {Those employees recommended each other./Those
employees each recommended the other.}
a/b. Even though Dr. Woods and Dr. Robinson were sick last week,
they didn't stay home. Instead, they went to work at the hospital as usual.
Dr. Woods treated Dr. Robinson, and Dr. Robinson treated Dr. Woods.
c/d. A couple of years ago, Dr. Woods treated Dr. Robinson for malaria.
And last week, Dr. Woods was sick with appendicitis, and Dr. Robinson
treated her.
Description: {Those doctors treated each other./Those doctors each
treated the other.}
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